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Abstract 
 
The objective of this PhD thesis work is the computational thermal hydraulic analysis of ITER and 
DEMO fusion reactors PHTSs; the performances of the cooling loops have been evaluated during 
normal operation pulsed condition (ITER) and accidental scenario (DEMO). 
 
The fusion reaction, which is at the basis of current tokamak machines, is briefly reported together 
with a description of the current design status for ITER and DEMO fusion reactors. Also some 
existing experimental facilities, aimed to test some of the fusion reactors cooling system features, 
are briefly presented. 
 
Then the ITER in-vessel components PHTS (IBED PHTS) is analyzed through the RELAP5 code 
during plasma pulse scenario. During the pulsed plasma operation, the pressure and temperature 
variation within the IBED PHTS shall be controlled and maintained within an acceptable range of 
values to avoid both potential dangerous pressure fluctuation within the circuit and thermal 
fatigue to the loop piping and equipment. A set of countermeasure to control the IBED PHTS 
pressure and temperature and mitigate their fluctuation during the plasma operation is simulated 
through RELAP5 and obtained results are shown and discussed.  
Finally, a temperature and pressure control strategy is proposed, also addressing possible 
criticalities to be carefully evaluated during the design activities. 
 
The reference PHTS layout for DEMO HCPB concept is analyzed, together with its auxiliaries 
systems, through a novel analytical method, the Functional Failure Mode and Effect Analysis at 
component level with evaluation of loss of function. The objective of the FMEA is to analyze the 
system and its functions and identify possible failure mode associated to the loss of function and 
hence define representative accidental scenarios to be further investigated. As result of this analysis 
a set of Postulated Initiating Events is identified and the possible accidental chain sequences 
discussed in detail, also specifying the severity of the events (e.g. Large and Small Break LOCA). 
 
Hence the DEMO PHTS ex-vessel LOCA, one of the identified Postulated Initiating Event in the 
FMEA, is analyzed by means of MELCOR code. The purpose of the analyses is to evaluate the 
influence of size and location of the break in terms of pressurization of the pressure confinement 
system of DEMO. 
In this section, together with the reference PHTS layout, an alternative loop configuration, whose 
design has been entirely developed within the thesis activities, is proposed and modeled. Here the 
dynamic behavior of the pressure and flow rate of the two PHTS layouts is compared, highlighting 
in which cases (i.e. for which break size and layout) mitigating actions, such as prompt loop 
isolation through safety valve activation or atmosphere detritiation, can be performed effectively. 
 
In the conclusions a rationale for the future fusion reactors PHTS is formulated on the basis of the 
consideration rising from the results collected in this work. Here The PHTS control strategy to be 
adopted to cope with the pulsed regime is discussed; some remarks on potential critical aspect 
associated to the pulsed operation are highlighted.  
Emphasis is given also to the preventive PHTS design features which might enhance the overall 
safety of the reactor. 
  
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
3 
Index 
 
 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................... 2 
Index ........................................................................................................................................................ 3 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................................................... 5 
Acronyms ................................................................................................................................................. 7 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. 9 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 11 
1.1 References ............................................................................................................................. 13 
2 Fusion Engineering and Tokamaks ................................................................................................ 14 
2.1 Fusion Reaction ..................................................................................................................... 14 
2.2 ITER ........................................................................................................................................ 17 
2.3 DEMO .................................................................................................................................... 28 
2.4 Main Differences between ITER and DEMO .......................................................................... 44 
2.5 The DEMO HCPB Concept ..................................................................................................... 45 
2.6 Fusion PHTS Experimental Facilities ...................................................................................... 46 
2.7 References ............................................................................................................................. 49 
3 Thermal Hydraulic Analysis of the ITER IBED PHTS ....................................................................... 51 
3.1 Description of the IBED PHTS system .................................................................................... 52 
3.2 ITER IBED PHTS LOOP MODELING ......................................................................................... 60 
3.3 Detailed Model Results ......................................................................................................... 71 
3.4 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 84 
3.5 References ............................................................................................................................. 85 
4 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis for DEMO HCPB concept .......................................................... 86 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 86 
4.2 Description of the Systems .................................................................................................... 89 
4.3 FMEA for DEMO HCPB concept ............................................................................................. 97 
4.4 Identified PIEs ...................................................................................................................... 104 
4.5 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 112 
4.6 References ........................................................................................................................... 113 
5 Thermal Hydraulic Analysis of the DEMO HCPB PHTS during an ex-vessel LOCA accidental 
scenario ............................................................................................................................................... 114 
5.1 HCPB DEMO concept - plant overview ................................................................................ 114 
5.2 Description of the nodalisations ......................................................................................... 126 
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
4 
5.3 Evaluation of influence of rupture size and location .......................................................... 131 
5.4 Comparison of the MELCOR models: HD001 case with thermal conductivity of TB walls . 153 
5.5 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 161 
5.6 References ........................................................................................................................... 163 
6 Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 165 
Annex I ................................................................................................................................................. 168 
FMEA Table ...................................................................................................................................... 168 
  
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
5 
List of Figures 
 
  
FIGURE 2.1: AVERAGE BINDING ENERGY FOR NUMBER OF NUCLEONS IN NUCLEUS (WIKIPEDIA, 
HTTPS://EN.WIKIPEDIA.ORG/WIKI/NUCLEAR_BINDING_ENERGY , 2015) ..................................................................... 14 
FIGURE 2.2: D-T REACTION ......................................................................................................................................... 15 
FIGURE 2.3: FUSION REACTION CROSS SECTION AS FUNCTION OF THE PARTICLE KINETIC ENERGY (KAYE&LABY, 2005) ................... 16 
FIGURE 2.4: ITER OVERVIEW (IO, 2015) ...................................................................................................................... 17 
FIGURE 2.5: SUPERCONDUCTING CABLE BEING SPOOLED AFTER PRODUCTION (IO, 2015) ........................................................ 18 
FIGURE 2.6: THE LARGE STAINLESS STEEL VACUUM VESSEL PROVIDES AN ENCLOSED, VACUUM ENVIRONMENT FOR THE FUSION 
REACTION (IO, 2015) ........................................................................................................................................ 19 
FIGURE 2.7: A CUT-AWAY OF THE ITER VACUUM VESSEL (IO, 2015).................................................................................. 19 
FIGURE 2.8: THE ITER VACUUM VESSEL WITH ITS 44 PORTS (IO, 2015) ............................................................................. 20 
FIGURE 2.9  BLANKET MODULES CUTAWAY (IO, 2015) ..................................................................................................... 21 
FIGURE 2.10: THE BLANKET SHIELD MODULE BM 11 THAT WILL BE PART OF THE ITER VV WALL (IO, 2015) ............................. 21 
FIGURE 2.11:  DIVERTOR OVERVIEW (IO, 2015) ............................................................................................................. 22 
FIGURE 2.12: THE THREE PLASMA-FACING COMPONENTS OF THE ITER DIVERTOR (IO, 2015).................................................. 22 
FIGURE 2.13: ITER ADDIONAL HEATING SYSTEMS (IO, 2015) ............................................................................................ 23 
FIGURE 2.14: ITER CRYOSTAT (IO, 2015) ..................................................................................................................... 24 
FIGURE 2.15: TORUS EXHAUST PUMPING SYSTEM GEOMETRY (IO, 2015) ............................................................................ 25 
FIGURE 2.16: ITER REMOTE HANDLING SYSTEM (IO, 2015)............................................................................................. 25 
FIGURE 2.17: THE "CLOSED DT LOOP" FUELLING CYCLE OF ITER (IO, 2015) ........................................................................ 26 
FIGURE 2.18: A DIAGRAM OF THE ITER COOLING WATER SYSTEM ...................................................................................... 27 
FIGURE 2.19: VIEW OF A TYPICAL TBM TEST PORT CELL ARRANGEMENT ............................................................................... 28 
FIGURE 2.20:  MAIN DEMO TOKAMAK SYSTEMS ............................................................................................................ 32 
FIGURE 2.21: SCHEMATICS OF THE FOUR BLANKET CONCEPTS ............................................................................................. 38 
FIGURE 2.22: HELOKA PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM .......................................................................................................... 47 
FIGURE 2.23: KATHELO PIPING LAYOUT ....................................................................................................................... 48 
FIGURE 3.1: TOKAMAK COOLING WATER SYSTEM OVERVIEW ............................................................................................ 53 
FIGURE 3.2: IBED PHTS OVERVIEW IN TCWS VAULT ...................................................................................................... 53 
FIGURE 3.3: IBED PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM (PFD), AREVA US (2011) ........................................................................... 55 
FIGURE 3.4: PRESSURIZER EIGHT -VOLUME MODEL WITH SPRAY INJECTION AND ELECTRICAL HEATERS ......................................... 63 
FIGURE 3.5: IBED LUMPED LOOP ................................................................................................................................. 66 
FIGURE 3.6: PLASMA POWER TO THE IBED PHTS AS FUNCTION OF THE TIME ....................................................................... 68 
FIGURE 3.7: IBED PHTS RELAP5 NODALIZATION ...................................................................................................... 70 
FIGURE 3.8: FLOW RATE VS. TIME IN SCENARIO#1 ........................................................................................................... 71 
FIGURE 3.9: FLOW RATE ACROSS THE INSURGE OF THE PRESSURIZER .................................................................................... 72 
FIGURE 3.10: PRESSURES BEHAVIOUR ALONG IBED PHTS FOR SCENARIO#1 ........................................................................ 73 
FIGURE 3.11: FLOW RATES DURING 10 PLASMA PULSE WITH SPRAY INJECTION AND HEATERS ACTIVATION ................................ 74 
FIGURE 3.12: FLOW RATE IN THE HEAT EXCHANGER AND IN THE BYPASS ............................................................................... 75 
FIGURE 3.13: DETAIL OF THE FLOW RATES IN ONE COOLING TRAIN (RED LINE), ONE BY-PASS (GREEN LINE) AND IN-VESSEL COMPONENT 
(BLUE LINE) ...................................................................................................................................................... 76 
FIGURE 3.14: FLOW RATE AT THE INSURGE OF THE PRESSURIZER ........................................................................................ 77 
FIGURE 3.15: TEMPERATURE OF PRIMARY AND SECONDARY SIDE OF HXS DURING TEN PLASMA PULSES ..................................... 78 
FIGURE 3.16: PRESSURE VS. TIME AT PUMP OUTLET AND DIVERTOR OUTLET .......................................................................... 79 
FIGURE 3.17: PRESSURE VS. TIME IN THE DETAILED SNAPSHOT OF IN-VESSEL (DIVERTOR) COMPONENTS ..................................... 80 
FIGURE 3.18: SURGE LINE TEMPERATURE DURING TEN PLASMA PULSE .................................................................................. 81 
FIGURE 3.19: SATURATION TEMPERATURE FOR STEAM/WATER IN THE PRESSURIZER ............................................................... 82 
FIGURE 3.20: PRESSURIZER LEVEL (IN METERS) DURING PLASMA PULSES ............................................................................... 83 
FIGURE 4.1: SAFETY RISK APPROACH (GULDEN & ALII, 2012) ............................................................................................ 88 
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
6 
FIGURE 4.2: BLANKET SYSTEM COMPONENTS TREE ........................................................................................................... 90 
FIGURE 4.3: SCHEME OF ONE BLANKET MODULE (CARLONI & KECSKES, HELIUM COOLED BLANKET DESIGN DEVELOPMENT, 2013) 91 
FIGURE 4.4: BLANKET OUTBOARD PHTS SIMPLIFIED PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM ...................................................................... 93 
FIGURE 4.5: BLANKET INBOARD PHTS SIMPLIFIED PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM ......................................................................... 93 
FIGURE 4.6: HCPB PHTS ........................................................................................................................................... 94 
FIGURE 4.7: FLOW DIAGRAM OF THE CPS PROCESS DEVELOPED FOR HCPB........................................................................... 95 
FIGURE 4.8: SECONDARY WATER COOLING SYSTEM ......................................................................................................... 96 
FIGURE 4.9: EXAMPLE OF FMEA TABLE FOR THE PHTS COLD LEG RING HEADER .................................................................. 108 
FIGURE 5.1: HCPB PROCESS FLOW DIAGRAM (PFD), SIMPLIFIED ...................................................................................... 116 
FIGURE 5.2A: ALTERNATIVE PHTS CONFIGURATION ....................................................................................................... 121 
FIGURE 5.3B: ALTERNATIVE PHTS CONFIGURATION  (COURTESY OF GUANGIMING ZHOU) ..................................................... 123 
FIGURE 5.4: DEMO SIMPLIFIED PLANT SKETCH .............................................................................................................. 124 
FIGURE 5.5: 48 NODALISATION SKETCH (LOCATION OF RUPTURE: HOT HEADER) .................................................................. 127 
FIGURE 5.6: 47+1 NODALISATION SKETCH .................................................................................................................... 128 
FIGURE 5.7: 10 NODALISATION SKETCH ........................................................................................................................ 129 
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
7 
Acronyms 
 
ACP Activated Corrosion Product 
ALARA  As Low As Reasonably Achievable 
BB Breeding Blanket 
BLK Blanket 
BoP  Balance of Plant 
BU  Breeder Unit (Blanket) 
CHF Critical Heat Flux 
CPS  Coolant Purification System 
CS  Central Solenoid 
CV Control Volume 
CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System 
CWS  Coolant Water System 
D Deuterium 
DCLL  Dual Coolant Lithium Lead (Blanket) 
DEMO Demonstration Fusion Power Plant 
DIV Divertor 
ECRH Electron Cyclotron Resonance Heating 
EFDA  European Fusion Development Agreement 
ELM  Edge-Localized Mode 
EM  Electromagnetic 
ENEA  Ente per le nuove tecnologie, l'energia e l'ambiente 
EST Environmental Source Term  
F4E  Fusion for Energy, Barcelona 
FMEA Failure Mode and Effect Analysis 
FPP  Fusion Power Plant 
FPY  Full Power Year 
FW  First Wall 
FZK  Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe (now KIT) 
H&CD  Heating and Current Drive 
HCLL  Helium Cooled Lithium Lead (Blanket) 
HCPB  Helium Cooled Pebble Bed (Blanket) 
HELOKA  Helium Loop Karlsruhe 
IAEA  International Atomic Energy Agency 
IB  Inboard 
IBED Integrated Blanket ELMs and Divertor 
IDM  ITER Document Management 
IFMIF International Fusion Material Experimental Facility 
IO ITER Organization 
ITER  International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor 
IVCs In-Vessel Components 
JET  Joint European Torus 
KIT  Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Germany (formerly FZK) 
LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident 
MC Monte-Carlo 
MMS  Multi-Module Segment (Blanket) 
MTTR  Mean Time To Repair 
NBI  Neutral Beam Injection 
NWL  Neutron Wall Loading 
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
8 
OB  Outboard 
ORNL  Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
PBS Plant Breakdown Structure 
PF  Poloidal Field 
PFM Plasma Facing Material 
PFC  Plasma Facing Component 
PHTS Primary Heat Transfer System 
PRZ Pressurizer 
PPCS  Power Plant Conceptual Study (EFDA_D_2JP3X3) 
RAFM  Reduced Activation Ferritic Martensitic (Steel) 
RAMI  Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Inspectability 
RH  Remote Handling 
RHE  Remote Handling Equipment 
SDC  Structural Design Criteria 
SFEAP  Safety and Environmental Assessment of Fusion Power 
T Tritium 
TBC  To be confirmed 
TBD  To be defined 
TBM  Test Blanket Module 
TBR  Tritium Breeding Ratio 
TCWS  Tokamak Coolant Water System 
TES  Tritium Extraction System 
TF  Toroidal Field 
TFC  Toroidal Field Coil 
TS  Thermal Shield 
VDE  Vertical Displacement Event (disruption) 
VV  Vacuum Vessel 
WC  Tungsten Carbide, water-cooled 
WCLL Water Cooled Lithium Lead 
  
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
9 
Acknowledgements 
 
We do not inherit the earth from our ancestors; 
   we borrow it from our children 
-Native Americans Dictum 
--- 
This work is dedicated to all the people who look at fusion technology as the key for a 
peaceful technological development for the entire human kind.  As man, I always 
thought my efforts should always aim to build a better society.  
The achievement of an almost unlimited source of power, theoretically available in every 
corner of the world, would contribute to enhance people life-conditions, especially in 
those countries where development both from the social and industrial point of view is 
still needed.  
Fusion can give us the opportunity, and the responsibility, to make the dream of a better 
future a reality.  
 
 
Nelson Mandela,  1918-2013 
--- 
Finally, to my mother Claudia: she instilled in me the capacity to (almost pacifically) 
fight for my ideas and my dreams. 
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
10 
  
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
11 
1 Introduction 
 
An international effort has been undertaken to demonstrate the feasibility of thermo-
nuclear fusion reaction to provide a new source for electricity generation. The main two 
projects lunched in the past years are the International Tokamak Experimental Reactor 
(ITER), currently under construction in France (IO, 2015), and the DEMOnstration 
Fusion Power Plant (DEMO) reactors (Romanelli, 2012).  
 
Two of the main objectives of ITER (IO, 2015) are: achieve robust plasma burning and 
validation of both fusion fuel cycle and additional heating systems. In turn, DEMO (G. 
Federici, 2014) represents the prosecution of the scientific and technological challenge 
of ITER, and shall demonstrate the suitability of the fusion power as a sustainable 
energy power source, also enabling fuel self-sufficiency, i.e. Tritium Breeding Ratio (TBR 
> 1) and assuring overall high plant availability (Bachmann, 2014). 
 
The heat coming from the fusion reaction (plasma) shall be removed in an efficient way 
to ensure the integrity of the in-vessel components (ITER, DEMO) and its transfer to the 
power generation system (DEMO). The exploitation of Fusion as energy source requires 
also the demonstration of the machine reliability during both normal and off-normal 
operational conditions, as well as a reduced impact in term of risk to the staff, to the 
public and to the environment well below the limits established by international 
committees and national safety authorities (Taylor, 2014). Therefore, a systematic 
safety analysis, similar to several analyses than in the past during the Power Plant 
Conceptual Study activities (Paci, 2003), has to follow the design development to 
demonstrate that: the safety objectives are met for each solution proposed and the 
possibility to detect abnormal operations of the machine.  
 
The goals of this work are two: to show the thermal-hydraulic behavior of the in-vessel 
components Primary Heat Transfer System (PHTS) of the ITER and DEMO reactors, both 
during normal and off-normal conditions; and to propose alternative solutions for the 
PHTSs design and the preventing/mitigating actions executed to enhance safety 
performances. For these purposes, the following work  can be subdivided into four parts, 
each covering a specific issue investigated. 
 
The ITER In-Vessel Components the PHTS is studied through a RELAP5 model, 
simulating both normal and off-normal conditions, to assess the thermal-hydraulic 
behavior of the circuit during transients. The ITER PHTS is a water closed system 
including four separate loops plus one spare for bake-up, with three separate 
distributions for the first wall/ blanket (FW/BLK) plus one distribution for the divertor 
(DIV). A pressurizer is connected to one hot horizontal manifold, located into the TCWS 
Vault, above the tokamak. The circuit operates at a pressure of 4 MPa and with 
inlet/outlet temperatures of 70 / 120 °C, which correspond to a power coming from the 
in-vessel components of about 960 MW. 
Since ITER operates in a pulsed regime, the expansion/contraction of large volume of 
water shall be accommodated within the pressurizer in such a way to avoid over-
pressurization of the circuit and a low water level within the pressurizer. 
The evaluation of pressure and temperature variations inside the pressurizer due to the 
thermal expansion of the coolant during a plasma pulse permits the definition of the 
required actions to mitigate the pressure fluctuation inside the system during normal 
operation scenarios.  
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The obtained results show that with an adequate “feed and bleed strategy” involving the 
Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) it is possible to achieve both goals. 
 
Safety analyses for ITER PHTSs have been also performed considering a double-hand 
guillotine ex-vessel Loss Of Coolant Accident (LOCA), which is one of the most 
challenging accidental scenario. Results of conservative thermal-hydraulic analyses 
carried on with RELAP5 code show that, during the first seconds after the accident 
occurrence, the variation of the pressurizer parameters (pressure and level) are quite 
decoupled from the rest of the cooling circuit. Therefore, the pressurizer signals are not 
able to provide reliable information to undertake mitigative actions to prevent the 
containment over-pressurization. For this purpose, an alternative leak detection system 
is proposed to detect any leakage from the PHTS and hence prevent aggravating 
sequences following an ex-vessel LOCA. 
 
Basis on ITER PHTS experience, a Functional Failure mode and Effect Analyses is carried 
on DEMO Helium Cooled Pebble Beds Breeding Blanket PHTS (Dalle Donne, 1994) to 
identify the Postulated Initiating Events associate to this concept. As results of this 
activity, the Ex-vessel LOCA scenario was identified of major concern in terms of safety, 
mainly due to the challenge to the second confinement barrier that the large release of 
primary coolant inside the Tokamak Building represents. 
 
Therefore, the DEMO Helium cooled PHTS current reference layout was analyzed 
through MELCOR code version 1.8.2 during an ex-vessel LOCA accident. The conceptual 
cooling strategy for the DEMO PHTS is based on the use of four independent cooling 
circuits distributed along the tokamak in a similar way to the ITER PHTS. However, due 
to the gaseous phase of the Helium coolant, almost the totality of the coolant is released 
within the containment in the first few seconds of the transients, eliminating the 
possibility to perform mitigative actions. As a consequence, the foreseen Expansion 
Volume (60000 m³, design pressure 0.2 MPa) for the He coolant is unable to 
accommodate the over-pressurization provided by the release, hence a possible 
radiological release to the environment may occur. 
 
An alternative layout for the DEMO PHTS is also proposed and analyzed. The needing of 
an alternative PHTS layout can be found on the high helium inventory of the reference 
solution, which poses several risks in terms of safety of the plant.  
The solution proposed adopts a segregation of the helium coolant into 16 independent 
cooling loops, which allows a sensible reduction on the inventory of He releasable 
during the ex-vessel LOCA sequence, practically keeping the same number and size of 
the equipment employed in the reference solution. The obtained results show that in the 
Expansion Volume (same of reference layout) the reached pressure peak values are not 
challenging the integrity of the confinement structures.  
 
Finally, some conclusions regarding the efficacy of a safety oriented preventive design, 
and the adoption of fusion specific mitigative measures are drawn. ITER experience 
shows that, during a LOCA, the possibility to segregate in time the releasable inventory 
as a key role in limiting the consequences in terms of safety. Therefore, the design of the 
DEMO PHTS should be inspired by the lesson learnt in the ITER project, and eventually 
adopt preventive design features to enhance the overall safety of the machine. The 
proposed features aimed to enhance the design robustness rely on passive-logic, such a 
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way to minimize as much as possible the human intervention during an accidental 
scenario. 
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2 Fusion Engineering and Tokamaks 
2.1 Fusion Reaction 
 
The fusion reaction is one of the most frequent and important reaction of the universe 
since it’s the source of heat, light and elements heavier than hydrogen, all essential 
actors for the existence of the life. Fusion consists of the union of two nuclei in one, 
which also implies the transmutation of one or two light elements (e.g. hydrogen) in a 
heavier one (e.g. helium). Figure 2.1 shows the average binding energy for number of 
nucleons in nucleus; it can be seen that the fusion of light (lighter than iron) nucleons 
leads to an energy gain, as well as  fission of heavy atoms (like uranium) . 
 
High energy is required to realize the fusion reaction between two nuclei since the 
electrical repulsion between particles with same electrical charge, the so called Coulomb 
barrier. To allow the fusion reaction the particles kinetic energy shall be high enough to 
overcome the Coulomb barrier and allow the domination of the strong nuclear forces 
(the one that keeps together protons and neutrons in the nucleus). If the energy to 
overcome the Coulomb barrier is provided by heating the particles, the reaction is called 
thermonuclear fusion.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Average Binding Energy for number of nucleons in nucleus (Wikipedia, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_binding_energy , 2015) 
 
The required kinetic energy to start the fusion reaction usually corresponds to such high 
temperatures (e.g. 100 MK within the core of the sun) that the positive and negative 
particles become unbounded and the fourth state of the matter is reached: the plasma. 
Globally, the plasma is electrically neutral, however, due to the free ions circulating 
within it, is an excellent electrical conductor and highly sensitive to magnetic fields. 
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The fuel for fusion has been selected by testing many different reactions (mainly light 
isotopes) and lead to the selections of a mixture of two hydrogen isotopes, deuterium 
(D) and tritium (T), which is the less complicated1 nuclear fusion reaction, at the lowest 
energy. Here after is reported the formula of the D-T reaction:  
 
𝑫𝟏
𝟐 + 𝑻𝟏
𝟑 → 𝑯𝒆 𝟐
𝟒 (𝟑. 𝟓 𝑴𝒆𝑽) + 𝒏 𝟎
𝟏 (𝟏𝟒. 𝟏 𝑴𝒆𝑽) (2-1) 
 
 
Figure 2.2: D-T Reaction 
 
This reaction is common in research, industrial and military applications, usually as a 
convenient source of neutrons. Deuterium is a naturally occurring isotope of hydrogen 
and is commonly available. The large mass ratio of the hydrogen isotopes makes their 
separation easy compared to the difficult uranium enrichment process. 
Tritium is a natural isotope of hydrogen, but due to its short half-life of 12.32 years, is 
hard to find, store, produce, and is expensive. Consequently, the deuterium-tritium fuel 
cycle requires the breeding of tritium from lithium using one of the following reactions:  
 
𝒏 𝟎
𝟏 + 𝑳𝒊𝟑
𝟔 → 𝑻𝟏
𝟑 + 𝑯𝒆 𝟐
𝟒  (2-2) 
 
𝒏 𝟎
𝟏 + 𝑳𝒊𝟑
𝟕 → 𝑻𝟏
𝟑 + 𝑯𝒆 𝟐
𝟒 + 𝒏 𝟎
𝟏  (2-3) 
 
The reactant neutron is supplied by the D-T fusion reaction shown above, and the one 
that has the greatest yield of energy. The reaction with 6Li is exothermic, providing a 
small energy gain for the reactor. The reaction with 7Li is endothermic but does not 
consume the neutron. At least some 7Li reactions are required to replace the neutrons 
lost to absorption by other elements.  
 
The reasons of the selection of such a mixture among others (e.g. D-D) are multiple and 
hereafter they are briefly summarized: 
                                                        
1 Prof. Nicola Cerullo, University of Pisa, in his Nuclear Fusion Reactor Engineering lessons always underlined that the adjective 
“easiest” it is not applicable to a fusion reaction on earth. 
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 Lower optimal fusion temperature T (see Figure 2.2) 
 and allow the formation of a new stable element (He) thanks to the strong 
nuclear forces, which keep together the protons and neutrons within the nucleus. 
 
Generally, the fusion of two elements lighter than the iron (see Figure 2.1) requires a 
considerable lower energy than the one generated by the fusion reaction itself, therefore 
the fusion reaction of such elements is exothermic and the energetic gain can be 
extremely high. Among the many reactions that occur in the stars, practically only the 
ones concerning the hydrogen isotopes are of interest for the exploitation of the fusion 
reaction as energy source for electricity production. In particular, the deuterium (D) – 
tritium (T) reaction presents two high desirable features: the energy required to 
overpass the Coulomb barrier is (relatively) low, 0.1 MeV, and the fusion cross section is 
(relatively) high if compared to the other possible fusion reactions among hydrogen and 
helium isotopes. Therefore the D-T mixture has been selected as fuel in many fusion 
reactors.  
 
 
Figure 2.3: Fusion reaction cross section as function of the particle kinetic energy (Kaye&Laby, 
2005) 
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2.2 ITER 
 
ITER (IO, 2015) is based on the 'tokamak' concept of magnetic confinement, in which the 
plasma is contained in a doughnut-shaped Vacuum Vessel (VV). The fuel - a mixture of 
Deuterium and Tritium, two isotopes of Hydrogen - is heated to temperatures in excess 
of 150 million °C, forming hot plasma. Strong magnetic fields are used to keep the 
plasma away from the walls; these are produced by superconducting coils surrounding 
the vessel, and by an electrical current driven through the plasma. Figure 2.4 shows a 3D 
model of the ITER reactor and its many auxiliary systems. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: ITER Overview (IO, 2015) 
 
In the following the various components which the tokamak and the External systems 
are made are briefly described (as reported in (IO, 2015)) in order to give a global vision 
of the various system necessary to achieve fusion with a high grade of safety during all 
the operation. 
 
2.2.1 Magnets  
 
The ITER Magnet System comprises: 
 18 superconducting Toroidal Field 
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 6 Poloidal Field coils 
 1 Central Solenoid 
 a set of Correction coils that magnetically confine, shape and control the plasma 
inside the Vacuum Vessel (VV) 
 
To mitigate highly energetic outbursts near the plasma edge, the so called Edge 
Localized Modes (ELMs), additional coil will be also installed to avoid loss of energy 
from plasma.  
Extremely high power is required to confine the plasma in the ITER VV through 
magnetic fields. Superconducting magnets are used for maximum efficiency and to limit 
energy consumption; (see Figure 2.5) such magnets lose their resistance when cooled 
down to cryogenic temperatures. The Toroidal and Poloidal Field coils (respectively TF 
and PF) are installed between the Cryostat and the  VV, and required to be cooled and 
shielded since the neutrons coming from the fusion reaction produce heat and atomic 
displacements within the magnets structure.  
 
 
Figure 2.5: Superconducting cable being spooled after production (IO, 2015) 
 
Central Solenoid (CS) and TF coils superconductive material is a special alloy of 
Niobium-Titanium. The PF coils and the Correction coils use a different, Niobium-
Titanium (NbTi) alloy. Superconductivity requires to be cooled with supercritical 
Helium in the range of 4 K (-269°C). Hence, due to the negligible loss of current due to 
the  absence of Joule effect, attractive ratio of power consumption to cost is achieved, 
which is highly beneficial for the long plasma pulses envisaged for the ITER machine. 
 
2.2.2 Vacuum Vessel (VV) 
 
The VV (see 6-8) provides confinement for the fusion reaction and also for the T and 
dust contained in the plasma chamber. Therefore, together with its extensions, it’s the 
first safety barrier against the release of radiological material to the environment.  
The VV doughnut-shaped chamber, or torus, contains the plasma particles spiral 
avoiding interactions with the inner walls.  
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Figure 2.6: The large stainless steel Vacuum Vessel provides an enclosed, vacuum environment for 
the fusion reaction (IO, 2015) 
 
The volume of the fusion plasma is strictly correlated to the size of the Vacuum Vessel: 
the greater the amount of target power to be produced, the larger the dimensions of the 
vessel needed to achieve such power. The ITER Vacuum Vessel has  an internal diameter 
of 6 meters, measures over 19 meters across by 11 meters high, and weigh 8000 tons 
(slightly more than the Eiffel Tower): thus it is twice as large and sixteen times as heavy 
as any previous existing tokamak.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: A cut-away of the ITER Vacuum Vessel (IO, 2015) 
1
1
 m
 
5 m 
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Water cooling will be provided between the double steel walls by a dedicated PHTS, also 
connect to an emergency cooling system, able to remove the decay heat in case of loss of 
offsite power. Blanket Modules are installed on the inner surfaces of the Vessel: they will 
provide shielding from the high-energy neutrons produced by the fusion reactions and 
they will transfer the heat coming from the plasma to the cooling system.  
The VV is accessible through 44 ports (18 upper ports, 17 equatorial ports, and 9 lower 
ports) to allow remote handling operations, diagnostic,  heating and vacuum systems 
installation and maintenance. 
 
 
Figure 2.8: The ITER Vacuum Vessel with its 44 ports (IO, 2015) 
 
2.2.3 Blanket (BLK) 
 
The interior surfaces of the VV are covered by the BLK (see Figure 2.9-10), which 
provides shielding to the VV and the Magnets from both heat and neutron fluxes coming 
from the plasma. The neutrons are thermalized in the BLK, where the neutrons kinetic 
energy is transformed into heat and finally removed by the coolant. In a fusion power 
plant, the energy coming from the plasma and removed though the BLK will be used for 
electrical power production.  
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Figure 2.9  Blanket modules cutaway (IO, 2015) 
 
The Blanket wall is modular to allow maintenance operations within the VV. It consists 
of 440 individual modules, each measuring 1x1.5 metres and weighing up to 4.6 tons. 
Each module has two sub-components: a detachable first wall, whose function is to 
directly face the plasma and remove the heat, and a semi-permanent Blanket shield 
dedicated to the neutron shielding.  
 
 
Figure 2.10: the Blanket Shield Module BM 11 that will be part of the ITER VV wall (IO, 2015) 
 
Beryllium has been chosen as armor material for the first wall while the rest of the 
Blanket shield will be made of high-strength copper and stainless steel. 
During the D-T plasma pulse campaign, at a later stage of the ITER project, test breeding 
modules (TBM) will be used to test different solutions for DEMO reactor.  
 
2.2.4 Divertor (DIV) 
 
The divertor (see Figure 2.11) is situated along the bottom of the Vacuum Vessel and its 
function is to extract heat and Helium ash and other impurities from the plasma. The 
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armor material for the plasma-facing components will be made of Tungsten, a high-
refractory element. 
 
Figure 2.11:  Divertor overview (IO, 2015) 
 
The divertor is made up of 54 cassettes, each holding three targets. These are the inner 
and the outer vertical targets (see Figure 2.12), and the dome. The targets are situated at 
the intersection of magnetic field lines where the high-energy plasma particles strike the 
components.  
 
 
Figure 2.12: The three plasma-facing components of the ITER Divertor (IO, 2015) 
 
A Carbon fiber-reinforced Carbon composite (CFC) Divertor target is foreseen for the 
first ITER operations, due to the the CFC high thermal conductivity and good 
compatibility with the plasma reaction. Tungsten will replace CFC at a later stage of 
ITER operations, since the lower rate of erosion and thus a longer lifetime of the target 
itself. 
 
2.2.5 External Heating Systems 
 
The gas temperature within the tokamak will reach about 150 million °C  (i.e. ten times 
the temperature at the core of the Sun) to reach the plasma state and allow the fusion 
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reaction to occur. To extract energy,  the hot plasma shall be maintained at these 
extreme temperatures in a controlled way.  
ITER foresees the use of three sources of external heating (see Figure 2.13) to provide 
the input heating power, i.e. 50 MW to bring the plasma at fusion temperatures. These 
are neutral beam injection (NBI) and two sources of high-frequency electromagnetic 
waves: the ion cyclotron and the electron cyclotron. 
 
The objective is to reach a "burning plasma" in which the energy of the Helium nuclei 
produced by the fusion reaction is enough to maintain the temperature of the plasma. 
The external heating can then be strongly reduced or switched off altogether. A burning 
plasma in which at least 50 percent of the energy needed to drive the fusion reaction is 
generated internally is an essential step to reaching the goal of fusion power generation. 
 
 
Figure 2.13: ITER addional heating systems (IO, 2015) 
 
2.2.6 Cryostat 
The Cryostat (see Figure 2.14) surrounds the Vacuum Vessel and 
superconducting Magnets and provides a super-cool, vacuum environment. It is made up 
of two concentric stainless steel walls connected by vertical and horizontal ribs. Helium 
gas circulate between the walls at about 1 bar of pressure to provide the required 
thermal barrier.  
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Figure 2.14: ITER Cryostat (IO, 2015) 
 
The Cryostat is 31 meters tall and 36.5 meters wide and it foresees many openings, 
some as large as four meters in diameter, to allow access to the VV for the many 
auxiliary systems. Bellows are used to allow for thermal contraction and expansion in 
the structures between the Cryostat and the Vacuum Vessel. The Bioshield, a two meters 
thick concrete layer, surrounds the Cryostat and provides shielding from fusion 
neutrons. 
 
2.2.7 Vacuum System 
 
The VV (1400 m3) and Cryostat (8500 m3) are the largest vacuum systems ever built. 
Before to start the fusion reaction Vacuum pumping is required to “clean” the vacuum 
chamber by eliminating all potential sources plasma degradation like organic particles. 
Vacuum pumping is also required to create low-density condition, which is a 
requirement to allow plasma ignition and operation. 
 
The VV and the Cryostat are evacuated by eight torus exhaust pumps and six cryopumps. 
The target pressure inside the VV is one millionth of bar; 24 to 48 hours are needed due 
to ITER VV dimensions.   
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Figure 2.15: Torus exhaust pumping system geometry (IO, 2015) 
2.2.8 Remote Handling (RH) 
 
RH is required to make changes, conduct inspections, or repair any of the Tokamak 
components in the on site inaccessible activated areas.. The reliability of the RH 
operations, which will require the installation and maintenance of components up to 50 
tons in weight, will directly impact the duration of the machine shut-down phases. The 
followed strategy (IO, 2015) uses a remote manipulator to detach the component; the 
component is removed through a port and placed into the docked transport cask; a 
temporary door is placed over the Vacuum Vessel access port; and the cask is closed to 
prevent contamination. The cask is moved on air bearings along to the Hot Cell. A similar 
docking occurs at the Hot Cell and the component is removed to be repaired or replaced. 
The process is then reversed to bring that component back to the Vacuum Vessel. 
 
 
Figure 2.16: ITER Remote Handling System (IO, 2015) 
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2.2.9 Fuel Cycle 
 
ITER will be the first fusion machine fully designed for operation with Deuterium-
Tritium, which will power the fusion reaction through a closed cycle. Three steps are 
foreseen for the commissioning: 
 Hydrogen operation 
 Deuterium operation 
 Full Deuterium-Tritium operation. 
 
Firstly air and any impurities must be evacuated from the Vacuum Vessel thought 
vacuum pumping, then magnets are turned on to help in controlling the plasma and a 
gas injection system introduces the low-density gaseous fuel into the VV. After the fuel 
injection starts, an electrical current is applied to the system to ionize the gas and form 
the plasma. 
 
Figure 2.17: The "closed DT loop" fuelling cycle of ITER (IO, 2015)  
 
 
The pellet injector is also used to control plasma density and ELMs. Frozen pellets are 
injected through guide tubes located inside the VV in specific zones within the plasmas 
where ELMs are particularly disruptive.  
 
During all ITER operations, less than 1 g of fusion fuel is confined in the VV. The DIV 
recycles the unburned D-T mixture (about the 97% of the injected one), than the fuel is 
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pumped out, separated from fusion reaction products (mainly He), mixed with fresh 
Tritium and Deuterium, and finally re-injected into the VV. 
 
2.2.10 Cooling Water (CWS) 
 
The CWS manages the heat generated during operation of the Tokamak. Water is used to 
remove heat from the VV, the in-vessel components and other auxiliary systems. The 
Cooling Water System consists of to two closed heat transfer circuits plus a Cooling 
Tower open circuit. 
 
Figure 2.18: A diagram of the ITER Cooling Water System 
The water flows from the primary to secondary heat exchangers to reduce the water 
temperature prior to the final release towards the environment. Most of the cooling 
water is simply evaporated in the Cooling Towers, since no electricity production is 
foreseen (unlike in a future fusion power plant).  
 
Also cooling basins in series are used to remove the heat coming from the plasma. A first 
basin collects the outlet from the plant. Prior the release to the environment, the 
processed water is tested for various parameters such as temperature (maximum 30°C), 
pH, hydrocarbons, chlorides, sulphates and Tritium.  
 
2.2.11 Tritium Breeding 
 
The concept of breeding Tritium during the fusion reaction is paramount for the future 
development of the fusion power plant as alternative and sustainable source of energy.  
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Figure 2.19: View of a typical TBM test port cell arrangement 
In ITER T will be provided from fission power plants to allow plasma operation for 20-
years of machine life. In DEMO about 300g of Tritium will be required per day to 
produce 800 MW of electrical power.  
The development of tritium breeding is paramount for the future of fusion energy.  
 
Therefore in ITER the Test Blanket Modules (six concepts to test the viability of different 
breeding blanket solutions) will be installed during the D-T phase of the machine.  
 
 
2.3 DEMO  
 
DEMO (DEMOnstration Power Plant) is a generic name for proposed nuclear fusion 
power plants that intend to build upon the expected success of ITER. Whereas ITER's 
main goal is to produce 500 million watts of fusion power for at least 500 seconds, the 
goal of DEMO will be to produce at least four times that much fusion power on a 
continual basis. This level of power production (2 gigawatts) is on the scale of a modern 
electric power plant. 
 
In the following, the information related to DEMO are taken from (Bachmann, 2014). 
2.3.1 Major Design Choices 
Plasma operation Pulsed operation, long-pulses (≥1 h) mainly inductively driven 
Power A plasma power of about 1.5 GW was chosen in order to generate 500 
MW of net electricity. 
Fuel A T-breeding blanket is implemented in the design to achieve tritium 
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self-sufficiency 
Magnet 
technology 
Low-temperature super conducting coils (Nb3Sn/ NbTi) were chosen 
given their superior technology readiness and the low power 
consumption 
Divertor 
configuration 
A single-null divertor configuration was chosen 
Divertor target A water-cooled Cu-based target concept was chosen for DEMO given 
the superior power handling capability and superior technology 
readiness, developed primarily within the ITER programme. 
In-vessel 
components 
structural 
material 
Reduced activation ferritic-martensitic (RAFM) steel (EUROFER) was 
chosen as structural material for all internal components mainly to 
minimize radioactive waste. 
Armour material Tungsten was chosen as armour material for all plasma facing 
components due to its refractory properties and low erosion rate. 
IVC lifetime Blanket: 20 dpa is currently defined as irradiation damage limit in the 
front-wall steel of the starter blanket, 50 dpa chosen as irradiation 
damage limit in the front-wall steel of the 2nd blanket. 
Divertor: 5 dpa is currently defined as irradiation damage limit in 
copper. 
Vacuum vessel A water-cooled ITER-like vessel was chosen for DEMO made of 
austenitic steel. Steel plates for neutron shielding are stacked into the 
inter-space between the two shells. ITER-like ports are integrated at 
the divertor and the equatorial level; large upper vertical ports 
extending up to the cryostat top lid are integrated at the upper level. 
Remote 
maintenance 
strategy 
Divertor: The divertor is segmented into 3 cassettes per lower port 
and maintained through the lower port using the ITER divertor 
remote maintenance approach. 
Blanket: The blanket is segmented into 3 outboard and 2 inboard 
segments per upper port. These segments can be removed and re-
installed remotely through the upper ports, provided that the divertor 
cassettes are removed. Their weight is carried from the top. A mover, 
temporarily installed in the divertor area, supports the kinematic 
sequence and reacts the unbalance due to the weight being carried off 
the center of gravity. 
 
2.3.2 DEMO Plant Build-up 
The DEMO plant breakdown structure is defined in .  
 
2.3.3 Tokamak 
The tokamak structure is composed of three main systems, each providing support to 
other systems: 
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1. The vacuum vessel (VV) is a torus-shaped double-walled pressure vessel. It 
provides the primary vacuum and shields the magnet system from neutrons. 
Being one of the  two backbone structures of the tokamak it supports the in-
vessel components and other systems: 
 Breeding blanket with first wall (FW). The actively cooled FW withstands 
the plasma heat radiation and additional heat loads due to impacting 
particles. The actively cooled breeder units contain lithium that is 
transmuted into tritium due to neutron radiation. The tritium is removed 
from the breeder unit in a closed loop and extracted from that loop by the 
tritium extraction system. The heat from both FW and breeder unit is 
exhausted by the primary coolant and transferred to the secondary 
cooling loop via the heat exchanger. The DEMO blanket concept has not 
yet been chosen, see also section 2.3.13. 
 Divertor. It is primarily a high heat flux component. The magnetic 
topology is chosen in a way that the field lines outside the last closed flux 
surface intersect the divertor targets, which collect most of the particles 
and energy exhausted by the plasma. In the intended operation scenario 
the divertor target is subject to the highest heat loads; the particle impact 
causes the most severe erosion in the tokamak. 
 Plasma start-up and shut-down limiters. These are primarily high heat 
flux components and are part of the plasma-facing wall integrated in the 
assembly of blanket segments. They protrude however the blanket FW 
slightly (stick out). They intersect the scrape-off layer (SOL) in plasma 
scenarios where the plasma becomes in contact with the plasma-facing 
wall and hence avoid to a large extent direct particle impact onto the 
blanket FW. The implementation of limiters is not required in case the 
blanket FW can be – as in ITER - designed for contact with the plasma. 
 FW protection limiters. As above these are primarily high heat flux 
components and are part of the plasma-facing wall integrated in the 
assembly of blanket segments. They protrude however the blanket FW 
slightly (stick out). They protect the FW from high heat loads during flat 
top due to off-normal events. Whether separate components need to be 
integrated in DEMO to fulfil this function will be decided later. 
 Auxiliary heating systems in the vessel port structures. These are ECRH, 
ICRH and Lower Hybrid systems whose front parts (launchers/antennas 
or ducts/liners) are integrated in the assembly of blanket segments. These 
systems face the plasma and radiate electromagnetic waves into the 
plasma transferring energy to certain particles (e.g. electrons for ECRH) at 
certain velocities but also provide additional functions to support e.g. 
plasma break-down, heating to H-mode, MHD-control, current drive and 
others. The electromagnetic waves (ECRH and ICRH) are delivered 
through wave guides from outside the tokamak building. 
 Diagnostics. There is variety of different sensors that are installed on the 
vessel, on the in-vessel components, or in VV port structures. These 
measure plasma and magnetic field parameters mostly in the framework 
of the plasma control system. 
 Fuelling system. It is located outside tokamak, forms pellets of frozen D, T, 
or D-T, accelerates these pellets, and guides them through a pipe up to the 
level of the FW. The pipe runs through a vessel port and penetrates the in-
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vessel components. Alternatively a gas fuelling system could be 
considered. 
 Impurity seeding system: One or more types of impurity gases are injected 
in several locations in the divertor area and the main chamber.  
 
2. The magnet system is an assembly of planar superconducting (SC) coils which 
provide the magnetic field required to break-down and confine the plasma, to 
drive its current and to define its poloidal structure. It is actively cooled by liquid 
helium at ~4K. Both electric current and liquid helium are supplied by ex-
tokamak systems through magnet feeders to the SC coils. The TF coil assembly is 
the 2nd backbone structure of the tokamak (the vacuum vessel being the 1st) 
supporting the following systems: 
 PF coils. Six individual coils are mounted to the outboard leg of the TF 
coils providing the vertical and radial magnetic field. Whereas the TF coil 
current remains constant during plasma operation the currents in the PF 
coils are altered over the duration of the plasma pulse contributing to 
driving the plasma current but also to actively stabilize the plasma. 
 Central Solenoid (CS). The CS is a stack of coils in the bore of the torus. 
Before plasma operation it is charged. Its current is then partly discharged 
providing the voltage required to break-down the hydrogen gas into a 
plasma. Over the duration of the plasma pulse it is further discharged 
driving the plasma current until it reaches the opposite peak current, 
which marks the end of the plasma pulse. 
 Vacuum vessel thermal shield. It is a shell-like structure supported by the 
TF coils that encloses the vacuum vessel and its port structures. It is 
actively cooled by helium at ~80K and shields the cryogenic magnet 
system from radiation heat from the vessel. 
 Cryostat thermal shield (outboard part). It is designed and operated based 
on the same principles as the vacuum vessel thermal shield. It shields the 
magnet system from radiation loads the cryostat and in-cryostat 
components. The top and bottom part of the cryostat thermal shield are 
supported off the cryostat, see below. 
 
3. The Cryostat is a large, single-walled, passively cooled vacuum vessel at room 
temperature. It provides the vacuum required to operate the magnet system in 
cryogenic condition and supports the two backbone structures of the tokamak: 
the vacuum vessel and the TF coil system. It is itself supported by the tokamak 
building. The cryostat has a large removable top lid through which the tokamak is 
assembled and through which it could be maintained in exceptional situations. 
The cryostat has a large number of openings, in particular to allow access into the 
vessel ports but also to allow in-cryostat maintenance as well as penetration of 
cooling pipes and magnet feeders. The cryostat has the following main 
penetrations: 
 Base level: penetration of magnet feeders 
 Lower level: access to divertor ports 
 Equatorial level: access to equatorial ports 
 Upper level: penetration of magnet feeders 
 Top lid: access to upper vertical ports 
 
The cryostat is connected to the vessel ports by rectangular bellows. 
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The cryostat provides support to the following systems (incomplete list): 
 Magnet system: All TF coil supports rest on the pedestal ring. 
 Vacuum vessel: All vessel supports rest on the pedestal ring. 
 Vacuum pumps: The plasma chamber vacuum pumps might be integrated 
in the special pumping port structures and might be supported by the 
cryostat. These provide the primary vacuum by evacuating the vacuum 
chamber through pumping unused fuel, helium, impurities, and – 
following a plant shut-down state - air. 
 Cryostat thermal shield (upper and lower parts). It is designed and 
operated based on the same principles as the vacuum vessel thermal 
shield. It shields the magnet system from radiation loads from the cryostat 
and in-cryostat components. 
 
 
Figure 2.20:  Main DEMO Tokamak Systems 
 
2.3.4 Tokamak Building 
The tokamak building layout is driven from the tokamak pit, which is surrounded by a 
thick cylindrical concrete structure: the bioshield. The bioshield is extended to enclose 
also the neutral beam cell. No man-access is possible inside the bioshield after tritium 
operation has started. Outside the bioshield man-access is limited depending on the 
“zoning” assigned to the individual rooms.  
 
The tokamak building basemat is supported by the ground. It has several levels 
corresponding to the cryostat penetrations and additional levels above the machine 
used for auxiliary equipment. Some are also assigned as expansion volumes to limit the 
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pressure in leak accident cases. The tokamak pit is connected to the large assembly 
building by a large corridor at the level above the tokamak. Overhead cranes can 
transport all tokamak components up to the tokamak pit, the largest components being 
PF3 and PF4 defining the width of that corridor. After assembly the bioshield above the 
tokamak is closed temporarily by a thick concrete structure. Most of the area above the 
tokamak then becomes a blanket remote handling area. From that area as well as from 
the rooms connecting to the divertor ports remote maintenance corridors are integrated 
into the tokamak building to allow the travel of the casks into the hot cell. 
 
All tokamak supply lines are routed through the tokamak building, in particular: 
 From the cryoplant: Magnet feeders (supplying liquid helium and electrical 
current) 
 From the PHTS: Vessel and in-vessel components cooling pipes 
 From the tritium plant: Fuel cycle lines (D, T), i.e. 
o Tritium Extraction System exhaust pipes  
o Primary vacuum pumping exhaust pipes 
o Coolant (water/ He) pipes 
o Fuelling system lines 
 From the cryoplant: Thermal shield helium gas cooling pipes 
 NB power supply. 
 ECRH pipes 
 
2.3.5 Plant 
The DEMO site will contain a number of auxiliary buildings housing equipment 
supporting the tokamak operation similar to the ITER site. In addition there will be the 
BoP systems. 
 
 
2.3.6 Tokamak Parameters and Plant Architecture 
Table 2.1 Basic Tokamak Parameters, mostly based on (Bachmann, 2014). 
Parameter Unit Quantity 
Plasma power MW 1572 
Thermal power including n-multiplication in 
blanket 
MW 1972 
Plant electricity output capability MW 500 
Lifetime neutron damage in steel in the FW dpa 20+50 
Major radius, R0 m 9.0 
Minor radius, a m 2.25 
Plasma current MA 14 
Toroidal field, B0 at R0 T 6.8 
Elongation, κ95  1.56 
Triangularity, δ95  0.33 
Plasma volume m³ 1453 
Plasma surface area m² 1084 
Auxiliary heating power, Pinj MW 50 
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Auxiliary ramp-up power, Pramp-up MW >60 
Average neutron wall load MW/m² 1.067 
Nuclear heating in blanket MW 1380 
Power to divertor MW 180 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.2 Weight of Major Core Components 
Component Number 
Weight [tons] 
Single Total 
Cryostat   15000 
TF coils 16 1000 16000 
PF coils 
 PF1 
 PF2 
 PF3 
 PF4 
 PF5 
 PF6 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
680 
680 
1200 
1200 
2100 
2100 
7960 
CS 5  2800 
Vessel  
 Main vessel 
 Lower port extension and duct 
 Equatorial port extension and duct (standard/NB) 
 Upper port extension and duct 
 In-wall shielding 
 
 
16 
13/3 
16 
 
 
 
80 
50/50 
100 
13680 
6000 
1280 
800 
1600 
4000 
Plug structures  
 Upper port plug 
 Equatorial port plug (standard/NB) 
 Lower port plug 
 
16 
13/3 
- 
 
50 
50 
1600 
800 
800 
Blanket  
 Inboard segment 
 Outboard segment 
 
32 
48 
 
50 
80 
5440 
1600 
3840 
Divertor 48 23 1104 
 
 
2.3.7 DEMO Design Configuration Options and Uncertainties 
The DEMO aspect ratio has been defined preliminarily as R/a = 4. It is currently being 
studied in the range R/a = 2.6 - 3.6. Due to this range the following tokamak parameters 
vary as indicated below: 
 Plasma cross-sectional size (and hence 2D size of tokamak), minor radius a = 3.4-
2.5m 
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 Plasma current (17.7-24 MA) 
 Total TF coil current (range: 190-320 MA) 
 Peak field at TF conductor: 9.9-13T 
 B0 (range: 4.25-7.0T) 
 Major radius (8.8-9.1m) 
 Number of TF coils: (16, 18, or 20) 
 Average neutron wall load (range: 0.91-1.22 MW/m²) 
 
Given the early state of the concept phase a number of design configuration options are 
still open. The following paragraphs introduce the options currently considered. 
 
2.3.8 Divertor Configuration 
An ITER-like single-X divertor configuration with the divertor cassette on the bottom of 
the vacuum vessel is currently considered. The divertor is segmented into 3 cassettes 
per lower port and maintained through the lower port using the ITER divertor remote 
maintenance approach. To reduce local target heat flux and erosion additional coils may 
be implemented inside the vacuum chamber to sweep the strike points across the 
targets (as in JET). 
Although not currently considered in the DEMO design configuration advanced divertor 
configurations are being studied in the frame of the European DEMO development, in 
particular snowflake and super-X configurations. 
 
2.3.9  FW Protection / Limiter configuration 
It is conceivable that limiters will be implemented in DEMO (unlike in ITER) to protect 
the FW from particle impact and the corresponding high heat loads. Main reason for this 
possibility is the choice not to use copper in the DEMO FW and the consequent reduced 
FW heat load capacity. 
There are different possibilities currently considered to integrate limiters in DEMO: 
 Equatorial port limiters. Such limiters would be mounted in a removable port 
plug and penetrate the blanket in front of the port. The PFC may be movable 
through a mechanism inside the port plug. 
 Upper port limiter. Such a limiter would be integrated in an upper port plug and 
penetrate the outboard segment at the top. It may be movable through a 
mechanism inside the port plug. 
 Outboard segment limiters. Such limiters would replace and have the size and 
shape of one outboard central blanket segment. Such a limiter segment may be 
movable through a mechanism in the upper port. 
 Inboard segment limiters. Such limiters would replace and have the size and 
shape of one inboard blanket segment. Such a limiter segment may be movable 
through a mechanism in the upper port. 
It is currently assumed that limiters would not contribute to the breeding of tritium. 
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2.3.10 Plasma Passive Stability  
It is known that the current DEMO design configuration does not provide adequate 
passive plasma vertical stability. The following options to improve this are currently 
studied: 
 Decreasing the radial extent of the upper port or chamfering it to reduce the cut-
out in the inner shell. 
 Implement toroidal electrical conductors inside the upper vertical port at the 
level of the inner shell to allow continuous toroidal currents. 
 Reduce the thickness of the bottom of the outboard blanket to allow the vessel 
inner shell to be closer to the plasma. 
 Implement electrical straps between outboard blanket segment and vessel on 
both lateral sides of the blankets to provide a toroidally uninterrupted conductor. 
This could be implemented at the bottom of the blanket segments and/or 
between equatorial and upper port. This should enable toroidal currents to flow 
partly in the FW and partly in the vessel inner shell. 
 Active in-vessel coils (saddle type or continuous) using similar technology as 
those in ITER (not superconducting) 
 
2.3.11 Confinement barriers 
Three systems are currently considered as possible confinement barriers: 
1. Vacuum vessel and port closure plates 
2. Cryostat and port closure plates 
3. Tokamak building 
No combination has yet been excluded. 
 
2.3.12 Shield component as in-vessel blanket support structure 
The semi-permanent shield is a toroidally continuous structure considered e.g. in the 
PPCS, whose segments are required to be structurally connected. A feasible shield 
design compliant with a credible remote maintenance procedure seems to be a major 
challenge. A promising attachment concept has been proposed without the need of an 
in-vessel shield component. The concept is based on the principle to fix the blanket 
segment on top and bottom and to use the thermal expansion of the blanket to apply a 
large preload on the segments. A successful development would avoid the 
implementation of the semi-permanent shield, which would be a significant 
simplification of the DEMO tokamak design. 
 
2.3.13 Blanket concept 
Four blanket concepts are being developed during the conceptual phase, see Error! 
Reference source not found.: 
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 Helium-Cooled Pebble Bed concept (HCPB), implementing a helium-cooled FW, a 
ceramic breeder (Li4SiO4 or Li2TiO3), and Be pebbles as neutron multiplier. 
 Helium-Cooled Lithium Led concept (HCLL), implementing a helium-cooled FW 
and a helium-cooled liquid metal (LiPb) breeder unit. 
 Water-Cooled Lithium Led concept (WCLL), implementing a water-cooled FW 
and a water-cooled liquid metal (LiPb) breeder unit. 
 Dual-Coolant Lithium Led concept (DCLL), implementing a helium-cooled FW and 
a self-cooled liquid metal (LiPb) breeder unit. 
 
All four concepts are based on the same overall design configuration including: 
 Multi-module configuration assembling a number of breeding modules to a 
common manifold/backplate structure, 
 Segmentation (3 outboard, 2 inboard segments per upper vertical port),  
 Size and thickness of segments, 
 Attachment concept, and 
 Kinematic sequence of remote handling operations 
 
They differ however regarding the following aspects: 
 Breeding unit design 
 Breeder and multiplier materials 
 Manifold design 
 Pipe connections 
 Number of breeding modules 
 Type of coolant 
 Number of independent cooling loops 
 FW configuration and heat load specification? 
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Figure 2.21: Schematics of the four blanket concepts 
 
2.3.14 Divertor target concept 
The divertor target is subject to the highest heat loads and particle fluxes. To take 
advantage of the superior thermal conductivity of copper as well as of the superior 
thermohydraulic properties of liquid water compared to helium gas a water-cooled 
target concept with a Cu-alloy heat sink is currently selected in DEMO (ITER-like). As in 
case of the FW, tungsten was chosen as armour material.  
Alternative target concepts are therefore developed in the frame of the DEMO program, 
namely: liquid metal and helium-cooled. 
 
 
2.3.15 H&CD systems 
The H&CD systems to be implemented in DEMO have not been selected. Three systems 
are being developed during the conceptual design phase: NBI, ECRH, and ICRH; LH 
systems are considered alternative and currently not implemented in the DEMO design 
configuration. The following integration options are currently being studied but not yet 
adopted in the design configuration: 
 NB: An ITER-like integration is currently considered with the NB systems located 
in an NB cell behind the bioshield injecting the neutrals through an inclined 
equatorial port. The integration of an NB requires cut-outs in more than one 
outboard blanket segment and divides at least on blanket segments into an upper 
and a lower part. 
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 ECRH: Three possibilities to integrate an ECRH system are currently considered, 
EC in an equatorial port plug, in an upper port plug, and/or in a dedicated vertical 
port plug. 
 ICRH: Integration with in-blanket antennas is currently considered. 
 
2.3.16 Torus vacuum pumping 
Currently a set of three vacuum pumps is considered as the primary choice pumping 
train of DEMO: 
1. Liquid ring pump  
2. Diffusion pump  
3. Metal foil pump 
 
The advantages of these pumps are: 
 Their ability to provide continuous operation, which allows minimizing the 
required number of pumps;  
 Their tritium compatibility to withstand the DEMO environment; and  
 H isotope recycling close to the vessel, to minimise the tritium inventory. 
 
As an alternative solution a three stage cryopump is developed, which is based on the 
ITER solution, possibly implementing an additional stage in the temperature range 15-
20 K with the purpose to improve the separation of H isotopes. 
2.3.17 Safety Design 
 
As described above three systems are currently considered as possible confinement 
barriers: 
1. Vacuum vessel and port closure plates 
2. Cryostat and port closure plates 
3. Tokamak building 
 
The ITER strategy is currently considered in the DEMO design configuration. Hence the 
following systems provide confinement: 
Primary confinement barrier:  
 Vacuum vessel outer shell 
 Port closure plates 
 Port flanges 
 Primary vacuum pump flange 
 Vacuum vessel pressure suppression system 
 ECRH windows and transmission lines between closure plate and window 
 ICRH windows and transmission lines between closure plate and window 
 NB injector and bellows to VV port duct 
 NBI absolute valve (during shutdown / NB maintenance) 
 Pellet injector system / gas injector system 
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Secondary confinement barrier: 
 Tokamak building basemat 
 Other parts of the tokamak building tbd 
2.3.18 Maintenance Strategy 
 
Most DEMO components are designed to allow scheduled maintenance to be performed 
to ensure machine availability. It is generally desired to provide component conditions 
required for hands-on maintenance and for hands-on assistance to remote handling 
procedures. Maintenance procedures in the vacuum chamber, the cryostat or other 
radioactively contaminated areas however are generally carried out through remotely 
controlled robotic equipment. Remote maintenance interventions will generally be 
preceded by remote inspection to obtain information on the extent of damage and 
maintenance activities required. 
 
DEMO systems and components are classified into three remote maintenance classes: 
 Class 1: Components that require scheduled remote maintenance or replacement 
 Class 2: Components that do not require scheduled but are likely to require 
unscheduled or very infrequent remote maintenance. 
 Class 3: Components not expected to require remote maintenance during the life 
time of DEMO. The projected maintenance time in case of failure may be long, 
since the remote handling operations and equipment may need to be developed 
first. 
 
 
 
 
2.3.19 In-vessel Maintenance 
All components inside the vacuum chamber must be maintainable. Maintenance of in-
vessel components will generally consist of the replacement of components. Access to 
the components within the primary vacuum boundary shall be possible from the outside 
without the need to break the cryostat vacuum. The removed, activated and 
contaminated components will be transported to the hot cell for eventual repair and 
refurbishment, or, alternatively for preparations for disposal as waste. 
 
RH equipment will be introduced into the vacuum vessel using transfer casks docked to 
the vacuum vessel port flanges. The transfer casks are sealed, but not shielded, hence 
requiring restricted access of personnel within the tokamak building when casks are 
traveling to and from the hot cell. 
 
Rescue procedures shall be available for every RH procedure, i.e., all RH equipment shall 
be designed for remote recovery. 
 
 
 
2.3.20 In-cryostat Maintenance 
Gross failure of components inside the cryostat may require their replacement. 
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Access to the interior of the cryostat for repair is provided at the following levels: 
 Cryostat top lid 
 Cryostat central lid 
 Divertor port level hatches; 
 Hatches at the cryostat basement level; 
 
Repairs will be conducted with the magnets off, warmed to room temperature and with 
the cryostat open; pressure will be ambient and the atmosphere. Residual magnetic 
fields will be negligible.  
 
The following table provides an overview over the maintenance requirements of the in-
cryostat components: 
 
Table 2.3: maintenance requirements of the in-cryostat components 
Component Inspection Maintenance Access 
Pre-compression rings (top) Yes replaceable Central lid 
Pre-compression rings 
(bottom) 
Yes replaceable 
(once) 
Basement level 
hatches 
Central solenoid Yes replaceable Central lid 
PF1 Yes tbd Top lid 
PF2 Yes tbd Top lid 
PF3 Yes tbd Top lid 
PF4 Yes no tbd 
PF5 Yes no tbd 
PF6 Yes no tbd 
TF coils Yes no tbd 
TF coil supports Yes yes Divertor port level 
hatches 
Magnet feeders Yes yes tbd 
Vessel outer shell Yes no tbd 
Vessel port structures 
(external) 
Yes tbd tbd 
Cryostat bellows Yes tbd tbd 
Cryostat thermal shield Yes replaceable tbd 
Vessel thermal shield Yes tbd tbd 
Vessel support Yes yes Divertor port level 
hatches 
2.3.21 Operational States 
 
During the operational phase, DEMO will always be in one of the states listed below.  
1. SHUTDOWN State (SDS): All tokamak systems and auxiliary systems are off. 
Plasma chamber at atmospheric pressure. Magnets at ambient temperature. 
Decay heat (if present) to be removed by either the primary circuits or an 
independent decay heat removal system 
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2. TEST & CONDITIONING State (TCS): Most systems ready for test-pulsing (no-
plasma). Cooling systems in low-flow. Vessel and Cryostat under vacuum. 
Magnets may be operating.  May include plasma conditioning operations where 
low performance plasmas for wall conditioning would take place. 
3. STANDBY State (STS): All systems ready for plasma start-up. Typically the state 
between pulses: 
 TF: cold, full current, nominal coolant flow. 
 CS: cold, full start-up current, nominal coolant flow. 
 PF1-6: cold, full start-up current, nominal coolant flow. 
 Vessel: operating temperature, operating pressure, nominal coolant flow, 
plasma start-up vacuum condition, all ports closed. 
 Blanket: uniform coolant inlet temperature, operating pressure, nominal 
coolant flow. 
 Divertor: uniform coolant(s) inlet temperature(s), operating pressure(s), 
nominal coolant flow. 
 Thermal shields: cold, nominal coolant flow. 
 Cryostat: closed, operational vacuum condition 
4. PLASMA OPERATION State (POS): All systems required for plasma pulses 
operational. Pulsed plasma operation ongoing.  
 TF: cold, full current, nominal coolant flow. 
 CS: cold, after break-down constant dI/dt, nominal coolant flow. 
 PF1-6: cold, varying currents, nominal coolant flow. 
 Vessel: operating temperature, operating pressure, nominal coolant flow, 
all ports closed. 
 Blanket: non-uniform operating temperature distribution, operating 
pressure, nominal coolant flow. 
 Divertor: non-uniform operating temperature distribution, operating 
pressure, nominal coolant flow. 
 Thermal shields: cold, nominal coolant flow. 
 Cryostat: closed, operational vacuum condition 
5. SHORT TERMN MAINTENANCE State (STM): (Typical weekends, holidays, short 
breaks): Vessel evacuated, all magnets at zero current but magnets cold. Some 
reduced current magnet testing allowed. Tightly controlled access. 
6. LONG TERM MAINTENANCE State (LTM): For serious maintenance or upgrade 
such as blanket/divertor maintenance. All magnets off but the cryostat may be 
under vacuum. Vessel maintenance ports opened. Remote Maintenance system 
operational.  The decay heat to be removed by either the primary circuits or an 
independent decay heat removal system.  
7. FAILED State (FLS): A mission- or safety-critical failure has been detected. 
Necessary machine protection and/or safety systems have been activated.  
8. UNSCHEDULED MAINTENANCE State (USM):  This state is entered following 
the detection of a mission- or safety-critical failure (i.e. FLS state) and a decision 
to carry out unscheduled maintenance operations to repair or replace the 
defective component. 
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2.3.22 Thermal Design Concept 
 
Most main tokamak systems (magnets, vessel, cryostat, thermal shields) are operated at 
approximately uniform temperature distribution: 
 The cryostat is at room temperature since its external surface is in air.  
 The magnet system is cooled to ~4K. 
 The vessel is operated at 200°C. 
 The VV thermal shield (between magnets and vessel) is operated at ~80K. 
 The cryostat thermal shield is currently assumed to also be actively cooled to 
~80K. However given the available space not actively cooled multi-layer 
insulation foil may be used instead. 
The principle to thermally insulate the tokamak systems from one another is to prevent 
convection (vacuum in cryostat), decrease the heat transfer by radiation through low 
coefficients of emissivity, and careful designing of the support structures that connect 
systems operated at different temperatures to minimize conduction. 
 
The most significant conduction occurs from the vessel supports to the magnet supports 
through the pedestal ring. 
 
The in-vessel components on the other hand experience significant temperature 
gradients due to the large heat loads. 
Blanket: 
 The temperature distribution of the breeding module shows significant gradients. 
Independent of the blanket concept the cooling system of FW and breeding 
module is designed to take advantage of the full temperature range of Eurofer 
[~300-350°C up to 500-550°C]. In addition the temperature distribution in the 
breeding blanket changes significantly in different phases of a plasma pulse. 
 On the contrary the main structure of the blanket manifold/backplate 
experiences only moderate temperature gradients and is kept due to the design 
of the cooling channels close to the inlet temperature ~300-350°C. 
Divertor: 
 The water-cooled divertor targets are cooled at ~220°C. During operation, in 
particular in the area of the strike point, the PFCs show significant temperature 
gradients. 
 On the contrary the water-cooled divertor cassette experiences only moderate 
temperature gradients. The temperature of its coolant has not yet been decided 
and may be in the range [220°C-300°C]. 
2.3.23 Vacuum Design Concept 
 
Two independent vacuum environments are established in a tokamak: 
 Cryostat vacuum (~tbd Pa) 
 Torus divertor pressure during plasma operations (~1-50 Pa) 
 Torus base pressure between pulses (<5x10-4 Pa) 
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2.4 Main Differences between ITER and DEMO 
 
The main differences between ITER and DEMO are summarised in Table 2.4. A variety of 
fusion power plant system designs have been studied across the world. In many cases 
promising performances are unfortunately opposed by rather immature underlying 
technologies and optimistic physics assumptions. The recent EU fusion roadmap 
(Romanelli, 2012) advocates a pragmatic approach and considers a pulsed “low-
extrapolation” DEMO to be constructed in the short to medium term. It shall be based on 
mature technologies and reliable regimes of operation to be, as much as possible, 
extrapolated from the ITER experience, and on the use of materials adequate for the 
expected level of neutron fluence. The mission requirements of such a near- to medium-
term DEMO put more emphasis on solutions with high technical readiness levels and 
reliable performance and component reliability, rather than on high-efficiency. 
 
Table 2.4 Main differences between ITER and DEMO, based on (G. Federici, 2014) 
 ITER DEMO 
Overall 
mission 
Experimental device with physics 
and technology development 
missions. 
Demonstrate capability for net 
electricity production 
Pulse 
length 
400 s pulses. Long pulses (≥ 1h) 
Availability 
Experimental campaigns. Long 
dwell time, outages for 
maintenance, component 
replacements. 
High availability. 
Complexity 
Diagnostics with large variety of 
purposes 
Diagnostics primarily required for 
operation. 
NB, EC, and IC EC, NB, IC (current design 
configuration).  
LH (alternative option) 
Plasma 
Large uncertainties regarding 
plasma performance and 
behaviour, large variety of plasma 
regimes. 
With ITER (and other) experience 
smaller uncertainties regarding 
plasma performance and behaviour, 
concisely defined plasma regime. 
IVC cooling 
IVC cooling systems optimized for 
minimum stresses and sized for 
modest heat rejection. 
IVC cooling systems optimized for 
heat conversion efficiency (high 
temperature operation). 
Tritium 
Tritium required for plasma 
operation provided from external 
sources 
Tritium self-sufficient, only start-up 
supply required. 
Materials 
Copper-based FW for improved 
heat flux capability 
Eurofer-based FW (due to 
irradiation damage, upper 
temperature limit (~400°C) and 
activation of copper). 
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Conventional 316 stainless steel 
structure for in-vessel 
components. 
Nuclear hardened, reduced 
activation steel for in-vessel 
components. 
n-fluence 
Very modest lifetime n-fluence, low 
dpa and He production. 
High fluence, significant in-vessel 
materials damage. 
Licensing 
Licensed as nuclear facility, but like 
a laboratory, not a reactor. 
Licensing as nuclear reactor more 
likely. 
“Progressive start-up” permits 
staged approach to licensing. 
Similar “Progressive start-up” as in 
ITER. In addition initial operational 
phase with a "starter" blanket with 
moderate lifetime, then switch to 
blankets qualified for a longer 
lifetime. 
During design, licensing in any 
ITER party had to be possible. 
Unknown. 
 
2.5 The DEMO HCPB Concept 
 
The HCPB blanket concept is considered in EU a near term solutions for a first DEMO 
reactor since 1995 and it is considered in the EU TBM Programme for testing in ITER. In 
KIT (former KfK and FZK) Helium concepts have been studied since the 80-ties with the 
selection of a solid breeder and Beryllium as neutron multiplier; than (Dalle Donne, 
1994) a Breeder Out of Tube (BOT) concept  was proposed for NET. This concept 
became some years later (1995 during a selection exercise in EU) a reference concept in 
the EU Breeding Blanket Programme with the name of Helium Cooled Pebble Bed 
(HCPB) concept for DEMONET and TBM (Giancarli, Dalle Donne, & Dietz, 1997). In 2000 
this blanket concept was selected as part of the PPCS as reference component for PPCS 
Model B (Hermsmeyer, Malang, Fischer, & Gordeev, 2003). The main features of the 
HCPB concept are the employment of lithiated Ceramic Breeders (CB) and Beryllium as 
neutron multiplier in forms of a flat pebble beds. The coolant is Helium at a pressure of 8 
MPa with temperatures in the range of 300-500°C. The velocities of Helium up to 80 m/s 
in the FW are required to obtain the right heat transfer coefficient. An independent 
Helium loop, the Tritium Extraction System (TES), provides the purging of the tritium 
from the pebble beds at relatively low pressure, in the range of 0.1-0.4 bar. Since the 
purge flow velocity is very low practically no heat removal is provided by the helium 
circulating in the loop. The Coolant Purification System provides Tritium and other 
impurities removal from the primary heat transfer system. The Secondary Cooling 
System is a closed loop with water at 11 MPa, and its main function is to transform the 
heat from the primary heat transfer system in electricity through steam turbines. 
 
2.5.1 HCPB Blanket Description 
The Blanket system shall be adapted on a reactor design subdivided toroidally on 16 
sectors (16 TF coils). The Vertical Maintenance System (VMS) is based on a reactor 
design characterized by large vertical ports for extraction of large blanket portions 
(segments). In fact each of the blanket sectors is made by 5 segments: three for the 
Outboard (OB) and two for the Inboard (IB). The primary option for the design of the 
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segment is the multi module segment (MMS) concept; a common back supporting 
structure (BBS, which contains the main manifolds) with 10 modules attached for each 
segment. The number, i.e. the dimensions of the module, is determined by a trade-off 
among different considerations: small modules are favourable to reduce thermal 
stresses and to reduce EM forces at the single attachments. On the contrary drawback 
could be possible in the Tritium Breeder Ratio (TBR) as the relative amount of steel can 
increase increasing the number of modules. The VMS foreseen that the single module 
are attached to a manifold segment that ensure the support of all the modules. The 
poloidal manifold system ensures the routing of the Helium coolant and of the purge 
lines to the upper part where collectors go in the vertical port. Weight and dimension of 
segments are also dictating the design of the Remote Handling (RH) system.  
Hereafter Table 2.5 summarizes the main feature of the HCPB DEMO concept. 
 
Table 2.5 HCPB DEMO Features (2013) 
Model HCPB 
Fusion power [MW] 1943 
Net electric power [MW] 500 
TBR 1.14 
Blanket 
Structural material Eurofer 
PFM W 
Coolant He 
Mass flow rate 
(kg/s) 
2143 
Coolant pressure 
(MPa) 
8.0 
Coolant T_in/out 
(°C) 
300 / 500 
Breeder Li4SiO4 
Neutron multiplier Be 
Divertor 
Structural material 
CuCrZr / 
Eurofer 
Armour material W 
Coolant Water 
Coolant T_in/out 
(°C) 
150 / 250 
 
2.6 Fusion PHTS Experimental Facilities 
Hereafter are briefly described some European facilities, currently running experimental 
campaigns or whose employment is foreseen in the next future activities, relevant for 
both ITER and DEMO PHTSs. 
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2.6.1 KIT Facilities 
HELOKA 
The Helium Loop Karlsruhe (HELOKA) facility, see Figure 2.12, is an experimental 
facility dedicated to the testing of the IVCs components for IFMIF, ITER, and DEMO 
(Ghidersa, 2006).  
 
HELOKA is designed as two “8”-shape loops, to test different in vessel components 
concept. The maximum required flow rate (i.e. 5.5 kg/s) is achieved through a three 
blowers put in parallelDue to the large difference between inlet/outlet 
temperatures(300 °C – 500 °C), each test section has its own cooler, recuperator and 
heater.  
Among the objectives of HELOKA, the main ones relevant to the design of fusion systems 
are: 
 Achieve operating condition for the ITER European TBMs (HCPB and HCLL 
TBMs); 
 Validate the hydraulic and thermal design of the ITER European TBMs (HCPB and 
HCLL TBMs); 
 Provide measurements values of the coolant parameters during operational 
condition to be compared with numerical calculation 
 
Figure 2.22: HELOKA Process Flow Diagram 
KATHELO 
The Karlsruhe Advance Technology Helium Loop is a helium cooled test loop operating 
at a pressure level of 10 MPa and temperatures up to 800 °C with flow rates up to 
200 g/s (Ghidersa, 2013).  
The facility main task is to qualify both  the helium-cooled divertor design and the 
associated materials. Furthermore the loop will be used to extend the experimental 
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range of the existing helium loop HELOKA-HP (Ghidersa, 2006) for small scale 
experiments, namely the qualification of blanket breeder units. KATHELO will operate 
independently from the HELOKA-HP loop while sharing the same infrastructure for the 
data acquisition and control. 
 
Figure 2.23: KATHELO piping layout 
 
2.6.2 ENEA Facilities 
HE-FUS3 
ENEA Brasimone hosted the HE-FUS3 facility, a helium loop designed to determine the 
thermo-mechanical characterization of small/medium/full scale mock-ups of HCPB 
DEMO blanket (Meloni, 2009). 
HE-FUS3 has a eight shape due to different working temperatures regions; to recover 
helium enthalpy before the inlet to the compressor,  an economizer is placed at the 
crossover point separating the two regions: the hot one where the test sections are 
installed/demountled and the cold one hosting the compressor and the flow-rate 
damping vessel.  
 
The loop was designed to operate at the following operative modes (Del Nevo, 2015): 
 long term isothermal cooling flow; 
 slow thermal cycling flow; 
 fast cold thermal shock flow; 
 LOCA/LOFA simulation. 
 
The main HE-FUS3 operative parameters are: 
 Processed fluid: He 
 Design temperature: 530°C 
 Designed Pressure: 8MPa 
 Max He mass flow rate: 1.4kg/s 
 Max heating removal capacity: 1.3 MW 
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3 Thermal Hydraulic Analysis of the ITER IBED PHTS 
 
One of the main challenges of the ITER fusion reactor is to effectively remove large 
amount of heat deposited to the surface of the plasma facing components (IO, Plant 
Description Document, 2009). The Tokamak Cooling Water System (TCWS) will 
accomplish the objective of removing about 1 GW of peak heat load from in-vessel 
components while maintaining pressures and temperatures of the coolant within 
acceptable and safe limits during different operational scenarios. A study of feasibility 
has been launched for integrating all the previous separate cooling systems for the main 
in-vessel components: (i.e. 3 loops for the First Wall-Blanket and 1 for the Divertor 
systems) in a unique main cooling circuit of the TCWS (Dell Orco & alii, 2011). This 
circuit, called IBED PHTS (Integrated Blanket, Edge localized mode coils (ELMs) and 
Divertor Primary Heat Transfer System, consists of five independent cooling trains (four 
operational and one in stand-by), one steam pressurizer, supply and return headers, 
ring manifolds and connections to all the in-vessel components (i.e. First Wall Blanket, 
Divertor, ELM, Diagnostics and other Ports clients). During plasma pulses the main 
function of the IBED PHTS is to provide cooling water to all the in-vessel components, 
transferring their heat load to the environment via secondary and tertiary cooling 
circuits. The IBED PHTS will also provide water baking at 240 ºC and 4.4 MPa to remove 
the impurities permeated in the structures from the plasma facing components for 
optimal plasma control (IO, TCWS System Description Document, 2011). The water 
baking of the circuit shall be performed within three days, two days for the heat-up 
phase and one day for the cool down phase. Proper heat-up and cool-down rates have 
been established to limit within acceptable limits thermal stresses. 
 
Due to the plasma heat deposition on the surfaces of the in-vessel components and 
subsequent increase in hot leg temperature, a large amount of water volume is 
transferred from the hot legs of the circuit to the surge-line of the pressurizer during 
each burn cycle. This causes rapid increase of pressure and temperature of the system 
and the following actions are proposed to counteract these variations: 
 
 spray injection in the upper dome of the pressurizer from the Chemical and 
Volume Control System (CVCS) to reduce the pressure  
 flow rates control through heat exchangers and their bypass loops to regulate the 
heat transfer from the primary system to the environment via secondary and 
tertiary loops.  
 
The dynamic behavior of the IBED PHTS is investigated by means of RELAP5 ® code to 
simulate the response of the system during plasma pulse both with a lumped and a 
detailed model of the circuit. 
 
RELAP5® is a transient 1-D system code for thermal-hydraulic analysis in which the 
fluid may be a mixture of steam, water, noncondensables, and a nonvolatile solute. 
 
RELAP5® has been largely used in the nuclear fission field to perform both operational 
and abnormal transients, it has been benchmarked against numerous experiments, and 
a large user database of commonly accepted modeling exists. 
 
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
52 
This chapter focuses on the prediction of the thermal hydraulic behavior of the IBED 
PHTS during plasma pulses, describing the various activity of the analysis, the 
geometrical assessment of the circuit and the modelling with RELAP5® code.  
The results have been compared with design and operational requirement. Possible 
strategies to enhance the system performances have been formulated in view of the 
obtained results. 
 
3.1 Description of the IBED PHTS system 
 
A system-engineering study has been carried out  to investigate the transient behaviour 
of the proposed Integrated Blanket Edge Localized Mode (ELMs) and Divertor Primary 
Heat Transfer System (IBED PHTS) for ITER during plasma operation. 
The conceptual design (2004) for the First Wall-Blanket (FW-BLK) and Divertor (DIV) is 
based on four separate primary cooling circuits, each one with a separate train of pump, 
heat exchangers, by-pass and pressurizer; all these 4 circuits plus the Neutral Beam 
Injectors (NBI) PHTS were located on the TCWS Vault, at level four (L4) of the Tokamak 
building.  
The IBED PHTS (Dell Orco & alii, 2011)proposes to merger the previous four loops (FW-
BLK + DIV) in a common integrated circuit with only one pressurizer and five separate 
identical cooling (four operative plus one spare) trains, with three separate distributions 
(inlet/outlet) for the FW/BLK, ELM and Upper Ports’ Clients, one distribution 
(inlet/outlet) for DIV and another distribution (inlet/outlet) for the Equatorial and 
Lower Ports’ clients, (see Figures 3.1-3.3). 
The pressurizer of the IBED loop is connected to one of the horizontal header (the hot 
one) and is located into the TCWS Vault. 
The process operation and control of the IBED PHTS (this is also valid for the entire 
Tokamak Cooling Water System) is managed by a dedicated autonomous 
Instrumentation and Control Plant (Plant System I&C, mainly PLCs) linked to the Central 
I&C Systems (Conventional, Interlock and Safety) for the coordination between different 
machine components and general supervision (IO, Interface Control Document (ICD) 
Between SSEN (PBS43) – TOKAMAK Cooling Water System). 
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Figure 3.1: Tokamak Cooling Water System Overview 
The proposed IBED PHTS would be designed to be able to provide cooling water to three 
FW-BLK loops, one Divertor loop and one equatorial port loop by using five independent 
cooling trains. Each cooling train is connected to the supply (cold leg) and return (hot 
leg) horizontal headers and it consists of two main pumps, a cluster of four Shell & 
Tubes Heat Exchangers with one by-pass loop. 
  
 
Figure 3.2: IBED PHTS Overview in TCWS Vault 
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A steam pressurizer of approximately 37.5 m3 volume is connected to the return leg by a 
surge line. The baking circuit is also connected in parallel to the supply and return 
headers to perform the water baking when the other cooling trains are isolated by 
closed valves. The major equipment and piping of the IBED PHTS is located in the TCWS 
Vault, at Level 4 in the Tokamak Building. The IBED PHTS piping for cooling the in-
vessel components is routed from the TCWS Vault to the Upper and Lower Pipe Chases 
supply and return Ring Manifolds and then from Ring manifolds to the Vacuum Vessel 
interfaces by dedicated distributions. 
 
The IBED PHTS shall be able to perform the following duties (Dell Orco & alii, 2011): 
 
 Supply cooling water to the in-vessel components and in port components, ELMs 
and VS coils during plasma operation (Max heat load to remove: 880 MW) at 70 
°C and 4.0 MPa at clients inlet; 
 Provide water baking at 4.4 MPa and 240 ºC to remove impurities from the 
permeated form the plasma facing components; 
 Provide primary confinement to Tritium and Activated Corrosion Products 
(ACPs) generated during plasma operation; 
 Protect the clients from over-pressurization by safety relief valves connected to 
the pressure suppression tank; 
 Monitor of water chemistry through the relevant CVCS;  
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The calculations made by RELAP5 in transient condition aimed at obtaining the thermal-
hydraulic characteristics of the circuit in terms of temperatures, pressure drops and 
flow rates during plasma pulse scenario. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: IBED Process Flow Diagram (PFD), AREVA US (2011) 
 
Table 3.1 summarizes the main operational parameters of the IBED PHTS both during 
plasma operation and water baking, while Tables 3.2 and 3.3 report the geometric data 
for Divertor and FW-BLK piping respectively. 
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Table 3.1  IBED PHTS Data 
 
 
Table 3.2 Pipe Geometries for Divertor 
DIVERTOR CASSETTES (54) 
 
Lower IN-VESSEL to LOWER PIPE CHASE 
 
54 SINGLE PIPES 
 
DN 65 
Schedule 40 
Pipe External Diameter[m] 0.073 
Wall thickness[m] 0.00516 
Pipe Inner Diameter[m] 0.06268 
Cross Area[m2] 0.003086 
Length[m] 29.7 
n. of bows 90 degree 13 
n. of bends 45 degree 2 
Flow Rate[kg/s] 6.1 
Fluid Velocity[m/s] 
 
Coolant Volume[m3] 0.091644 
18 COLLECTORS  
 
DN 100 
Schedule 40 
Pipe External Diameter[m] 0.1143 
Wall thickness[m] 0.00602 
Pipe Inner Diameter[m] 0.10226 
Cross Area[m2] 0.008213 
Length[m] 11.5 
n. of bows 90 degree 4 
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
57 
n. of bends 45 degree 
 
Flow Rate[kg/s] 6.1 
Fluid Velocity[m/s] 
 
Coolant Volume[m3] 0.094449 
1 OUTLET RING MANIFOLD 
 
DN 300 
Schedule 80 
Pipe External Diameter[m] 0.3239 
Wall thickness[m] 0.0174 
Pipe Inner Diameter[m] 0.2891 
Cross Area[m2] 0.065643 
Length[m] 140 
n. of bows 90 degree 0 
n. of bends 20 degree 18 
Flow Rate[kg/s] 6.1 
Fluid Velocity[m/s] 
 
Coolant Volume[m3] 9.18997 
from LOWER PIPE CHASE to TCWS VAULT 
 
1 HEADER 
 
DN 450 
Schedule 80 
Pipe External Diameter[m] 0.4572 
Wall thickness[m] 0.0238 
Pipe Inner Diameter[m] 0.4096 
Cross Area[m2] 0.131768 
Length[m] 28.5 
n. of bows 90 degree 3 
n. of bends 45 degree 
 
Flow Rate[kg/s] 6.1 
Fluid Velocity[m/s] 
 
Coolant Volume[m3] 3.755386 
TCWS Vault 
 
OUTLET VAULT MANIFOLD 
 
DN 1000 
Schedule 40 
Pipe External Diameter[m] 40 inches 
  
Pipe Inner Diameter[m] 1.016 
Cross Area[m2] 0.810732 
Length[m] 38.7 
n. of bows 90 degree 5 
n. of bends 45 degree 
 
Flow Rate[kg/s] 18.3 
Fluid Velocity[m/s] 
 
Coolant Volume[m3] 31.37533 
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Table 3.3 Pipe geometries for FW-BLK 
UPPER PIPE CHASE 
 
OUTLET COLLECTOR (18) 
 
DN 150 
Schedule 40 
Pipe External Diameter[m] 0.1683 
Wall thickness[m] 0.00711 
Pipe Inner Diameter[m] 0.15408 
Cross Area[m2] 0.018646 
Length[m] 5.986 
n. of bows 90 degree 1 
n. of bends 45 degree 
 
Flow Rate[kg/s] 177.8 
Fluid Velocity[m/s] 
 
Coolant Volume[m3] 0.111614 
UPPER PIPE CHASE 
 
OUTLET RING MANIFOLD (3) 
 
DN 300 
Schedule 40 
Pipe External Diameter[m] 0.3239 
Wall thickness[m] 0.0103 
Pipe Inner Diameter[m] 0.3033 
Cross Area[m2] 0.072249 
Length[m] 121.41 
n. of bows 90 degree 
 
n. of bends 45 degree 
 
Flow Rate[kg/s] 1066.8 
Fluid Velocity[m/s] 
 
Coolant Volume[m3] 8.771809 
CVCS AREA  
 
OUTLET PENETRATION (3) 
 
DN 300 
Schedule 40 
Pipe External Diameter[m] 0.3239 
Wall thickness[m] 0.0103 
Pipe Inner Diameter[m] 0.3033 
Cross Area[m2] 0.072249 
Length[m] 22.8 
n. of bows 90 degree 3 
n. of bends 45 degree 
 
Flow Rate[kg/s] 1066.8 
Fluid Velocity[m/s] 
 
Coolant Volume[m3] 1.647288 
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TCWS Vault 
 
OUTLET VAULT MANIFOLD 
 
DN 1000 
Schedule 40 
Pipe External Diameter[m] 40 inches 
  
Pipe Inner Diameter[m] 1.016 
Cross Area[m2] 0.810732 
Length[m] 38.7 
n. of bows 90 degree 5 
n. of bends 45 degree 
 
Flow Rate[kg/s] 3200.4 
Fluid Velocity[m/s] 
 
Coolant Volume[m3] 31.37533 
TCWS Vault 
 
HEAT EXCHANGERS INLET HEADER (5) 
 
DN 500 
Schedule 40 
Pipe External Diameter[m] 0.508 
Wall thickness[m] 0.015 
Pipe Inner Diameter[m] 0.478 
Cross Area[m2] 0.179451 
Length[m] 13.86 
n. of bows 90 degree 1 
n. of bends 45 degree 
 
Flow Rate[kg/s] 640.08 
Fluid Velocity[m/s] 
 
Coolant Volume[m3] 2.48719 
TCWS Vault 
 
HEAT EXCHANGERS INLET DISTRIBUTION (3x5) 
 
DN 200 
Schedule 40 
Pipe External Diameter[m] 0.2191 
Wall thickness[m] 0.00818 
Pipe Inner Diameter[m] 0.20274 
Cross Area[m2] 0.032283 
Length[m] 2.1 
n. of bows 90 degree 1 
n. of bends 45 degree 
 
Flow Rate[kg/s] 213.36 
Fluid Velocity[m/s] 
 
Coolant Volume[m3] 0.067794 
HEAT EXCHANGERS OUTLET DISTRIBUTION 
(3x5)  
DN 200 
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Schedule 40 
Pipe External Diameter[m] 0.2191 
Wall thickness[m] 0.00818 
Pipe Inner Diameter[m] 0.20274 
Cross Area[m2] 0.032283 
Length[m] 1.25 
n. of bows 90 degree 1 
n. of bends 45 degree 
 
Flow Rate[kg/s] 213.36 
Fluid Velocity[m/s] 
 
Coolant Volume[m3] 0.040353 
TCWS Vault 
 
HEAT EXCHANGERS OUTLET HEADER (5) 
 
DN 500 
Schedule 40 
Pipe External Diameter[m] 0.508 
Wall thickness[m] 0.015 
Pipe Inner Diameter[m] 0.478 
Cross Area[m2] 0.179451 
Length[m] 4.47 
n. of bows 90 degree 0 
n. of bends 45 degree 
 
Flow Rate[kg/s] 640.08 
Fluid Velocity[m/s] 
 
Coolant Volume[m3] 0.802146 
 
3.2 ITER IBED PHTS LOOP MODELING 
 
The geometry of the input model has been defined taking into account 3-D models, 
Process Flow Diagrams (PFD) and the Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams (P&ID). The 
inputs check has been done by steady state runs with a simplified model for the 
pressurizer (i.e. a time dependent volume filled of water). This time dependent model 
provides the information on the pressure inside the pressurizer, the sprayed water from 
CVCS and the surge water flow rate from the primary system. This method permits 
(RELAP Code Development Team, 2003) to avoid oscillation of the pressure that could 
impair the validity of the results, especially at the very begin of the run (e.g. unrealistic 
values of pressure in proximity of valves).  
In a second phase, the time dependent volume has been replaced for the real calculation 
with an 8 volumes pressurizer and its associated spray line in the transient.  
A lumped loop (see Figure 3.5: IBED Lumped loop) has been firstly realized and the 
validity of  some input parameters  have been verified, in particular for the control cards 
required to allow the temperature control inside the loop and hence the volume of water 
of the entire system. Then a second model (see Figure 3.7: IBED PHTS RELAP5 
NODALIZATION), called the detailed nodalization, has been realized simulating a circuit 
layout closer to the real one. In the following both models are described, while only the 
results obtained for the detailed loop are reported for sake of brevity. 
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3.2.1 Description of the thermal-hydraulics analysis 
 
  The IBED PHTS  has been modelled using RELAP5 code; 
  The pressurizer and surge-line geometries have been taken from 2D-3D 
drawings, also an Excel file with all the length, diameter and schedule of the 
entire IBED circuit has been created; 
 The thermal- hydraulic parameter (circuit pressure and temperatures) have been 
taken from (IO, TCWS System Description Document, 2011); 
 To simulate the transient, a two phase non-equilibrium model has been 
implemented to take  in account the interactions between liquid and vapour 
phases inside the pressurizer (RELAP Code Development Team, 2003); 
 The total amount of coolant inventory inside the circuit (CVCS not included) was 
obtained by adding the inner volume of each pipe line or components; 
 The walls of the pressurizer were assumed as adiabatic (this is a conservative 
assumption in terms of pressure increase inside the pressurizer if a coolant 
insurge occurs). 
 
3.2.2 Lumped Loop 
 
The five cooling loops of IBED PHTS were firstly modelled as a single loop following the 
RELAP5 manual logic to lump multiple circuit: the flow rate of the lumped loop is the 
sum of the single loops flow rates, as well as the volumes and wet surface, while the 
average velocity and length has been kept equal to the single ones. 
The in vessel components were lumped in a heat source pipe of 50 volumes, where 30 of 
them generate 32 MW of thermal power each, with a total power of 960 MW. This value 
exceeds the real power that is physically possible to obtain inside the tokamak, which is 
about 880 MW. 
The modelled Heat Exchanger, that in steady state nominal conditions provides a 
temperature decrease of approximately 56 °C, represents the 4 active heat exchangers.  
The evaluation of pressure and temperature variation inside the pressurizer due to the 
thermal expansion of the coolant during a plasma pulse permits to define the required 
actions to mitigate the pressure fluctuation inside the system during normal operation 
scenarios.  
 
 
3.2.3 Pressurizer 
 
The RELAP5 model of the IBED pressurizer has taken the CATIA drawings of the IBED 
circuit developed by the CWS of ITER IO as reference for the layout of the pipes and 
components.   
 
The Pressurizer of the IBED circuit has a volume of about 72 m3; this value is 
considerably high for sucha a component, in particular comparing this value to the 
pressurizer volume of the previous IVCs PHTS concept (4 separated cooling loops, each 
one with a pressurizer of 22 m3. 
During a plasma pulse, the increase of the temperature of the hot leg (from 70 °C to 
126 °C) determines an increase in the average temperature of the entire circuit and 
therefore the thermal expansion of the coolant. In the following analysis a volume for 
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the hot leg of 214 m3 and the consequent change in the density that occurs in the water 
was teaken into account. In Table 3.4 the pressurizer data used for the RELAP5 model 
(see Figure 3.4), are reported. 
 
 
Table 3.4 IBED Pressurizer Data 
IBED Pressurizer Data 
Pressurizer Internal 
Volume (m3) 
70 
Pressurizer diameter (m) 3.5 
Pressurizer Height (m) 8 
Wall thickness (m) 0.052 
Design Pressure (MPa) 5.0 
 Pressure during plasma 
pulse (MPa) 
1.4 
Approximate Mass 
without water (tons) 
17.93 
Approximate Mass 
fulfilled of  water (tons) 
88.96 
Major Material 304L Stainless Steel   
Coolant Cold Leg 
Temperature (°C) 
70 
Coolant Cold Leg Density 
(kg/m3) 
979.4 
Coolant Outlet 
Temperature (°C) 
120 2)  
Coolant Hot Leg Density 
(kg/m3) 
945.2 
Coolant Saturation 
Temperature at 3 MPa (°C) 
234 
 
The increase in temperature leads to a volume increase in the coolant of about 7.75 m3. 
This coolant inventory volume increase determines also an increase in the level of the 
pressurizer and an increase in the overall pressure of the system. To reduce the 
pressurization of the system during normal operation two active systems could be used 
in parallel: Pilot Operated Relief Valve (PORV) and the Spray Injection from the CVCS. 
The Pressure Relief Valve, that is actuated by a passive system, has not been considered 
for this analyses, although is a mandatory component in terms of safety, since the 
simulation of a circuit over-pressurization scenario is beyond the scope of this work. 
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Figure 3.4: Pressurizer eight -volume model with spray injection and electrical heaters  
(detailed model) 
  
The simplified model represents the condition of the pressurizer if an insurge of water 
due to a plasma cycle pulse occurs, without any active action as spray injection in the top 
part of the pressurizer, opening of  a pilot operating relief  valve, or switch on of the 
electrical heaters.  
 
3.2.4 In-vessel components 
 
In the simplified model of the PHTS to heat coming from the plasma and transferred to 
the IVCs structural material is represented through heat structures The piping 
representing the IVCs were hence connected to the heat structures to simulate the 
power generation inside the tokamak. Obviously this model is based on an assumption 
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that is not representative of the real geometry of the in-vessel components, nevertheless 
it is helpful to try to understand the behaviour of the temperature and pressure in the 
global system (HXs and pressurizer) and to determine the logic of the active control of 
the system parameters such as pressure and flow rate. The pressure drop along the in-
vessel pipe in fact is the same of the expected pressure drops inside the divertor 
components.  
The total thermal power is 960 MW during the plasma pulses and 9.60 MW during the 
dwell time, to also take in account the heat load coming from in-vessel components 
generated by the activation of the materials. The main data related to the In-Vessel 
components are reported in Table 3.5 IBED In-Vessel data 
 
Table 3.5 IBED In-Vessel data 
IBED In-Vessel Data 
Divertor Heat Load (MW) 204 
FW-BLK Heat Load (MW) 736 
Pressurizer Height (m) 8 
Wall thickness (m) 0.052 
Pressure at inlet (MPa) 3.0 
 Pressure at outlet-
DIV(MPa) 
1.4  
Coolant Cold Leg 
Temperature (°C) 
70 
Coolant Cold Leg Density 
(kg/m3) 
979.4 
Coolant Outlet 
Temperature (°C) 
126  
Coolant Hot Leg Density 
(kg/m3) 
945.2 
Flow Rate (kg/s) 4550 
 
3.2.5 Heat Exchanger 
 
The heat exchangers of the IBED PHTS are five identical shell and tubes HXs, each one 
connected to the relative main pump. During normal operation activities, four of five 
HXs loops are working, while one is maintained in stand-by alternatively.  
The lumped heat exchanger model is based on a conceptual design performed 
particularly for this analysis. 
The 4+1 HXs were simulated as an equivalent heat exchanger, in order to simplify the 
scheme in terms of number of nodes and to reduce the computational time. 
The primary coolant flows inside the tubes, while the secondary fluid flow through the 
shell side. 
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3.2.6 Main Pump 
 
The main pump of the IBED PHTS has been modelled with the Westinghouse pump 
single-phase homologous tables. 
The pump characteristics have been obtained by the web site of SULZER® pump 
selector (Sulzer, 2011), once specified the flow rate (4550 kg/s) and the required 
pressure head (2.2 MPa). The data used in the input comes from the SULZER® catalogue 
of a SMN Double Suction Axially Split Pump. 
The lumped pump model is based on a conceptual design performed particularly for this 
analysis. 
In was possible to model the five (or ten, depending form the typology) pumps directly 
taking data from SULZER® catalogue without scaling, since there are several available 
solution for  flow rate of 1140 kg/s and pressure head of 2.2 MPa.  
The same thing was not possible for a flow rate of 4550 kg/s, so a scaling of the 
properties as torque an momentum of inertia (data required by the input) has been 
performed in order to fit the parameter requested by the circuit. 
 
3.2.7 By-pass 
 
The by-pass of the heat exchanger is a parallel pipeline to the heat exchanger managed 
by a control valve. 
Another control valve is set after the heat exchanger to regulate, in combination with the 
by-pass valve, the flow rate across the heat exchanger.  
Both valves opening and closing trips have been selected in order to obtain full flow rate 
across the heat exchanger during the burn phase.   
 
3.2.8 Spray Line 
 
The spray line is connected to the top of the pressurizer by a vertical oriented pipe and 
to the CVCS by an on/off valve. The spray injection is activated (valve opening) if the 
pressure inside the system goes up to 3.08 MPa and deactivated (valve closing) if the 
pressure is below 3.03 MPa.  
The CVCS is here represented as a Time Dependent Volume connected by a valve to the 
spray line. 
The water injected in the pressurizer is slightly subcooled than the one after the main 
pump in the cold leg of the PHTS to simulate the same condition of the water re-injected 
in the system by the CVCS. 
 
3.2.9 Description of the scenario 
 
The model represents the IBED PHTS behaviour during 11 plasma pulse, with time 
duration of 1800 seconds each cycle of Burn & Dwell; in particular the Burn lasts for 500 
seconds and dwell for 1300 seconds. During the plasma pulse, the spray injection and 
the heaters power modulation are performed in order to reduce the pressure absolute 
variation. The first plasma pulse starts at 100s, while the last one ends at 18600 
seconds.  
The Spray Line is here represented as a three cells-pipe connected with one single 
junction to the top of the Pressurizer vessel, and with a Time dependent junction to a 
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
66 
Time Dependent Volume 106 that simulates the CVCS (i.e. the injected coolant get an 
higher pressure and lower temperature than the main loop inventory).  
The electrical heaters are modelled as heat structures directly connected to the second 
cell of pressurizer walls of the and the heat generated within the heaters is varying 
during the time in function of the vapour generation required to counteract the 
depressurization of the vessel during a water outsurge. 
The component 170 in Figure 3.5 represents the main pump, which is connected to pipe 
150, i.e. the lumped representation of the entire pipeline between main pump and in-
vessel components. The pump has a fixed flow rate, and it is assumed that it works 
regularly for the whole period of the eleven burn and dwell cycles, that is 19000 seconds 
and is switched off for further 1000 s to simulate the pump cost-down and the following 
stagnation of the system. Pipe 500 represents the in vessel components in terms of total 
pressure drops and heat loads. Pipe 153 represents the entire pipeline between the 
outlet of the in vessel components and the connection to the pressurizer before the heat 
exchangers. Pipe 140 represents the primary side, u-tube shape, of the heat exchangers 
whilst pipe 240 represents the secondary side, shell shape, of the heat exchanger. 
Pipe 130 is the bypass of the heat exchangers, and, depending on the temperature in the 
cold leg, i.e. pipe 150, valves 126 and 135 regulate the flow rate respectively in the heat 
exchanger and in the by-pass. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: IBED Lumped loop 
 
A steady state input has been firstly modelled and run with a simplified pressurizer (i.e. 
a time dependent volume filled of water). The time dependent volume provide in this 
way the pressurizer pressure and supplies or absorbs water from the primary system as 
needed. This method permit to avoid oscillation of the calculation that could impair the 
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validity of the results, especially at the very begin of the run (e.g. unrealistic values of 
pressure in proximity of valves). Also, the modelling of the control system that maintains 
liquid level and temperature during the run could be avoided. 
 
The time dependent volume has been replaced by the 8 volumes pressurizer and its 
associated spray line in the transient. For this purpose, two different RESTART file have 
been created, one simulating the behaviour of the IBED PHTS without active control (i.e. 
spray injection and back-up heaters activation off), and the other with active  control of 
the system parameters (i.e. spray injection and back-up heaters activation on). 
 
3.2.10 Detailed Model 
 
The detailed model represents the IBED PHTS behaviour during 10 plasma pulse (see 
Table 3.6:Plasma Pulse Scenario  and Figure 3.6: Plasma Power to the IBED PHTS as 
function of the time), with time duration of 1800 seconds each cycle of Burn & Dwell; in 
particular the Burn lasts for 500 seconds and dwell for 1300 seconds. During the plasma 
pulse, the spray injection and the heaters power modulation were performed in order to 
reduce the pressure absolute variation. The first plasma pulse starts at 200s, while the 
last one ends at 16800 seconds.  
Table 3.6:Plasma Pulse Scenario 
Steady State period [s] 45 
Start of Power Ramp Down [s] 100 
First Plasma Pulse Start [s] 200 
Duration of Plasma Pulse [s] 400 
First Pulse End - Start of Power Ramp 
Down [s] 600 
End of Power Rump Down [s] 700 
End of first Cycle [s] 1900 
Duration of one single Cycle 
(Burn+Dwell) [s] 1800 
Total duration of the run [s] 20000 
 
The Pressurizer volume and the surge line, hence the connection of the Pressurizer with 
the Main Loop, has been modelled has the ones of the simplified model. 
The Spray Line is here represented as a three cells-pipe connected with one single 
junction to the top of the Pressurizer vessel, and with a Time dependent junction to a 
Time Dependent Volume that simulates the CVCS (i.e. the injected coolant get an higher 
pressure and lower temperature than the main loop inventory, reference from the P&ID 
of Ansaldo –Belgatom of the FW-BLK circuit).  
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Figure 3.6: Plasma Power to the IBED PHTS as function of the time 
The electrical heaters are modelled as heat structures directly connected to the 
pressurizer walls of the second cell and the heat generated within the heaters is varying 
during the time in function of the vapour generation required to counteract the 
depressurization of the vessel during a water outsurge. 
 
In Figure 3.7 the components 118, 138, 158, 178 and 198 represent the main pumps, 
which are connected to once cooling train each. The pumps have a fixed flow rate, and it 
is assumed that they all work regularly (except the one on the spare line) for the whole 
period of the ten burns and dwell cycles, that is 18000 seconds and is switched off for 
further 2000 s to simulate the pump cost-down and the following stagnation of the 
system.  
Pipe 511, 512, 541, 542, 571 and 572 represent the in vessel components of the First 
Wall-Blanket in terms of total pressure drops and heat loads; pipes 611 and 612 
represent the in vessel components of the Divertor (i.e. a lumped configuration of the 54 
Divertor Cassettes) in terms of total pressure drops and heat loads.  
 Pipes 106, 126, 146, 166 and 186 represent the primary side, u-tube shape, of the heat 
exchangers; at each one of the primary side tubes a secondary side pipe is associated by 
means of heat structures. 
Pipes 113, 133, 153, 173 and 193 are the bypass of the heat exchangers, and, depending 
on the temperature in the cold leg, i.e. pipe 150, associated control valves (e.g. 111 and 
114) regulate the flow rates respectively in the heat exchangers and in the by-passes. 
CCWS-1 circuit has been modelled taking into account the flow rate, the pressure at inlet 
of the secondary side of the HXs and the expected overall pressure drop.  
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Figure 3.7: IBED PHTS RELAP5 NODALIZATION   
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3.3 Detailed Model Results 
 
The results of the RELAP5 analysis for IBED PHTS are showed from Figure 3.8 up to 
Figure 3.20.  
 
Two different scenarios are discussed below, scenario #1 and scenario #2, to highlight 
the difference of pressure stability with or without the contribution of the active 
systems as pressurizer heaters and spray from CVCS. 
 
3.3.1 Scenario #1: Plasma Pulse without active action 
 
The scenario #1 represents the IBED PHTS loop transient during 10 plasma pulses 
without the spray injections from CVCS in the pressurizer upper dome and no activation 
of the heaters. The only performed active actions are the flow rate regulation by means 
of the heat exchangers by-pass loops, in order to reduce the temperature variation 
between burn and dwell phases and hence to avoid thermal cycling . 
 
Figure 3.8 shows the flow rates inside the main loop, in- vessel (blue line), the heat 
exchangers line (red line), and the bypass line of the heat exchangers (green line). 
 
Figure 3.8: Flow Rate vs. time in scenario#1 
 
The flow rate inside the heat exchanger is equal to the flow rate of the main loop during 
the plasma burn phases (the control valve after the HX is fully open), and consequently 
no coolant flows through the bypass (control valve of the bypass fully closed).  
At 100 s the power ramp-up starts, and at 200 s the first plasma pulse begins: the valves 
open/close respectively to the HXs lines and bypass lines. The plasma pulse lasts for 400 
s, and then ends in concomitancy with the power ramp down begin. At 700 s only the 
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decay heat has to be removed from the in-vessel components. Then dwell time begins, 
for 1200 s, i.e. at 1900 s the second power ramp up starts and at 2000 s the second 
plasma pulse is performed.  
 
Figure 3.9 shows the behaviour of the flow rate across the surge line of the Pressurizer 
during seven plasma pulse cycles. 
 
Figure 3.9: Flow rate across the insurge of the pressurizer 
 
 
At 1900 seconds the second power ramp up starts, and consequently, the temperature 
increase in the channel yields a volume expansion of the coolant in the hot leg, i.e. a 
water insurge in the pressurizer; these expansions are shown as top spikes on the graph. 
The burning phase lasts for about 500 seconds while the volume inside the pressurizer 
is quite stable after the initial expansion. Then the dwell time (plasma shutdown) starts 
and lasts 1300 seconds. These phases are represented by the bottom spikes in the graph, 
which represent the water exiting the pressurizer due to the temperature decrease and 
consequently volume contraction of the system. 
 
In Figure 3.10 the pressure behaviour indifferent region of the circuit is shown.  
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Figure 3.10: Pressures behaviour along IBED PHTS for scenario#1 
The x axis ends at about 11500 s, instead of 20000 s, and that is due to an error of low 
pressure in the code. Due to both the colder water insurge in the pressurizer during the 
burn, and to the partial flow rate across the heat exchanger during the dwell, the global 
average temperature of the system is decreasing, and hence the pressure.  
The trends of pressure in scenario#1 is showing that active actions, as spray injection 
and back-up heaters activation, are required in order to maintain the pressure variation 
within acceptable limits.  
Also an overall control logic of the system should be implemented to optimize each 
action to be performed to maintain the system parameters in acceptable margins during 
all the different operating scenarios. 
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3.3.2 Scenario #2 plasma pulses with spray injection and heaters activation 
 
Figure 3.11 shows the flow rates in the PHTS during 10 plasma pulses. At 18000 s the 
pump is switched off to simulate the pump cost down phenomena, and hence the 
stagnation condition in the circuit. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11: Flow rates during 10 plasma pulse with spray injection and heaters activation 
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The flow rates inside the main loop are shown in Figure 3.12, the heat exchangers line 
(red line), and the bypass line of the heat exchangers (green line). The flow rate inside 
the heat exchanger is equal to the flow rate of the main loop during the plasma burn 
phases (the control valve after the HX is fully open), and consequently the flow rate is 
null in the bypass (control valve of the bypass fully closed).  
 
Figure 3.12: Flow rate in the heat exchanger and in the bypass 
 
At 100 s the power ramp-up starts, and at 200 s the first plasma pulse begins: the valves 
open/close respectively to the HXs lines and bypass lines. The plasma pulse lasts for 400 
s, and then ends in concomitancy with the begin of the power ramp down. At 700 s only 
the decay heat has to be removed from the in-vessel components. Then dwell time lasts 
for 1200 s, i.e. at 1900 s the second power ramp up starts and at 2000 s the second 
plasma pulse is performed. 
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Figure 3.13 reports in detail the flow rate in the by-pass (green line) and in the heat 
exchangers (red line) along 10 plasma pulses. During the burn phase the by-pass flow 
rate is 0 (by-pass valve closed) and the flow rate in the primary side of the heat 
exchanger is 4500 kg/s. 
When the plasma is on, the temperature increase in the circuit drives to a volume 
expansion in the hot-leg, and hence pressure increases inside the whole circuit. 
To counteract the rapid increase in pressure below 0.1 absolute MPa (Pressure Set-Point 
for Spray Injection is fixed at 4.05 MPa), a spray injection is performed on the top of the 
pressurizer. 
When the pressure returns to the set-point value, the valve regulating the injection 
across the spray closes. 
After the plasma shut down, i.e. dwell phase, the temperature in the cold leg begins to 
decrease, and the control valve of the bypass opens to reduce the heat transfer to the 
secondary system and hence avoid a depressurization of the primary system. During the 
dwell time, the back-up heaters counteract the decrease in temperature and pressure of 
the system, performing a smoothing of the fluctuation of the system parameters. 
 
 
Figure 3.13: Detail of the Flow Rates in one cooling train (red line), one by-pass (green line) and in-
vessel component (blue line) 
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The  detail of the Pressurizer Insurge flow rate during the whole simulation (10 plasma 
pulses) is shown in Figure 3.14. 
 
Figure 3.14: Flow Rate at the Insurge of the Pressurizer 
 
As expected, during the ramp up of the power and the consequential burn phase, the 
entire system experiences a volume increase of the coolant; this phenomena leads to a 
positive flow rate (water entering in the Pressurizer) in the surge line. Vice versa, after 
the end of the burn phase and in concomitance with the start of the power ramp down, 
the overall volume of coolant rapidly decrease; this phenomena leads to a negative flow 
rate (water exiting the Pressurizer) in the surge line. 
 
In the simulation, the CVCS has been simulated as a closed system connected with the 
top of the pressurizer by a valve that opens at a certain set-point of pressure, while in 
the real system the CVCS has several connections with the IBED PHTS. A detailed model 
of the CVCS was out of the scope of these calculations. 
 
In Figure 3.15 the behaviour of the water temperature along the IBED PHTS during 10 
plasma pulses is showed. The red line represents the temperature inside the hot leg of 
the primary circuit of the Heat Exchanger, while the green one represents the 
temperature in the secondary side. The delta T between hot and cold leg is about °50 C 
during the burn phase, whilst during the dwell phase the temperature inside the IBED 
PHTS approaches the temperature of the secondary system inlet, due to the closure of 
the HXs lines after the stop of the plasma.   
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Figure 3.15: Temperature of Primary and Secondary Side of HXs during ten plasma pulses 
 
Since the power to be removed from the in-vessel components rapidly decrease after the 
plasma shut-down, and together with a valve logic that is regulated only by temperature 
(i.e. without anticipatory actions to prevent too low temperatures on the primary side of 
the heat exchangers), the secondary continues to remove heat from the primary side. 
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Figure 3.16 shows the behaviour of the pressure during 10 plasma pulses. At 100 s the 
power ramp up begins, then at 200 s plasma pulse starts, and consequently, the piston 
effect due to the water insurge in the pressurizer yield an abrupt increase of pressure. 
To counteract the increase in pressure a spray injection is performed during the water 
injection phase.  
 
 
Figure 3.16: Pressure vs. Time at pump outlet and divertor outlet 
 
The water of the spray comes from the CVCS system, i.e. the most subcooled water of the 
system, since the pressure is higher and the temperature is slightly lower than the ones 
of the cold-leg. The total amount of sprayed water for each cycle of plasma pulse is 
around 600 kg. In order to avoid the Pressurizer level increase during several cycles, this 
water shall be discharged during the Dwell phase of each cycle (not simulated in the 
model) . 
After the Burn phase, the overall temperature of the system decreases to the initial one, 
and consequently also the volume of inventory decreases. As effect of the water 
outsurge, also the pressure inside the loop is decreasing and the activation of the 
electrical heaters are required in order to reduce the pressure fluctuation. 
Electrical heaters are supposed to work continuously, but during the dwell phase their 
power needs to be increased in order to evaporate water inside the Pressurizer and 
hence reduce the fluctuation of the pressure. The required back-up power has been 
estimated as 2600 kW. 
After 18000 s, the pumps are simulated to trip, consequently the pressure rapidly 
decrease and finally increases again due to the heaters inside the pressurizer. 
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Figure 3.17 shows the pressure behaviour during eleven plasma pulse of the outlet of 
the in-vessel components for the Divertor branch. 
 
 
Figure 3.17: Pressure vs. Time in the detailed snapshot of in-vessel (Divertor) components 
It is evident, comparing the same results for scenario#1, how the spray injection reduce 
the pressure rise up during the burn phase, and how both the bypass opening and the 
heaters action contribute to maintain the depressurization inside the range of +/- 0.15 
MPa. 
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The behaviour of the water temperature inside the surge line of the pressurizer is shown 
in Figure 3.18. 
 
 
Figure 3.18: Surge line temperature during ten plasma pulse 
 
At 450 K, i.e. 180 °C, the saturation pressure is ~1.0 MPa, since the calculated minimum 
of pressure in the system is 2.0 MPa, the boiling of water in the surge-line of the 
pressurizer, also considering local pressure drop, never occurs during the ten plasma 
pulses. 
Nevertheless, in this calculation the material of the pipeline hasn’t been taken into 
account: to better simulate the behaviour of the temperature of the coolant entering and 
exiting the pressurizer, a proper heat structure for the surge line and the insulation 
material around it should be modelled, also taking into account the room temperature. 
 
  
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
82 
In figure 3.19, the behaviour of the saturation temperature inside the Pressurizer is 
shown.  
 
Figure 3.19: Saturation temperature for steam/water in the pressurizer 
 
The variation of pressure inside the system due to the ten plasma pulse yield to an 
oscillation of the saturation temperature of the pressurizer in a narrow range of +/- 5 °C 
around 215 °C. 
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Figure 3.20 reports the behaviour of the pressurizer level during plasma pulses. The 
volume expansion and contraction each plasma cycle is evidently showed by the peaks 
of the curve. The CVCS is simulated as an independent system that only injects spray 
from the top of pressurizer into the IBED PHTS. Due to the spray injections, performed 
to limit the increase in pressure, the level increase constantly during burn, and remain 
constant during dwell: that also implies that the level of the pressurizer shall be 
controlled by the CVCS to avoid the filling of the pressurizer and the solid system 
condition that would lead to a pressure higher than the design one. 
 
 
Figure 3.20: Pressurizer level (in meters) during plasma pulses 
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3.4 Conclusions 
 
The current analysis shows that the proposed IBED PHTS pressure is accurately 
controlled, by spraying cold water from the top of the pressurizer and using an electrical 
heater. This simulation has taken into account a uniform and smooth distribution of the 
heat deposition in the in-vessel components, whilst in reality plasma disruptions are 
expected to occur randomly with a sudden temperature increase in cooling channel that 
might lead to an overall flow rate unbalance. Therefore, the control system will have to 
regulate independent loops to avoid unbalance by regulating control valves 
opening/closure. 
The comparison between the scenario#1 and the scenario#2 is showing that the 
pressure of the system shall be controlled within a narrow range of fluctuation with 
specific action during the different phases of operation.  
 
These actions are: 
 
1. Spray injection of water from the CVCS to avoud pressure peal during the power 
ramp-up of the plasma pulses; 
2. The liquid level setpoint of the Pressurizer can be maintained constant by the 
CVCS Control Volume Tank: this allows maintaining the same values also for the 
other parameter as spray injection flow rate and heater power since the 
pressurizer inventory is the same at the beginning of each Burn operation; 
3. The electrical heaters permit the reduction of pressure decrease during the 
outsurge of water and hence to re-establish the value of pressure at set-point 
during the Dwell in order to permit another Burn cycle. 
4. The possibility to use also a PORV will contribute to smooth the operation of the 
CVCS and the start-up of the Back-up heaters. The possibility to maintain the 
heaters at a constant power, instead an on/off functioning, will permit to reach a 
higher availability of such components. 
 
3.4.1 Proposed Control Logic 
The pressure of the system can be controlled through the actuation of pressurizer 
heaters (to increase the pressure of the circuit) and water spray (to decrease the 
pressure of the circuit). Attention shall be paid to the life-cycle of the pressurizer back-
up heaters (used during the dwell time), which are supposed to face thermal fatigue due 
to the high number of call on service (once each dwell time). 
 
The coolant temperature can be controlled by switching the control valves of the HXs 
and increase the flow rate in the bypass line, such a way that the pump velocity is not 
required to vary during the transition between plasma pulse and dwell time and vice 
versa. However, in the real circuit attention shall be paid to possible flow unbalance due 
to the opening/closing of the by-pass valve, which may induce multiple pump trip and 
hence a general loss of flow within the circuit. 
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However, the pulsed reactor PHTS will have to manage the coolant volume 
expansion/contraction during plasma burn/dwell phase, respectively. 
A possible strategy is to monitor the level of the pressurizer and regulate the volume of 
the circuit during each dwell time, through the CVCS associated to the PHTS.  
In any case, the quite large temperature difference between the pressurizer and the 
cooling circuit (about 50 °C) may induce thermal fatigue on the pressurizer surge line, 
and hence increase the risk of leakage/rupture of the pipeline 
 
The overall trends of pressure and temperature during 10 plasma pulses has been 
simulated taking in account conservative parameters, and the limitation of fluctuation of 
pressure has been reached by means the active control systems listed above. 
Moreover, The possibility to integrate a PORV on the top of the pressurizer will also 
permit to estimate the effective smoothing of the operation required to restore the 
pressure to the set point. 
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4 Failure Mode and Effect Analysis for DEMO HCPB concept 
 
4.1 Introduction 
One of the main targets of fusion researchers is to demonstrate the safety of the fusion 
process during all the project phases, from design to decommissioning  (Romanelli, 
2012), (Colombo, 1990). Therefore since the very beginning, a safety oriented approach 
is applied. The assessment of the failure modes of DEMO systems, the identification of 
the causes and the formulation of possible consequences and mitigating actions is one of 
the key points to ensure the safety of the overall project (WENRA, 2013),(Johnston, 
2015), (Carloni, 2014). 
However, the current level of the DEMO plant design (G. Federici, 2014) is not so 
detailed to justify a Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) at component or system 
level. 
In the following an alternative method is proposed and detailed to analyse the DEMO 
Helium cooled Pebble Bed Blanket (HCPB) PHTS and its auxiliaries. 
 
4.1.1 Description of the Methodology  
Usually a Functional FMEA (FFMEA) is applied to define an exhaustive set of accident 
initiators when the project level is still in a pre-conceptual status (Pinna, Porfiri, & 
Cambi, 2002). The functions associated to the systems are firstly listed and then the 
consequences of the loss of each function are analysed. Despite the lack of information of 
systems design, through this approach it is possible to identify elementary initiators, 
possible causes and safety consequences. By the FFMEA, it is possible to provide a 
complete list of potential accident initiating events (IEs) and give suggestions in order to 
improve the machine overall safety. From the complete list of IEs, a set of Postulated 
Initiating Events (PIEs) can be identified as the most representative in terms of 
challenging conditions for the safety of the plant. Each elementary accident initiator is 
associated to the related PIE, according to the procedure explained below. In such a way, 
it is possible to concentrate safety studies on the most relevant accident sequences, 
avoiding studies related to the other minor and almost equivalent sequences. 
Each important initiator could then be discussed in order to define the accident 
sequences that could stem from the initiator and the deterministic assessment that 
could be required. 
 
As explained in (Pinna, Porfiri, & Cambi, 2002), firstly each system is subdivided in 
different subsystem following the structure of simplified process flow diagrams (PFDs). 
For each subsystem, i.e. for each specific component, different functions are identified 
and listed. Hence for each function the failure associated to its loss is postulated and the 
possible causes analysed and listed. The individuation of the causes has to be handled 
carefully: this refers to the failure of components (e.g. piping, valves, I&C)of a subsystem 
(e.g. cold leg between steam generator and pump) that can induce the loss of the specific 
function.  If the design detail level doesn’t allow individuating in the diagrams all the 
components of a system, engineering judgement is applied, also using reference from 
similar systems with higher level of design detail. 
The consequences associated to the loss of function from a component are analyzed for 
the overall system. Such consequences can be distinguished in immediately occurring 
after the loss of the function and aggravating sequences. A set of mitigating actions is 
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also proposed to limit the failure consequences. Eventually the event is categorized as 
Initiating Event (IE). 
Once all the IEs are identified, similar IEs are grouped in a unique PIE. The individuated 
PIE must be the most challenging in terms of safety to encompass also the other IEs 
consequences.  
For each PIE the accidental sequence is described considering aggravating events and 
possible mitigating actions. 
The accidental scenarios, i.e. the accidental sequences most representative in terms of 
safety, are defined by grouping different PIEs with similar consequences, and the 
phenomenology of each scenario described. 
Selection of accident sequences for which deterministic accident transient analyses have 
to be performed has to be defined as summa of the FFMEA activities. 
 
4.1.2 Applicable failure modes 
Applicable failure modes are those affecting the loss of function of a component. 
Generally these are: 
 
 Fail to operate 
 Leakage 
 Rupture 
 Fails to start 
 Fails to stop 
 
 When loss of function is caused by the fail of the structural materials, it is (Aktaa, 
Kecskes, & Cismondi, 2012) due to:   
 Electromagnetic loads which causes stress in most parts of structures 
 Cycle thermo-mechanical loads due to temperature fields; nonhomogeneous 
temperature causes cycle peak stress at geometrical discontinuities,  
 Radiological due to modification of materials properties because  radiation 
(irradiation creep, swelling, embrittlement, hardening/softening, loss of 
elongation, thermal conductivity modification, etc.) 
 Chemical damage due to corrosion  
 Physical damage due to physical sputtering and coolant erosion 
 
Then, failure mode is produce by damage mechanism that increase stress in a 
component,  resulting in a  reduction of material resistance to a given failure mode as: 
 Immediate elastic collapse and instability: caused by too high primary stress 
(electromagnetic loads) 
 Progressive inelastic deformation (Ratcheting): increase of inelastic strain under 
cyclic primary and secondary stress (cycle thermo-mechanical loads) 
 Creep: occur in high temperature region>370 °C for EUROFER). Fatigue: it is 
relevant where appear high stress peaks (thermomechanical loads)  
 Creep-fatigue: temperature peaks generate stress loads: failure is accelerated in 
discontinuities due to long pulsed operation. Lifetime limiting. 
 Fatigue: relevant in notches and discontinuities in temperature regions < 370 °C. 
 Fast fracture: occur in welds caused by defects. 
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4.1.3 Operating conditions 
Normal operation condition has been considered for all the Initiating Events (IE) as no 
sufficient data are available for other operation scenarios. 
 
4.1.4 Classification of the events 
In order to understand the probability of DBA and BDBA, mitigation of accident and dose 
limit to the public, safety risk approach is shown in Figure 4.1. It schematizes the 
behaviour of public dose vs. probability (i.e. occurrence rate or frequency) on a 
logarithmic scale. The red line in the figure separates dose rates in the acceptable risk 
zone (left) and the not acceptable risk zone (right) depending on the probability. 
Accidents events with frequency larger than 10-6 are classified as DBA; while Design 
Basis Extension with frequency lower than 10-6 is considerable as BDBA. The field of 
acceptable accident is further limited by a maximum admissible dose rate that is related 
to the so called “fusion bounding accident sequences” in green bar, which are the worst 
consequences of an accident driven by in-plant energies. This was assumed to be a total 
loss of cooling from all loops in the plant, with no active cooling, no active safety system 
operating, and no intervention whatever for a prolonged period. The decay heat is 
rejected by passive conduction and radiation only. For this kind of events a maximum 
limit of dose of 50 mSv was selected, which is recommended by the ICRP and is used as 
ITER dose criterion. Accidents in the not acceptable risk zone can be brought back to the 
acceptable risk zone taking proper countermeasures, e.g. improving the confinement 
reduces the dose rate and can move the accidental event down to the acceptable risk 
zone; adding certain safety systems, even if the dose rate is unchanged, can reduce the 
probability of the event moving it to the left into the acceptable risk zone. 
 
Figure 4.1: Safety risk approach (Gulden & alii, 2012) 
 
4.1.5 Approach proposed for DEMO HCPB concept 
The approach followed for the present work is based on a FMEA at component level with 
evaluation of loss of functions, such an approach is proposed by the candidate in 
collaboration with T. Pinna and D. Dongiovanni (ENEA-FUS Laboratories, Frascati). 
Although DEMO PHTS and its auxiliaries are still in a pre-conceptual design phase, some 
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assumptions for the loop layout and components features can be taken from similar 
works done in the past (Dalle Donne, 1994). The PHTS and SCWS PFDs for the DEMO 
HCPB concept have been re-drawn on the basis of some simplified sketches reported in 
(Dalle Donne, 1994).   
Through this, all the available information about the systems to be analysed are 
collected both in tabular and graphical form, hence a good level of detail is reached.  
Therefore a wider range of failures can be considered and eventually a more detailed 
analysis can be conducted assuming specific systems layout and components 
performances (e.g. dual cooling of the FW/BLK). 
 
The following steps have been pursued performing the work: 
 
 Drawing of PFDs for DEMO HCPB concept; 
 Identification of the plant functional breakdown;  
 Assessment of possible loss of functions associated to the components by the 
FMEA; 
 Identification of Postulated Initiating Events; 
 Discussion of possible sequences arising from PIEs; 
Failure Rate for the DEMO HCPB piping and Equipment 
In the following Table 4.1 the values proposed in (Dalle Donne, 1994) of failure rates for 
the HCPB DEMO concept are shown 
 
Table 4.1: Values of failure rate for DEMO HCPB concept 
FAILURE MODES Failure Rate [1/h] 
External Circuits  
Pipe Failure 3E-9 
SG Failure 1.2E-5 
Valve Failure 1E-6 
Blower Failure 1E-5 
Collector Failure 1E-8 
Blanket Segment  
Electron Beam weld [1/m] 1E-9 
Diffusion weld [1/m] 1E-8 
Butt Weld [1/m] 1E-9 
Pipe Bend (180°) 1E-8 
Pipe Bend (90°) 5E-9 
Straight Pipe [1/m] 1E-10 
 
4.2 Description of the Systems 
The current design of the HCPB, is reported in (Boccaccini, Norajitra, & Cismondi, 2012). 
A detailed design description of the  HCPB Blanket is provided in (Carloni & Kecskes, 
Helium Cooled Blanket Design Development, 2013). 
In the following is reported a brief summary of the systems analysed in the FMEA, which 
are: 
 
· HCPB Blanket 
· HCPB PHTS 
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· Coolant Purification System 
· Secondary Cooling System 
 
HCPB Blanket 
The current DEMO HCPB Blanket concept is subdivided in 16 sectors, each one of 22.5°. 
A blanket sector comprises three OutBoard (OB) and two InBoard (IB) segments, leading 
to a total number of 48 OB and 32 IB segments respectively. These modules are fixed to 
the Back Supporting Structure (BSS) through welding, thus no gaps between the module 
back plate and the BSS are expected (details about HCPB design can be found in 
(Bocaccini, et al., 2009) (Carloni & Kecskes, Helium Cooled Blanket Design Development, 
2013)) This configuration maximises the radial breeding region in the blanket module 
and it also increases the neutron shielding performances for magnet coils and Vacuum 
Vessel (VV). 
Components tree (Figure 4.2) is constructed  following blanket system components view 
from plasma to VV. 
The coolant employed is helium at 8 MPa in the range of 300 -500 °C. In the First Wall 
(FW) velocities up to 80 m/s are imposed,  to enhance the heat transfer performances of 
the coolant. As in PWRs, the primary exchanges heat toward the Secondary Cooling 
System (SCS), which is filled with water at 10 MPa (closed loop). Connected to the 
primary, a Coolant Purification System (CPS) is to remove tritium and other impurities.  
Figure 4.3 shows the 3D model of the HCPB Blanket OB module, its FW and one of the 
Breeder Units (BU). 
 
Figure 4.2: Blanket system components tree 
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Figure 4.3: Scheme of one blanket module (Carloni & Kecskes, Helium Cooled Blanket Design 
Development, 2013) 
 
 
 
PHTS 
The purpose of the PHTS is to provide cooling to the blanket and its subcomponents, i.e. 
back supporting structure, box modules and relative internals.  
The PHTS performs the following functions: 
 Provides (together with the VV) a primary confinement barrier for radioactive 
material such as tritium and sputtering particles and maintains leak-tight 
integrity during all operating modes; 
 Provides helium coolant to all blanket segments during plasma operation 
scenarios; 
 Maintains coolant temperatures, pressures, and flow rates to ensure that 
component temperatures and thermal margins are maintained during the 
operating campaign; 
 Removes maximum power during plasma operations; 
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 Provides helium coolant to blanket segments for decay heat removal following 
plasma operations; 
 Provides baking for in-vessel components; 
 Measures heat load, temperature and pressure inside the blanket system; 
 Allows helium chemistry and inventory control; 
 
Table 4.2 Blanket thermal hydraulic parameters  
 Inboard Outboard Total 
N. of Sectors 16 16  
    
N. of Segments 32 48  
 
Thermal Power 
[MW] 
  2227 
Helium temperature 
at Blanket 
inlet/outlet [°C] 
 
300/500 300/500  
 
 
 
Flow Rate [kg/s] 
 
  2200 
Inlet Pressure [MPa] 8.0 8.0  
 
Estimated Delta P 
across the Blanket 
[MPa] 
0.4 0.4  
 
 
 
Redundancies for the 
blankets circuits 
2 x 50% 2 x 50%  
 
 
Additional Standby 
circuit  
2 (1 per circuit) 2 (1 per circuit) 4 
 
 
Decay Heat Power 6% 6% 6% 
 
Steady State Natural 
Convection flow rate 
1% 1% 1% 
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Figure 4.4: Blanket outboard PHTS simplified process flow diagram 
 
Figure 4.5: Blanket inboard PHTS simplified process flow diagram 
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Figure 4.6: HCPB PHTS 
 
Coolant Purification System 
(Ricapito, 2004) revised also the CPS and confirmed again that one developed in the past 
years by FZK for the HCPB-DEMONET; the flow-diagram of a CPS process is shown in 
Figure 4.7. 
 
The whole process consists of three steps: 
1. Oxidation 
2. Cold trap for Q2O removing. 
3. Cryogenic Molecular sieve beds for gas removal. 
 
In the first one, the slip stream entering the CPS upstream of the steam generator is sent 
to an oxidizer unit containing a metal catalyst (Pt on alumina). Oxygen in over-
stoichiometric amount is added into the oxidizer unit to obtain a quantitative conversion 
of HT to HTO and of H2 to H2O. The kinetics of the oxidation process is made faster by 
the high temperature of the feed stream. The gas stream goes into the first heat 
exchanger where it is cooled-down to 423 K and into a filter system for the removal of 
particulate material. The filtering system consists of two sections: a centrifugal dust 
separator (for larger particles) and an arrangement of sintered stainless steel fibres (for 
smaller particles). 
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In the second step after a further cooling down through the heat exchanger HE2, the feed 
stream is sent to a cold trap designed as a coiled tubular heat exchanger where Q2O is 
frozen out. Under the operating conditions proposed in the previous paragraph for CPS 
in HCPB-DEMONET, the Q2O molar fraction at the cold trap inlet is around 131 vppm. In 
the past preliminary design for HCPB-DEMONET, the cold trap temperature was fixed to 
150 K. Taking into account the required CPS efficiency of 0.9 and, consequently, that the 
Q2O molar fraction at the cold trap outlet could be in principle 13 vppm, the cold trap 
temperature could be increased from 150 K to around 200 K. 
In the third step, a part of the gas stream at the outlet of the cold traps is sent to an 
adsorption system where impurities (mainly O2, N2, CH4) and not oxidised Q2 are 
removed. Such a system consists of two 5A molecular sieve beds (CMSB, Cryogenic 
Molecular Sieve Beds), which are fed by a part of the total flow-rate processed by CPS. 
They are operated at liquid nitrogen temperature in the adsorption phase. Before 
entering the adsorption section the pressure of the feed stream must be decreased to 
around 5 MPa, which is the top limit when adsorption processes are adopted (higher gas 
pressure strongly decrease the adsorbent material lifetime). 
 
Figure 4.7: Flow diagram of the CPS process developed for HCPB 
 
Secondary Water Cooling System 
Figure 4.8 shows a scheme of water-based secondary Rankine cycles (Carloni & Kecskes, 
Helium Cooled Blanket Design Development, 2013). Heat is transported from the hot He 
side to water (heat sink) in the SG of each operation line (e.g. one line of IB D in the 
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figure). The cycle consists of four processes: an isentropic expansion process in steam 
turbine; an isobaric heat rejection process in condenser; an isentropic compression 
process by pumping; and an isobaric heat supply process in the SG that superheated 
steam is generated. By steam flow through HP (High-Pressure) and LP (High-Pressure) 
turbines, the internal energy is converted to the mechanical work to run the electric 
generator system. The Rankine cycle efficiency is improved by introducing intermediate 
reheating of the water in stages (LT, MT and HT) before entering the SG. Hereby a small 
amount of steam from HP and LP turbines is bled off. Thus the mass flow through the 
condenser is reduced and the cycle efficiency is raised due to the reduced heat rejection. 
The reduced flow through the LP turbine allows reducing the turbine dimension as well. 
In addition, heat from the divertor can be used as a pre-heating stage before the feed 
heating stages by the bleed off.  
 
 
Figure 4.8: Secondary Water Cooling System 
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4.3 FMEA for DEMO HCPB concept 
A FMEA at component level with evaluation of loss of function has been performed for 
the DEMO HCPB concept: in the following the performed activities are summarized as 
series of successive steps. 
 
 A Plant Breakdown Structure at component level has been compiled for each 
investigated system.  
 PFDs shown in Figures 4.4-8 have been drafted starting from reference 
documentation (Dalle Donne, 1994) and then used to identify the single 
components for each system (see Tables 4.3-6);  
 The functions associated to the components have been listed (see Tables 4.3-6); 
 The component failure/unavailability (i.e the loss of the component function) has 
been evaluated for each component/subsystem; 
 For each loss of function the possible causes (failure modes) have been identified, 
together with the consequences for the system and the whole plant; the 
consequences can be further sub-divided basis on their occurrence: i.e. 
immediately after the loss of function or after a certain time from the loss of 
function (aggravating effect); 
 Preventive and mitigating actions associated to a loss of function have been 
formulated to orient the project stakeholders towards a safety-oriented design. 
 One or more Initiating Events (IEs) associated to the failure of the 
component/subsystem has/have been identified; 
 From the complete list of IEs, a set of Postulated Initiating Events (PIEs) is 
identified as the most representative in terms of challenging conditions for the 
safety of the plant. 
 
The complete FMEA table is reported in Annex I while the detailed list of scenarios 
associated to each PIE are can be found in  (Jin and Carloni, 2013) 
 
 
4.3.1 PBS at component level and associated function 
 
The compilation of the PBS at component level has been done splitting each system in 
subsystems and or components. For each subsystems and/or components investigated, 
the associated functions have been listed down. Hereafter the various system analysed 
are reported together with their associated functions in tabular form. It’s important to 
underline that while trough the FFMEA only the function associated to the PBS level 1 
are identified, the FMEA at component level enable the identification of functions for 
each component/subsystem. However, different components may have similar or even 
the same functions (especially for the confinement of the process fluid function). 
 
Primary Helium Cooling System 
 
The basic functions of the HCPB PHTS are two: confine radioactive products like T and 
ACPs and provide cooling to the Breeding Blanket segments. In the following Table 4.3 
the functions associated to the components are reported: in here, the loop A is described 
in detail up to PBS level 4 as example of cooling loop, while the other three loops are just 
reported  at PBS level 2.  
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Table 4.3 PHTS PBS and associated functions 
PBS 
Level 
System/component Function 
1 1-Primary He Cooling System 
(HCS) 
To confine radioactivity; 
To provide In-Vessel components Cooling 
(Primary HTS) 
2 1-1-Outboard segment A  
3 1-1-1-Ring Header feeder A (cold 
leg) 
 
4 1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at process level 
4 1-1-1-2-Outlet from  distributor 
manifold to CPS 
F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at process level; 
F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS line; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide flow in CPS lines 
4 1-1-1-3-Outlet from  distributor 
manifold to PCS 
F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at process level; 
F2-2-1-3-2-Maintain integrity of PCS loops; 
F2-2-1-3-1-Provide inventory control in He 
primary loops; 
F1-3-1-Manage pressure 
4 1-1-1-4-Pressure Relief in the 
distributor manifold 
F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at process level; 
F1-3-1-Manage pressure 
3 1-1-2-Segment supply line A (48) F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at process level" 
F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops 
3 1-1-3-Blanket channels A F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at process level; 
F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops 
3 1-1-4-Segment return line A (48) F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at process level; 
F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops 
3 1-1-5-Ring Header collector A (hot 
leg) 
 
4 1-1-5-1-Collector Manifold F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
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F1-1-1-Confine at process level 
4 1-1-5-2-Inlet from CPS to collector 
manifold 
F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at process level; 
F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide flow in CPS lines 
4 1-1-5-3-Inlet from PCS to collector 
manifold 
F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at process level; 
F2-2-1-3-2-Maintain integrity of PCS loops; 
F2-2-1-3-1-Provide inventory control in He 
primary loops; 
F1-3-1-Manage pressure 
3 1-1-6-Cooling trains A (5+1)  
4 1-1-6-1-Line from Ring Header 
Collector to SG 
F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at process level; 
F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops 
4 1-1-6-2-Pressure Relief at the SG 
sections 
F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at process level; 
F1-3-1-Manage pressure 
4 1-1-6-3-Steam Generator F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at process level; 
F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F2-2-1-5-Provide Heat Sink for BK cooling 
loop 
4 1-1-6-4-Line from SG to Circulator F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at process level; 
F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops 
4 1-1-6-5-HCS-Circulator F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at process level; 
F2-2-1-3-Provide pressure control in BK 
cooling loops 
4 1-1-6-6-Circulator by-pass F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at process level; 
F2-2-1-3-Provide pressure control in BK 
cooling loops 
4 1-1-6-7-Linefrom Circulator to  
Ring Header 
F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at process level; 
F2-2-1-2-Provide flow in BK module 
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cooling loops 
2 1-2-Outboard segment B As for 1-1 
2 1-3-Inboard segment C As for 1-1 
2 1-4-Inboard segment D As for 1-1 
 
 
Secondary Water Cooling System 
 
The basic functions associated to the SWCS, beside keep the integrity of the pipelines, 
are to provide heat transfer from the PHTS, to produce electricity and to ensure the heat 
sink for the heat coming from the plasma,. In particular, the Turbine group it’s called to 
transform the thermal energy of the secondary fluid in mechanical energy to be 
transferred to the electrical generator while the Condenser group provides the final heat 
transfer  function towards the environment. 
 
Table 4.4 SCWS PBS and associated functions 
PBS 
Level 
System/component Function 
1 2-Secondary water cooling system F3.1 Provide transformation of thermal 
energy in mechanical energy; 
F3.2 Provide inventory and chemistry 
control of water secondary loop; 
F3.3 Provide transformation of mechanical 
energy in electric energy 
2 2-1-SG 2nd side loop - Outboard A 
(5+1 lines) 
 
3 2-1-1-Saturated steam line F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines 
3 2-1-2-Separator F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines; 
F3-1-5-Keep integrity of water lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow in water lines; 
3 2-1-3-Water line from separator to 
SG 
 
4 2-1-3-1-Piping upstream pump F3-1-5-Keep integrity of water lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow in water lines; 
4 2-1-3-2-Separator pump F3-1-5-Keep integrity of water lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow in water lines; 
4 2-1-3-3-Piping downstream pump F3-1-5-Keep integrity of water lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow in water lines; 
3 2-1-4-Steam line from separator to 
collector 
F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines 
2 2-2-SG 2nd side loop - Outboard B 
(5+1 lines) 
Same as 2-1 
2 2-3-SG 2nd side loop - Inboard C 
(2+1 lines) 
Same as 2-1 
2 2-4-SG 2nd side loop - Inboard D Same as 2-1 
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(2+1 lines) 
2 2-5-Turbine loop   
3 2-5-1-Steam Collector F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines 
3 2-5-2-HP Steam line F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines; 
3 2-5-3-HP Turbine F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines; 
F3-1-8-Provide transformation of thermal 
energy conveyed by steam in mechanical 
energy 
3 2-5-4-HP Spillage line F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines; 
F3-1-3-Provide temperature and quality 
control in steam lines; 
F3-1-7-Provide temperature control in 
water lines 
3 2-5-5-LP Steam Line  
4 2-5-5-1-Piping F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines 
4 2-5-5-2-Demister F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines; 
F3-1-3-Provide temperature and quality 
control in steam lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow in water lines 
4 2-5-5-3-Steam Re-heater F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines; 
F3-1-3-Provide temperature and quality 
control in steam lines 
 
3 2-5-6-LP Turbine F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines; 
F3-1-8-Provide transformation of thermal 
energy conveyed by steam in mechanical 
energy 
3 2-5-7-Generator F3-1-8-Provide transformation of thermal 
energy conveyed by steam in mechanical 
energy; 
F3-1-9-Provide transformation of turbine 
mechanical energy into electric energy 
3 2-5-8-LP spillage 1st stage line (to 
degasser tank) 
F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines; 
F3-1-7-Provide temperature control in 
water lines 
3 2-5-9-LP spillage 2nd&3rd stage 
lines (to recuperators) 
F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines 
3 2-5-10-Turbine exhaust line F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines 
3 2-5-11-Condenser  
4 2-5-11-1-Condenser vessel F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
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F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines; 
F3-1-4-1-Provide condenser vacuum; 
F3-1-5-Keep integrity of water lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow in water lines; 
4 2-5-11-2-Vacuum pumping F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines; 
F3-1-4-1-Provide condenser vacuum; 
F3-1-5-Keep integrity of water lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow in water lines; 
4 2-5-11-3-chilling water F3-1-4-1-Provide condenser vacuum 
4 2-5-11-4-Condenser Pump F3-1-5-Keep integrity of water lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow in water lines 
3 2-5-12-Condensate line  
4 2-5-12-1-Piping F3-1-5-Keep integrity of water lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow in water lines 
4 2-5-12-2-LT Recuperator F3-1-5-Keep integrity of water lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow in water lines 
4 2-5-12-3-MT Recuperator F3-1-5-Keep integrity of water lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow in water lines 
4 2-5-12-4-HT Recuperator F3-1-5-Keep integrity of water lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow in water lines 
4 2-5-12-5-Degasser tank F3-1-5-Keep integrity of water lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow in water lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines 
4 2-5-12-6-Water pump F3-1-5-Keep integrity of water lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow in water lines 
3 2-5-13-Water Distributor F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines 
4 2-5-13-1-Outlet to Outboard A SG 
(6 lines) 
F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines 
4 2-5-13-2-Outlet to Outboard B SG 
(6 lines) 
F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines 
4 2-5-13-3-Outlet to Inboard C SG (3 
lines) 
F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines 
4 2-5-13-4-Outlet to Inboard D SG (3 
lines) 
F3-1-1-Keep integrity of steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow in steam lines 
 
Pressure Control System 
 
The basic functions of the PCS are to provide He inventory to the PHTS and keep the 
pressure set point during normal operation. Additionally, it allows He discharge from 
the PHTS in case of overpressure.  
 
Table 4.5: PCS PBS and associated functions 
PBS 
Level 
System/component Function 
1 3-Pressure Control System  
2 3-1-PCS - Storage Tank F2-2-1-3-1-Provide inventory control in He 
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primary loops; 
F2-2-1-3-2-Maintain integrity of PCS loops; 
F2-2-1-3-3-Provide coolant pressure 
control 
2 3-2-PCS - Buffer Tank F2-2-1-3-1-Provide inventory control in He 
primary loops; 
F2-2-1-3-2-Maintain integrity of PCS loops; 
F2-2-1-3-3-Provide coolant pressure 
control 
2 3-3-PCS - Source Tank F2-2-1-3-1-Provide inventory control in He 
primary loops; 
F2-2-1-3-2-Maintain integrity of PCS loops; 
F2-2-1-3-3-Provide coolant pressure 
control 
2 3-4-PCS - Helium compressor F2-2-1-3-1-Provide inventory control in He 
primary loops; 
F2-2-1-3-2-Maintain integrity of PCS loops; 
F2-2-1-3-3-Provide coolant pressure 
control; 
F2-2-1-3-4-Provide flow in PCS loops 
2 3-5-Piping  in the Pressure Control 
System 
F2-2-1-3-1-Provide inventory control in He 
primary loops; 
F2-2-1-3-2-Maintain integrity of PCS loops; 
F2-2-1-3-3-Provide coolant pressure 
control" 
2 3-6-Valves in the Pressure Control 
System 
F2-2-1-3-1-Provide inventory control in He 
primary loops; 
F2-2-1-3-2-Maintain integrity of PCS loops; 
F2-2-1-3-3-Provide coolant pressure 
control; 
F2-2-1-3-4-Provide flow in PCS loops 
 
 
Coolant Purification System 
 
The CPS allows to the control of the temperature and chemistry of the coolant 
recirculating inside the PHTS. In particular it provides detritiation of the primary 
coolant, to reduce the permeation of T through the steam generators and also lower the 
risk in case of primary circuit leak/break. 
 
Table 4.6: CPS PBS and associated functions 
PBS 
Level 
System/component Function 
1 4-Coolant Purification System  
2 4-1-Water Separator F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide flow in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-4-Provide temperature and 
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quality control in CPS lines 
2 4-2-Heater-2a F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide flow in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-4-Provide temperature and 
quality control in CPS lines 
2 4-3-Catalytic oxidizer F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide flow in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-5-Provide detritiation in CPS line 
2 4-4-Water Cooler F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide flow in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-4-Provide temperature and 
quality control in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-5-Provide detritiation in CPS line 
2 4-5-Blower F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide flow in CPS lines; 
2 4-6-Adsorbers: 2 Molecular Sieve 
Beds 
F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide flow in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-4-Provide temperature and 
quality control in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-5-Provide detritiation in CPS line 
2 4-7-Heater-2b F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide flow in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-4-Provide temperature and 
quality control in CPS lines 
2 4-8-Relief Tank F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-5-Provide detritiation in CPS line 
2 4-9-Helium Make-up Unit F2-2-1-4-4-Provide temperature and 
quality control in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-5-Provide detritiation in CPS line 
2 4-10-Valves needed to operate the 
circuit (26) 
F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide flow in CPS lines; 
2 4-11-Piping  in the Coolant 
Purification System 
F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide flow in CPS lines; 
 
 
4.4 Identified PIEs 
The total list of PIEs recognized by the FMEA (see Annex I) on HCPB systems is reported 
in the following Table 4.7 List of Postulated Initiating Event (PIEs). 
 
Table 4.7 List of Postulated Initiating Event (PIEs) 
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PIE Description Class 
FB1 Loss of flow in all FW-BK cooling channels of one section (A,B,C or D) 
of the outboard or inboard segments (48 or 32) because stop of 
circulators for CCF 
DBA 
FB2 Reduction of flow in all FW-BK cooling channels of one section (A,B,C 
or D) of the outboard or inboard segments (48 or 32) because stop of 
circulator in one SG line 
DBA 
FB3 Reduction of flow in cooling channels of one FW-BK module because 
internal clogging 
DBA 
AOP1 Loss of Off Site Power <1h DBA 
AOP2 Loss of Off Site Power from 1h up to 32h BDBA 
HB1 Loss of heat sink in all FW-BK primary cooling circuits because trip of 
both HP and LP turbines due to loss of condenser vacuum 
DBA 
HB2 Loss of heat sink in one FW-BK cooling train DBA 
LBB1 Loss of FW-BK cooling circuit inside breeder blanket box: Rupture of a 
sealing weld 
DBA 
LBB2 Loss of FW-BK cooling circuit inside breeder blanket box: Leak of a 
sealing weld 
DBA 
LBO1 LOCA Out-VV because large rupture of He Manifold feeder inside PHTS 
Vault  
DBA 
LBO2 LOCA Out-VV because small rupture of He Manifold feeder inside 
PHTS Vault 
DBA 
LBO3 LOCA Out-VV because rupture of tubes in a Steam Generator DBA 
LBV1 Loss of FW-BK cooling circuit integrity inside VV: Rupture of FW-BK 
module 
DBA 
LBV2 Loss of FW-BK cooling circuit integrity inside VV: Leak from FW-BK 
module 
DBA 
TBO2 Small rupture from PHTS "Coolant purification system" process line 
inside the PHTS Vault (Outside VV), i.e. possible significant amount of 
tritium released into building 
DBA 
N/S Not Safety Relevant  
 
The main accident initiators are related to loss of power, LOFA, in-vessel LOCA, ex-vessel 
LOCA, loss of heat sink and in-box LOCA for the blanket. The related accident sequences 
are described in Annex I with respect to the causes, scenarios by failure assumptions, 
possible consequences and proper mitigating actions limiting the accident 
consequences. Failures are assumed for DBA (Design Basis Accidents) and for BDBA 
(Beyond Design Basis Accidents) by additional aggravating failures. A priority list of 
event sequences for deterministic analyses is provided completed in section 4.4.1 
 
 
Classification of the PIEs 
 
The classification of PIEs foresees two possible category of accident: DBA and BDBA. 
Due to the huge pipeline length of the PHTS and SCWS, practically almost all the 
identified PIEs fall in the DBA category, since the probability of failure on such lines is 
greater than E-6 (see 4.4.2). 
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However, among the fifteen identified PIEs one can be categorized as BDBA basis on 
some assumptions: the AOP2.  
The failure rate associated to the AOP2 has been calculated assuming the following: 
 Frequency of the station black out event once every ten years 
 Diesel Generator Failure in case of call on service 1E-3 event/year 
 two physically-separated trains of diesel generator operating in parallel to cope 
with the loss of power supply from the grid 
 
Hence the probability of the event is: 
 
1E-1 x 1E-3 x 1E-3= 1E-7 events/year 
  
Therefore the probability of the event is 10-7/year, hence such an event can be classified 
as BDBA. 
 
4.4.1 Priority list of event sequences 
Concerning safety assessment in terms of containments challenging, mobilised 
radioactive products and radioactive releases towards the environment a priority list for 
the event sequences has been generated from the overall accident scenarios discussed 
above to show which events have to be analysed deterministically: 
 Loss of power 
o AOP1 
o AOP2 
 LOFA inducing in-vessel LOCA 
o FB1 
 Ex-vessel LOCA inducing in-vessel LOCA 
o LBO1 
o LBO3 
 Loss of heat sink due to loss of condenser in the SWCS 
o HB1 
 In-box LOCA inducing in-vessel LOCA 
o LBB1 
The selected coolant concerned accidents like LOFA, ex- and in-vessel LOCAs and loss of 
heat sink are similar to those identified during the PPCS (Maisonnier & alii, 2005). 
However the accident sequences have to be analysed regarding the design of DEMO 
HCPB concept, and accident consequences have to be evaluated.  
Deterministic calculations have to be devoted to assess consequences arising from such 
accident conditions and they should be performed in the following steps: 
 identification of causes and accident description, 
 calculation methods, 
 transient analysis, 
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 analysis results obtained in terms of design and safety measures implemented, 
 foreseen consequences from the accident including mobilisation of source terms 
and radiological consequence. 
Capability of mitigating systems (e.g. EV, EDS, isolation system, station batteries, etc.) 
will be tested by analysis for the selected sequences so that design of these systems can 
be optimised. 
 
4.4.2 Ex-Vessel LOCA case 
Hereafter the large ex-vessel LOCA accident is described as example of PIE identified 
through the FMEA at component level. In particular the detail of the FMEA table at a 
component level, one of the PHTS ring header (i.e. the largest piping in diameter of the 
whole circuit), is shown in figure 4.9. The associated scenarios related to the Ex-vessel 
LOCA PIEs are also discussed, giving emphasis to the possible preventive/mitigating 
actions. 
The ex-vessel LOCA can be caused by piping leak/rupture; instrument leak/rupture, 
valve leak/rupture, circulator leak/rupture, or SG tube leak/rupture. Following PIEs 
have been identified: 
 LBO1 LOCA out-VV because large rupture of He manifold feeder inside PHTS 
vault 
 LBO2 LOCA out-VV because small rupture of He manifold feeder inside PHTS 
vault 
 LBO3 LOCA out-VV because rupture of tubes in a SG 
 TBO2 Small rupture from CPS process line connected to PHTS inside the PHTS 
vault (outside the VV) 
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Figure 4.9: Example of FMEA table for the PHTS cold leg ring header
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LBO1 LOCA out-VV because large rupture of He manifold feeder inside PHTS vault 
For this PIE the break of a ring header distributor inside the blanket-PHTS room has 
been selected as the representative event. A double-ended manifold break in a large size 
during plasma burn induces the discharge of He coolant into the PHTS vault. The vault 
pressurizes. The broken cooling loop will be emptied soon and 50% heat removal 
capability of the blanket-PHTS is lost due to the redundant design. The maximum time 
allowed for the intervention of the FPSS has to be assessed to assure the integrity of the 
FW-BK structures, well before reaching the critical conditions of the materials. 
If the plasma fails to shut down, PFC and blanket box can be overheated. Swelling of 
ceramic breeder and Be pebbles occurs. Swelling of pebbles can lead to mechanical 
interaction of the bed with EUROFER plates and bed deformation. Exceeded thermo-
mechanical stress on the blanket structures can affect the integrity of blanket box 
towards the VV.  
When the He pressure drops to the room pressure, air enters the blanket-PHTS and to 
the channels of blanket box. If the channels have a collapse for the thermal stress, air can 
get in touch with Be pebbles. Be reactions with air and water from moisture contained in 
air are possible. H2 production from Be-water reaction is a risk for explosion hazard. 
If the FW loses its integrity by plasma burn, He remained in the loops and air ingress 
into the VV, a major plasma disruption is triggered, and the VV pressurizes (in-vessel 
LOCA event). Bleed lines to the EV open if the pressure overcomes setting points. PFC 
can react with air and moisture at high temperature. Be pebbles are lost into VV due to 
dynamic effects (e.g. VV suction, He flowing). This makes more complicated recovery 
actions inside VV to clean vacuum chamber before restart. 
About radioactive releases, mobilised dust and tritium in the VV can be released to the 
EV due to differential pressure inversion and tritium in He coolant into the PHTS vault. 
Radiological consequences need to be estimated. 
Mitigating actions for LBO1 can be: 
 Monitoring of the mass flow rate and pressure in the ring headers 
 FPSS actuation to avoid aggravating in-vessel LOCA 
 Opening the VV rupture disk to the EV. Design of the EV size due to over-
pressurization in the VV. 
 Isolation of HVAC 
 Vault atmosphere detritiation by Vent Detritiation System (VDS) 
 
The failure rate associated to the LBO1 has been also calculated, taking into account: 
 Collector failure rate 1E-8 events/hour (Pinna, Porfiri, & Cambi, 2002) 
 8 Ring manifold 
Hence the probability of the event is: 
 
1E-8 x 24 x 365 x 8= 7E-4 events/year 
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Therefore the LBO1 has to be considered has a DBA. 
LBO2 LOCA out-VV because small rupture of He manifold feeder inside PHTS vault 
For this PIE a small rupture in a ring header distributor inside the blanket-PHTS room 
has been selected as the representative event. The small rupture in the distributor 
during plasma burn induces the discharge of He coolant into the PHTS vault. The vault 
pressurizes slowly. He loss takes longer time than it in case of LBO1, which will be 
detected by low pressure and flow signals and the plasma shutdown is triggered. In 
contrast to LBO1 the integrity of the FW and blanket box is not affected and no 
subsequent event like in-vessel LOCA in LBO1 is possible.  
About radioactive releases, tritium in He coolant can be released to the PHTS vault. 
Radiological consequences need to be estimated. 
Mitigating actions for LBO2 can be: 
 Monitoring of the mass flow rate and pressure in the ring headers 
 Plasma shutdown actuation 
 Isolation of HVAC 
 Vault atmosphere detritiation by Vent Detritiation System (VDS) 
 
LBO3 LOCA out-VV because rupture of tubes in a SG 
For this PIE a multiple tube rupture in a SG has been selected as the representative 
event. In the SG He flows in tubes and water in shell. The pressure in the water side is 
11 MPa and 10 MPa in the He tubes. If the tubes fail the water enters the He side 
pressurizing the primary circuit. The isolation valves and the relief valves must 
intervene to avoid the water flow towards the blanket. Plasma has to be shut down. 
If the failed cooling train is not isolated promptly, the water flows through the HX breaks 
occurs because of differential pressure inversion and enters the blanket-PHTS to the 
channels of blanket box. If the channels have a collapse for the thermal stress, water can 
get in touch with Be pebbles and H2 production from Be-water reaction is a risk for 
explosion hazard. 
In such a case coolant and tritium content in the PHTS could damage the FW/blanket 
structure and He, steam, tritium and H2 expand towards the VV. If the pressure set point 
for bleed lines and rupture disks opening will be reached, the EV will collect all the 
fluids.  
If the FW/blanket structure stands up to the pressure wave the expansion of the gas and 
water containing tritium will occur towards the SWCS and are transported to turbines 
finally. Contamination of He gas through SG leak induces corrosion/oxidation of pipe 
surfaces. Radiological consequences need to be estimated. 
Mitigating actions for LBO3 can be: 
 Monitoring of the mass flow rate and pressure in the PHTS cooling trains  
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 Monitoring of the mass flow rate, pressure and temperature in the SWCS 
 Isolation of the affected cooling train promptly 
 Operating the cooling train in reserve 
 Plasma shutdown actuation 
 Isolation of HVAC 
 Maintenance of the SG 
 
TBO2 Small rupture from CPS process line connected to PHTS inside the PHTS vault 
(outside the VV) 
For this PIE a small rupture in CPS process line has been selected as the representative 
event. During the normal operation a fraction of He flow bypasses the SG and it goes to 
the CPS via process line. After the purification He returns to the downstream of the SG in 
the PHTS cooling train via process line. A small rupture in a process line induces the 
discharge of He for purification into the PHTS vault and He loss in the affected cooling 
train. The vault pressurizes slightly. He loss takes even longer time than it in case of 
LBO2, which will be detected by low pressure and flow signals and the plasma shutdown 
is triggered. The integrity of the FW and blanket box is not affected and no subsequent 
event like in-vessel LOCA in LBO1 is possible.  
About radioactive releases, tritium in He can be released to the PHTS vault. Radiological 
consequences need to be estimated. 
Mitigating actions for TBO2 can be: 
 Monitoring of the mass flow rate and pressure in the CPS process lines  
 Isolation of the CPS 
 Plasma shutdown actuation 
 Isolation of HVAC 
 Vault atmosphere detritiation by VDS 
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4.5 Conclusions 
The systematic approach to the identification of potential hazards arising from HCPB 
DEMO concept systems has provided a comprehensive assessment of accident initiators. 
The FMEA methodology has given first screening of the various causes that could induce 
failures in the plant or simply a stop in the operating phases because of failures in HCPB 
Blanket, PHTS, CPS, or SCWS. Also a qualitative overview on accident sequences arising 
from each elementary failure could be derived on FMEA tables looking at consequences 
description and preventive/mitigating actions. 
 
Analogously to the FFMEA, the FMEA at component level with evaluation of loss of 
function provides a list of potential accident initiating events (IEs) and give suggestions 
in order to improve the machine overall safety; however, thanks to the assumptions 
made for the components, a higher level of detail is reached, since each identified failure 
mode can be associated to a specific component/sub-system. 
 
Each elementary accident initiator is associated to the related PIE, according to the 
procedure explained below. In such a way, it is possible to concentrate safety studies on 
the most relevant accident sequences, avoiding studies related to the other minor and 
almost equivalent sequences. 
 
A list of fifteen public safety relevant PIEs has been set assessing elementary failures 
related to the different components of HCPB systems. Each PIE has been discussed in 
order to qualitatively identify accident sequences arising from each PIE itself. 
Deterministic analysis will have to demonstrate the plant capacity in mitigating and, in 
every case, in withstanding accident consequences, arising from the overall set of PIEs, 
below fixed safety limits. 
 
A PIE named N/S (Not Safety relevant) groups all elementary failures not inducing 
public safety relevant consequences. Although such failures are not important from a 
safety point of view, they can be important on defining plant operability and 
maintenance strategy. 
 
Four of these events have been identified by the discussion on possible consequences as 
the ones more relevant to be studied with deterministic assessments.  
They are: 
 
 AOP1 
 FB1 
 LBO1  
 HB1 
 
Due to the possible implication on the overall architecture of the machine (cooling 
circuit layout, Expansion Volume dimension, etc.) the ex-vessel LOCA scenario (LBO1, 
LBO2, LBO3) has been selected to perform MELCOR analyses of the HCPB DEMO concept 
(see Chapter 5). 
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5 Thermal Hydraulic Analysis of the DEMO HCPB PHTS 
during an ex-vessel LOCA accidental scenario 
 
One of the most challenging accidents identified in the FMEA for the DEMO HCPB PHTS 
is the ex-vessel LOCA, due to the possible consequences in terms of radiological releases 
to the environment. Because of the relative small radiological inventory and to the lower 
decay heat density (Jin, Carloni, & Boccaccini, 2013), the risk associated with a break of 
the primary cooling loop in a fusion reactor is lower than the risk of the same event in a 
fission reactor.  Nevertheless the consequent peak of pressure in the Expansion Volume 
located within the Tokamak Building  could severely impact  the confinement function, 
hence the overall safety of the plant. For this purpose a numerical assessment of a 
blanket PHTS ex-vessel LOCA has been carried out considering two possible layout 
solutions. This analysis has been performed employing MELCOR 1.8.2, since this version 
of the code allows to simulate Helium as primary coolant (Merril, Modifications to the 
MELCOR code for application in fusion accident analyses, 2000), (Merril, MELCOR 1.8.2 
Analyses , 2008)  and aims to support the design of the Blanket and its PHTS with some 
safety-related considerations. 
 
5.1 HCPB DEMO concept - plant overview 
In this section the main characteristics of the current design of the HCPB blanket 
concept and its PHTS will be discussed (Conceptual design of the cooling system for a 
DEMO fusion reactor with helium cooled solid breeder blanket, and calculation of the 
transient temperature behaviour in accidents, 1992). Moreover, also another alternative 
PHTS not yet reported in literature will be discussed. Finally, a short description of the 
Tokamak Building (TB) and the Expansion Volume (EV) will be reported.  
 
5.1.1 HCPB Blanket 
The HCPB blanket concept is considered (since 1995) by EU as a “near term solutions” 
for a first DEMO reactor. It is considered for testing in ITER (Bocaccini, et al., 2009) as 
reported in the frame of EU TBM Programme. In KIT (formerly KfK and FZK) helium 
concepts have been studied for more than three decades, focusing on a solid breeder and 
beryllium as neutron multiplier. In early 90’s Dalle Donne proposed a Breeder Out of 
Tube (BOT) concept for NET (Dalle Donne, 1994). In 1995 this concept has become one 
of the reference concepts in the EU Breeding Blanket Programme with the name of 
Helium Cooled Pebble Bed (HCPB) concept for DEMONET and TBM (Giancarli, Dalle 
Donne, & Dietz, 1997). Following, in 2000 it was selected as part of the Power Plant 
Conceptual Study (PPCS) as reference component for the Model B (Hermsmeyer, 
Malang, Fischer, & Gordeev, 2003). The main features of the HCPB concept are the 
employment of lithiated ceramic breeders and beryllium as neutron multiplier in form 
of a flat pebble beds.  
The current DEMO Blanket concept is subdivided in 16 sectors, each one of 22.5°. A 
blanket sector comprises three Outboard (OB) and two Inboard (IB) segments, leading 
to a total number of 48 OB and 32 IB segments respectively. Each blanket segment bears 
six blanket boxes which are arranged in rows along the poloidal coordinate(Figure 5.1). 
For manufacturing reasons, the maximum length of 2 m was chosen for the poloidal 
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module. These modules are fixed to the Back Supporting Structure (BSS) through 
welding, thus no gaps between the module back plate and the BSS are expected (details 
about HCPB design can be found in (Bocaccini, et al., 2009) and in (Carloni & Kecskes, 
Helium Cooled Blanket Design Development, 2013). This configuration maximises the 
radial breeding region in the blanket module and it also increases the neutron shielding 
performances for magnet coils and Vacuum Vessel (VV). 
The coolant employed is helium at 8 MPa in the range of 300 -500 °C. In the First Wall 
(FW) velocities up to 80 m/s are imposed,  to enhance the heat transfer performances of 
the coolant. As in PWRs, the primary exchanges heat toward the Secondary Cooling 
System (SCS), which is filled with water at 10 MPa (closed loop). Connected to the 
primary, a Coolant Purification System (CPS) is to remove tritium and other impurities. 
Moreover, an independent low-pressure helium loop purges tritium from the pebble 
bed. Due to the low velocity achieved, its heat removal capabilities are negligible.  In 
Table 5.1 the design data of the HCPB blanket concept are reported (Carloni & alii, 
Summary of key parameters for the design of the PHTS and related BoP for the BB, 
2014). 
Table 5.1: HCPB design data 
Characteristic Unit HCPB 
Typology of breeder   Lithium Pebble Beds 
Typology of coolant  Helium 
Pressure MPa 8.0 
Blanket Temperature Inlet °C 300 
Blanket Temperature Outlet °C 500 
Coolant Density (average) kg/m³ 6.0 
Flow Rate kg/s 2165 
Fusion Power MW 2200 
Enthalpy Increment kJ/kg 1000 
Circuit Pressure Drop MPa 0.4 
 
5.1.2 Reference Primary Heat Transfer System (PHTS) design 
 
The conceptual cooling strategy for the HCPB Blanket is based on the use of four 
independent cooling circuits: two for OB and two for IB segments respectively.  
Together, 4 He header distributors (inlet gas) and 4 He header collectors (outlet gas) 
characterize this layout (Figure 5.1). Two cooling systems are connected to the blanket 
segments via the manifolds in the BSS. Each cooling system provides 50% of the 
required helium mass flow rate to ensure adequate heat removal from the blanket 
structure during a plasma pulse. This configuration has been selected to allow a (partial) 
refrigeration of each segment in case of ex-vessel rupture of one of the circuits; this 
ensure the decay heat removal at long term and might also be advantageous in reducing 
the frequency of the actuation of the Fast Plasma Shut-down System (FPSS). The two OB 
cooling circuits consist of five Cooling Trains (CTs) each plus one spare, while two CTs 
plus one spare for each IB circuit. Each CT foresees a Steam Generator (SG) and a blower 
(Figure 5.1) connected in series to the main pipeline; cooling design data are 
summarized in Table 5.1 and in Table 5.2. 
The HCPB cooling scheme requires four connecting pipes at the VV upper port interface. 
The proposed pipes size is DN 250 and a reduction to DN 200 could be also a viable 
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solution due to limited space availability in the VV upper port. However, the resulting 
high helium velocities in the DN 200 pipes could not be acceptable for the overall plant 
efficiency (too high pressure drops) and/or for the induced vibrations. Following, a 
piping enlargement to DN 350 is foreseen outside of the VV upper port to reduce the 
velocity of the coolant and thus the pressure drops. The coolant is then 
collected/distributed by massive ring headers (about 200 m³ in volume) (Figure 5.1) 
surrounding the tokamak, which in turn re-distribute/collect the coolant to/from the 
CTs. The pipe size for the cooling train main piping is DN 1200, while the circulator by-
pass is DN 600. The OB and IB loops are both provided with same size of piping, 
compressor, steam generator and valves, and the overall piping layout rely on a quite 
good standardization in terms of pipes and components.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: HCPB process flow diagram (PFD), simplified 
In Table 5.2 the description and the dimensions of the main pipes composing the 
reference PHTS design are reported. 
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Table 5.2: Dimensions of the reference PHTS pipework configuration (one OB circuit) 
Description Characteristics Label Mult. 
Length 
[m] 
DN 
Internal 
diameter 
[m] 
Coolant 
Volume 
[m3] 
Blanket piping Pipes passing 
through each 
blanket 
segment. 
BLK 
48 \ \ \ 4.68 
Pipework at 
the blanket 
outlet 
 
BP001 
48 1.0 250 0.24 0.04 
Enlargement 
from DN250 
to DN350 
 
EN001 
48 1.0 250-
350 
(300) 
0.2783 0.06 
Pipework to 
the annular 
header at the 
outlet 
5 bends. 
BP002 
48 10.0  0.3156 0.78 
Annular 
header at the 
outlet 
 
HD001 
1 200.0 1200 1.08 183.21 
Hot line from 
annular 
header to 
steam 
generator 
10 bends and 2 
valves. 
MP001 
5 45.0  1200 1.08 41.22 
Steam 
Generator 
 
SG 
5 \ \ \ 36.94 
Cold line from 
steam 
generator to 
blower 
5 bends and 1 
valve. 
MP002 
5 20.0 1200 1.08 18.32 
Cold line from 
blower to 
annular 
header 
5 bends and 2 
valves. 
MP003 
5 25.0 1200 1.08 22.90 
Annular inlet 
header 
 
HD002 
1 200.0 1200 1.08 183.21 
Pipeline from 
annular inlet 
header to 
blanket inlet 
5 bends. 
BP002 
48 10.0 300 0.2889 0.65 
Reduction 
from DN300 
to DN200, 
pipeline at 
blanket inlet 
 
RD001 
48 1.0 300-
200 
(250) 
0.2415 0.05 
 Total 1180 
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5.1.3 Pressure drops calculation 
 
The local and distributed pressure drops have been calculated by the candidate to 
provide the circuit hydraulic resistance for the MELCOR models. This operation was 
required since a slight difference (50 °C) in the range of temperatures provided in the 
reference document (Conceptual design of the cooling system for a DEMO fusion reactor 
with helium cooled solid breeder blanket, and calculation of the transient temperature 
behaviour in accidents, 1992); the results are shown in Table 5.3. In particular, all the 
distributed pressure drops were calculated as reported in (Dalle Donne, 1994).  
 
Table 5.3: Distributed pressure drops calculation 
Label 
Multip. 
[-] 
Single 
mass 
flow 
[kg/s][1] 
Density 
[kg/m3][
2] 
Velocity 
[m/s][3] 
Re f[4] D/ε 
ΔP[5] 
[MPa] 
BP001 48 18.24 4.92 81.95 5.1E6 
0.01
2 
9.60E
3 
0.00086 
EN001 48 18.24 4.92 60.94 4.4E6 
0.01
2 
1.11E
4 
0.00040 
BP002 48 18.24 4.92 47.39 3.9E6 
0.01
2 
1.26E
4 
0.00211 
HD001 1 875.5 4.92 38.85 5.4E7 
0.01
2 
4.32E
4 
0.00645 
MP001 5 175.1 4.92 38.85 1.1E7 
0.00
9 
4.32E
4 
0.00152 
MP002 5 175.1 6.61 28.92 1.1E7 0.01 
4.32E
4 
0.0005 
MP003 5 175.1 6.61 28.92 1.1E7 0.01 
4.32E
4 
0.00063 
HD002 1 875.1 6.61 42.09 5.4E7 0.01 
4.32E
4 
0.01017 
BP002 48 18.24 6.61 42.09 4.2E6 
0.01
2 
1.16E
4 
0.00247 
RD001 48 18.24 6.61 60.24 5.1E6 
0.01
2 
9.66E
3 
0.00062 
  
TOTA
L 
0.02574 
[1] The single mass flow has been calculated subdividing the total mass flow (875.5 kg/s 
(Conceptual design of the cooling system for a DEMO fusion reactor with helium cooled 
solid breeder blanket, and calculation of the transient temperature behaviour in 
accidents, 1992)) by the multiplicity of the component. 
[2] The density has been taken from (Dalle Donne, 1994). 
[3] The velocity has been calculated with the following equation: 
𝑣 = ?̇? (𝐴 ∙ 𝜌)⁄  
Where ṁ is the single mass flow, A the floor area for velocity calculations (see Error! 
Reference source not found.) and ρ the helium density (Dalle Donne, 1994) 
[4] f has been calculated with the Swamee-Jane correlation: 
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𝑓 =
0.25
[log10 (
1
3.7 (
𝐷
𝜀 )
+
5.74
𝑅𝑒0.9
)]
2 
Where ε is the rugosity (assumed equal to 25E-6 m). 
[5] The pressure drops were calculated with the Darcy-Weisbach correlation: 
∆𝑃 = 𝑓
𝐿
𝐷
1
2
𝜌𝑣2 
 
On the contrary, the concentrated pressure drops were calculated with the following 
equation: 
∆𝑷 = 𝑲
𝟏
𝟐
𝝆𝒗𝟐 (5.4) 
 
Where K was imposing based on the data reported in (Idel'cik, 1986). The needed values 
to calculate the concentrated pressure drops are reported in Table 5.4. 
 
Table 5.4: Concentrated pressure drops calculation 
Label 
Valve Enlarg.[2] Reduct.[2] Disch.[3] Entr.[4] Bends ΔP 
[MPa] M.[1] K[5] M. K[5] M. K[5] M. K[5] M. K[5] M. K[5] 
BP001 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.26 
EN001 0 0.0 1 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.009 
BP002 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 0.3 0.008 
HD001 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.004 
MP001 2 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.0 10 0.3 0.019 
SG             0.038 
MP002 1 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 0.3 0.006 
MP003 2 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 0.3 0.007 
HD002 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.006 
BP002 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 5 0.3 0.009 
RD001 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.006 
 TOTAL 0.372 
[1] Mult. = Multiplicity of the characteristic. 
[2] Enlargement, or reduction, from a nominal diameter to another. 
[3] Discharge of fluid from a pipe to a tank. 
[4] Entrance of fluid from a tank to a pipe. 
[5] K values were taken from (Idel'cik, 1986). 
 
A specific mention should be made for the Steam Generators (SGs) CVs and the blanket 
pipes CV, because two different approaches have been employed: 
 For the SG the forward and reverse loss of flow coefficients (K) were calculated 
basing on the data reported in (Conceptual design of the cooling system for a 
DEMO fusion reactor with helium cooled solid breeder blanket, and calculation 
of the transient temperature behaviour in accidents, 1992). 
 For the blanket pipes the forward and reverse loss of flow coefficients (K) were 
imposed in order to obtain the same total pressure drop reported in (Conceptual 
design of the cooling system for a DEMO fusion reactor with helium cooled solid 
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breeder blanket, and calculation of the transient temperature behaviour in 
accidents, 1992). 
 
5.1.4 Alternative PHTS layout 
The large He inventory contained in the reference OB loops(approximately 4000 kg), 
impacts directly the design of the confinement structures, i.e. the Tokamak Building 
(TB). For this purpose an alternative PHTS layout, which aims reducing the releasable 
helium inventory in case of leakage, has been proposed and analysed by the candidate; 
hereafter the alternative layout is briefly described 
As shown in Figure 5.2, in the alternative layout the total helium cooling system is 
subdivided in 16 independent loops; each of these loop cools a pair of adjacent sectors 
(10 segments). 10 outlet pipes route the coolant fluid toward the hot header, which is 
consistently smaller than the header of the reference layout. In fact while in the 
reference design the ring headers shall surround the tokamak, in the alternative layout 
each header is on charge to collect/distribute coolant to two adjacent sectors. Starting 
from this header, a single main coolant pipes transport helium through a SG and to the 
cold header, which in turn redistributes the coolant flow to ten inlet pipes. It should be 
noted that each loop can remove only 50% of the heat of each segment. A second loops is 
connected to the same 10 segments for completing the heat removal.   
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With the solution proposed, the blanket is cooled by 16 independent systems, instead of 
2 (OB) + 2 (IB) as in the reference layout. This increased independency reduces the 
maximum helium inventory dischargeable inside the TB due to a single rupture of a 
loop. In addition, the remaining 15 intact loops should be able to extract the decay heat 
without encounter overheating of the FW and PHTS. Compared to the reference layout, 
the obvious advantage is due to the higher available cooling capability in case of loss of 
one circuit. In Table 5.5 the description and the dimensions of the main pipes composing 
the alternative PHTS are reported. 
 
Table 5.5: Dimensions of the alternative PHTS pipework configuration (one circuit) 
Description Characteristics Label 
Length 
[m] 
DN 
Internal 
diameter 
[m] 
Coolant 
Volume 
[m3] 
Blanket piping Pipes passing 
through each 
blanket 
segment. 
BLK 
\ \ \ 23.4 
Pipework at the 
blanket outlet 
 
BP001 
1.0 250 0.24 0.45 
Figure 5.2a: Alternative PHTS configuration 
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Enlargement 
from DN250 to 
DN350 
 
EN001 
1.0 250-
350 
(300) 
0.2783 0.61 
Pipework to the 
annular header 
at the outlet 
5 bends. 
BP002 
10.0  0.3156 7.82 
Annular header 
at the outlet 
 
HD001 
200.0 1200 1.08 9.2 
Hot line from 
annular header 
to steam 
generator 
10 bends and 2 
valves. 
MP001 
45.0  1200 1.08 41.2 
Steam 
Generator 
 
SG 
\ \ \ 36.9 
Cold line from 
steam generator 
to blower 
5 bends and 1 
valve. MP002 
20.0 1200 1.08 18.3 
Cold line from 
blower to 
annular header 
5 bends and 2 
valves. MP003 
25.0 1200 1.08 22.9 
Annular inlet 
header 
 
HD002 
200.0 1200 1.08 9.1 
Pipeline from 
annular inlet 
header to 
blanket inlet 
5 bends. 
BP002 
10.0 300 0.2889 6.56 
Reduction from 
DN300 to 
DN200, pipeline 
at blanket inlet 
 
RD001 
1.0 300-
200 
(250) 
0.2415 0.45 
     Total 177 
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
123 
 
Figure 5.3b: Alternative PHTS configuration  (courtesy of Guangiming Zhou) 
 
5.1.5 Tokamak building 
Basing on the data reported in (Dalle Donne, 1994), (Jin X. , Carloni, Boccaccini, Pinna, & 
Dongiovanni, 2013), and (Paci & Porfiri, Analysis of an ex-vessel break in the ITER 
divertor cooling loop, 2006) a simplified sketch of DEMO tokamak building and systems 
is reported in Figure 5.4.  
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Figure 5.4: DEMO simplified plant sketch 
 
As stated in (Taylor, 2014) the Vacuum Vessel (VV) and the magnets will be placed 
inside a cryostat. The cryostat, in turn, is enclosed inside the tokamak building (TB), 
which is assumed to be 70000 m3 in volume (Paci, Analysis of the external radioactive 
releases for an in-vessel break in the power plant conceptual study using the ECART 
code, 2003). In Table 5.6 the main characteristic of the tokamak building has been 
reported (Barbé & Costaz). 
 
Table 5.6: Tokamak Building characteristics 
CV 
name 
Orientation 
Height 
[m] 
Floor Area 
[m2] 
Volume 
[m3] 
Multiplicity 
[-] 
Floor 
height [m] 
TOKBIL Vert 50.0 1400.0 70000.0 1 -10.0 
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5.1.6 Ex-Vessel LOCA event assumptions 
 
A first set of analyses, whose results are reported in Error! Reference source not 
found., is performed basis on the following assumptions to simulate the EX-vessel LOCA 
transients and to evaluate the impact of the break size and location within the circuit on 
the dynamic pressurization of the TB: 
 
 The accident occurs at 100 s after the start 
 Plasma is shut down within 1.0 s 
 The decay heat of the blanket module is 5% of the nominal power 
 The circulator trip occurs 10 seconds after the accident 
 Initially the TB is filled with air at 40 °C and 1 atmosphere 
 TB design pressure is 0.2 MPa 
 
A second set of analyses, whose results are reported in Error! Reference source not 
found., is performed to better take into account the temperature (and hence the 
pressure) behaviour of the released gas inside the TB, with the following assumption: 
 
 The TB is assumed to be a stainless steel cylinder 0.1 m thick,  
 TB outer surface is kept constant at 40°C 
 
Finally, assumptions are made to estimate the time to isolate the circuit in case of large 
LOCA and the possibility to use the Detritiation System (DS): 
 Basis on an engineering judgement coming from ITER experience [Somboli, 
2015] 20 seconds are taken as the time to perform the mitigating action ( broken 
loop isolation) to counteract the accident 
 The DS is considered unavailable for temperature higher than 100 °C [Pinna, 
2015] 
 
Referring to these values, safety consideration are formulated after the results (see 
chapter 5.5) about the possibility to mitigate the LOCA scenario. 
 
5.1.7 Physical description of the simulated events 
 
The main objective of the analysis on the HCPB PHTS is to evaluate the dynamic 
pressurization of the TB in function of both pipe rupture size such a way to identify 
possible preventive and/or mitigating design solutions. 
 
The peak of pressure inside the TB is determined in the very first place by the inventory 
of helium that is released from the PHTS. As first approximation, this value of pressure 
can be calculated by hand calculations: the TB is approximated as an adiabatic system 
and the final pressure value is given by the ideal gas law: 
 
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
126 
𝒑𝑽 = 𝒏𝑹𝑻 Eq. 5.5 
 
In the large break scenarios, e.g. the double hand guillotine break of a large pipe, such a 
model can be adopted to conservatively estimate the peak pressure value occurring 
within the TB at the beginning of the accident. In fact the rapid release of all the He 
inventory within the TB allows to neglect the contribution of the TB surface in reducing 
the atmosphere temperature and hence the pressure of the gas mixture. On the other 
hand the behaviour of the TB pressure as function of the time need to be assessed in 
detail due to its relevance to the safety of the overall machine. Such a parameter in fact 
may allow the introduction of mitigating actions, such as isolation of the broken circuit 
through safety valves.  
 
For smaller break size the contribution of the TB walls in reducing the enthalpy of the 
gas mixture along the time surely affects the maximum value of pressure within the 
confinement volume. Therefore this contribution shall also be taken into account via 
proper heat transfer model.  
 
Also the influence of location shall be assessed, to evaluate if the occurrence of the 
break/leak in some portions of the circuit (e.g. hot or cold leg) plays a role both in terms 
of value of pressure and time to discharge the whole inventory. 
 
In summary the behaviour of the pressure and temperature inside the TB during various 
LOCA scenarios (different in terms of break size) needs to be assessed to elaborate 
preventing design features (e.g. alternative layout) and specific mitigating measures (e.g. 
actuation of safety isolation valves).  
 
5.2 Description of the nodalisations  
The employed nodalisation for the two different PHTS layouts are described. For the 
reference design two nodalisations were built: the “48 model” and the “47+1 model”. As 
explained in section 5.1 the outboard blanket system is fed by 48x2 pipes (48 segments 
with 2 pipes per segment) organised in 2 independent loops.: 
 
 the 48 model simulates the loop A as described in Figure  5.1; the 48 inlet blanket 
pipes are modelled as a single lumped Control Volume (CV). A similar approach is 
used for the 48 outlet blanket pipes and for the 5 main pipes.  
 the 47+1 model consist of 47 outlet blanket pipes simulated as a single lumped 
CV and one single pipe (the 48th) simulated as another separate CV. A similar 
approach was also used for the 48 outlet blanket pipes and for the 5 main pipes. 
 
The 48 model represents a simplified schematization of the real loop; however, flow 
reversal phenomena within a pipe bundle cannot be simulated. The 47+1 model 
simulates the real geometry of a single pipe in parallel with the circuit pipeline and 
hence allows the evaluation of the influence of flow reversal phenomena that take place 
within the loop during the ex-vessel LOCA. 
 
A specific nodalisation was built also for the alternative PHTS design. This nodalisation, 
called “10 model”, is similar in shape and approach to the 48 model, but with different 
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dimensions of the CV due to the lower number of piping connections from/to the 
blanket. In this case a single loop feeds 10 segments both in IB and OB part through two 
“small” header, while a single SG provides the heat removal function and a single 
compressor provides the flow circulation within the loop.   
 
5.2.1 48 Model 
A simple nodalisation has been built in order to obtain robust and fast-running 
simulations. Although the very simple nodalisation, the 48 model simulates the main 
characteristics (differences in components height, coolant mass and volume) of the 
PHTS of the HCPB blanket concept. In Figure 5.5 a sketch of this model is reported. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: 48 nodalisation sketch (location of rupture: Hot Header) 
 
5.2.2 47+1 Model 
After the construction of the 48 model the 47+1 model was created to evaluate also the 
influence of flow reversal phenomena on the LOCA accident. The differences between 
these two nodalisations are related to the different approach employed in the 
construction of the PHTS parallel pipes, to assess the possible differences among a 
lumped and a detailed model from the thermal hydraulic point of view. In the 48 model 
all the 48 inlet blanket pipes were simulated as a single CV, while in the 47+1 model 47 
pipes were simulated as a single CV and the remaining pipe as another CV. Similarly the 
5 main pipes and the 48 outlet blanket pipes were simulated with the same approach 
employed for the 48 inlet blanket pipes. In the following pages only the modifications 
executed in the 47+1 model will be reported, and in a sketch of the nodalisation is 
shown in Figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6: 47+1 nodalisation sketch 
 
5.2.3 Accident Matrix for Transitory runs  
A parametric study was carried out in order to analyse the influence of the break 
position and its flow area. The accidents analysed for the 48 and 47+1 models are 
reported in Table 5.7: in particular the rupture size spans from 200% (double hand 
guillotine break) to 0.1 % of the pipe nominal area. 
 
Table 5.7: Accidents matrix for the 48 and 47+1 models 
Pipe involved CV name Case name 
Break Area 
[m2] 
Diameter 
[m] 
[%][1] 
1/48 outlet pipe (before 
the enlargement) 
BP011 BP001_C1 0.09048 0.33941 200.0 
BP001_C4 0.00452 0.07589 10.0 
BP001_C7 0.00045 0.024 1.0 
BP001_C8 0.00005 0.00759 0.1 
1/48 outlet pipe  
(after the enlargement) 
BP012 BP002_C1 0.15646 0.44633 200.0 
BP002_C4 0.00782 0.0998 10.0 
BP002_C7 0.00078 0.03156 1.0 
BP002_C8 0.00008 0.00998 0.1 
Hot header HD001 HD001_C1 1.83218 1.52735 200.0 
HD001_C4 0.09161 0.34153 10.0 
HD001_C7 0.00916 0.108 1.0 
HD001_C8 0.00092 0.03415 0.1 
1/5 pipe from the 
header to the SG 
MP011 MP001_C1 1.83218 1.52735 200.0 
MP001_C4 0.09161 0.34153 10.0 
MP001_C7 0.00916 0.108 1.0 
MP001_C8 0.00092 0.03415 0.1 
1/5 pipe from the SG to 
the blower 
MP012 MP002_C1 1.83218 1.52735 200.0 
MP002_C4 0.09161 0.34153 10.0 
MP002_C7 0.00916 0.108 1.0 
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MP002_C8 0.00092 0.03415 0.1 
1/5 pipe from the 
blower to the header 
MP013 MP003_C1 1.83218 1.52735 200.0 
MP003_C4 0.09161 0.34153 10.0 
MP003_C7 0.00916 0.108 1.0 
MP003_C8 0.00092 0.03415 0.1 
Cold header HD002 HD002_C1 1.83218 1.52735 200.0 
HD002_C4 0.09161 0.34153 10.0 
HD002_C7 0.00916 0.108 1.0 
HD002_C8 0.00092 0.03415 0.1 
1/48 inlet blanket pipe BP013 BP003_C1 0.1311 0.40857 200.0 
BP003_C4 0.00656 0.09136 10.0 
BP003_C7 0.00066 0.02889 1.0 
BP003_C8 0.00007 0.00914 0.1 
 
[1] Refers to the percentage respect to the nominal area of the pipe. 200 % means that 
the rupture is a double guillotine rupture, 10 % means that the rupture cover only the 
10% of the nominal area (based on the inner diameter), etc. 
 
5.2.4 10 Model 
As for the 48 model, a simple nodalisation has been built in order to obtain robust and 
fast-running simulations also for the alternative design. This is a very simple 
nodalisation, which lumps ten inlet blanket pipes in three single CVs connected in series 
to the cold header CV and to the blanket CV. Analogously the same approach has been 
used to simulate the outlet piping, i.e. the one connecting the blanket CV to the hot 
header CV. In Figure 5.7: 10 nodalisation sketch a sketch of this model is reported. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: 10 nodalisation sketch 
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Table 5.8a: Velocities for the 10 model 
10 model Junctions 
MELCOR 
Velocity [m/s] 
BLBP001 67.4 
BPEN001 67. 4 
ENBP001 50.1 
BPHD001 39.0 
HDMP001 33.3 
MPSG001 33.3 
SGMP001 24.8 
MPMP001 24.8 
MPHD001 24.8 
HDBP001 34.6 
BPRD001 49.5 
RDBL001 49.5 
 
5.2.5 Accidents matrix  for transitory runs 
For the 10 model the ruptures involving the hot and cold headers have been 
investigated. In Table 5.9 the investigated scenarios are reported. 
Table 5.9b: Accidents matrix for the 10 model. 
Pipe 
involved 
CV name Case name 
Break Area 
[m2] 
Diameter [m] 
Diameter 
[%][1] 
Hot header HD001 HD001_C1 1.83218 1.52735 200.0 
HD001_C3 0.45804 0.76368 50.0 
HD001_C5 0.0458 0.24150 5.0 
HD001_C7 0.00916 0.108 1.0 
HD001_C8 0.00092 0.03415 0.1 
Cold header HD002 HD001_C1 1.83218 1.52735 200.0 
HD001_C3 0.45804 0.76368 50.0 
HD001_C5 0.0458 0.24150 5.0 
HD001_C7 0.00916 0.108 1.0 
HD001_C8 0.00092 0.03415 0.1 
 
[1] Refers to the percentage respect to the nominal diameter. 200 % means that the 
rupture is a double guillotine rupture, 10 % means that the rupture cover only the 10% 
of the nominal inner diameter, etc. 
 
5.2.6 MELCOR input decks  
In Appendix II are reported the MELOCR input decks for the 48, 47+1 and 10 models. 
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5.3 Evaluation of influence of rupture size and location  
5.3.1 Stationary runs 
Stationary runs have been performed both for the 48 and 47 +1 models  to verify the 
input decks validity to simulate stationary conditions of the PHTS.  
Four parameters have been selected to verify the stability of the stationary runs: the 
total pressure (8MPa), the atmospheric temperature (500 °C for the hot leg and 300°C 
for the cold leg), the total mass flow rates (875 kg/s) and the fluid velocity. The above 
mentioned parameters have been checked for stability in each CV. In the following pages 
the main results of the stationary runs are shown in tabular form. 
 
5.3.1.1 Total pressure & Atmospheric temperatures 
The tables below report the total pressure and the atmospheric temperatures during 
stationary runs for both the 48 and 47+1 models.  
 
Table 5.10: Total pressure in the 48 and the 47+1 models 
48 model CVs 
MELCOR 
Pressure [MPa] Temperature [°C] 
BL001 8.163 498.39 
BP001 7.918 498.39 
EN001 7.901 498.39 
BP002 7.895 498.39 
HD001 7.888 498.39 
MP001 7.884 498.39 
SG001 7.864 300.83 
MP002 7.821 300.83 
MP003 8.197 300.83 
HD002 8.190 300.83 
BP002 8.185 300.83 
RD001 8.176 300.83 
 
Table 5.11: Atmospheric temperatures in the 48 and the 47+1 models 
47+1 model CVs 
MELCOR 
Pressure [MPa] Temperature [°C] 
BL001 8.162 494.38 
BP001 7.918 494.38 
BP011 7.921 494.38 
EN001 7.901 494.38 
EN011 7.904 494.38 
BP002 7.896 494.38 
BP012 7.898 494.38 
HD001 7.887 494.38 
MP001 7.884 494.38 
MP011 7.884 494.38 
SG001 7.864 301.16 
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SG011 7.863 299.40 
MP002 7.821 301.16 
MP012 7.821 299.40 
MP003 8.197 301.16 
MP013 8.197 299.40 
HD002 8.190 301.16 
BP002 8.184 301.16 
BP012 8.185 301.16 
RD001 8.176 301.16 
RD012 8.176 301.16 
 
 
 
5.3.1.2 Mass flow rate & Velocities 
In the table below the mass flow rates and the velocities of the main pipes of the 48 and 
the 47+1 models are reported. The mass flow rates predicted by the code are slightly 
lower (3%) compared to the nominal value (875.5 kg/s),however, they have been 
judged acceptable for the analyses to be performed.  
 
Table 5.12: Mass flow rate in the 48 and the 47+1 models 
48 model Junctions 
MELCOR 
Mass Flow rate [kg/s] Velocity [m/s] 
BLBP001 872.79 78.89 
BPEN001 872.79 81.53 
ENBP001 872.79 47.25 
BPHD001 872.79 47.28 
HDMP001 872.79 38.80 
MPSG001 872.79 38.82 
SGMP001 872.79 28.88 
MPMP001 872.79 28.99 
MPHD001 872.79 27.66 
HDBP001 872.79 40.30 
BPRD001 872.79 40.33 
RDBL001 872.79 91.34 
 
Table 5.13: Velocities in the 48 and the 47+1 models 
47+1 model Junctions 
MELCOR 
Mass Flow rate [kg/s] Velocity [m/s] 
BLBP001  854.50 78.88 
BLBP002  18.06 78.37 
BPEN001 854.50 81.52 
BPEN002 18.06 80.95 
ENBP001 854.50 47.24 
ENBP002 18.06 46.92 
BPHD001 854.50 47.28 
BPHD002 18.06 46.96 
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HDMP001 699.38 38.86 
HDMP002  173.33 38.53 
MPSG001 699.38 38.88 
MPSG002 173.33 38.55 
SGMP001 699.38 28.94 
SGMP002 173.33 28.61 
MPMP001 699.38 29.06 
MPMP002 173.33 28.72 
MPHD001 699.38 27.73 
MPHD002 173.33 27.40 
HDBP001 856.01 40.37 
HDBP002  16.82 37.29 
BPRD001 856.01 40.40 
BPRD002 16.82 37.31 
RDBL001 856.01 89.59 
RDBL002 16.82 82.75 
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5.3.2 Transitory runs  
5.3.2.1 Generalities 
 
In the following the transitory runs is subdivided in 4 categories: 
 
1. Ruptures of the blanket outlet pipes, involving the BP001, and the BP002 CVs. 
2. Ruptures of the main coolant pipes before the SGs, involving the HD001, and the 
MP001 CVs. 
3. Ruptures of the main coolant pipes after the SGs, involving the MP002, the 
MP003, and the HD002 CVs. 
4. Rupture of the blanket inlet pipes, involving the BP003 CV.  
Due to the larger diameter, the rupture of the headers (both hot and cold) is the most 
challenging in terms of safety, since the circuit depressurization and consequent EV 
pressurization are the fastest, hence mitigating actions, such safety isolation valves 
actuation, cannot be performed effectively. Therefore for the 10 model only the hot and 
cold header LOCAs were investigated. 
5.3.3 Ruptures of the blanket outlet pipes 
Two CVs simulate the blanket outlet pipes, the BP001 and the BP002. The results shown 
by these two CVs are similar; hence in the following only the graphs related to BP001 
will be reported and described. 
 
5.3.3.1 Total pressure 
In Graph 1 and in Graph 2 the pressure trends in selected CVs (i.e. blanket piping and 
EV) during several LOCAs affecting the outlet blanket pipes are shown, and in Table 5.10 
the time and pressure values at which the system reaches an equilibrium condition (i.e. 
the flow rate between the broken loop and the EV is lower than 0.1 kg/s) are reported. 
Some differences can be highlighted among the two models, meaning that the influence 
of the model geometry is not negligible. In the following each case will be reported and 
discussed with greater detail.  
The first investigated scenario (C1) is characterized by a rupture area of 0.09 m2.  As 
shown in both graphs the equilibrium condition is reached in just few seconds, thus it is 
not possible to reduce the severity of the transient due to its fast evolution. The 
maximum pressure expected in the EV is 0.27 MPa that is beyond the limits assumed for 
this component.  
The second case investigated (C4) is characterized by a rupture area of 0.00452 m2. As 
expected, the time needed to reach an equilibrium conditions are higher compared to 
the C1 case due to the smaller area investigated. The maximum expected pressure is 
similar to the C1 case (0.29 MPa), hence similar conclusions can be drawn. Although, the 
depressurization slope of the C4 case allows the introduction of safety devices, as 
isolation valves in the main coolant pipes (the pipes connecting the headers to the SGs), 
hence a reduction in the severity of the transient can be obtained. 
Finally, the last two cases investigated (C7 and C8) are characterized by a rupture area 
of 0.00045 and 0.00005 m2. For these two cases the following remarks can be pointed 
out: 
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 The hydraulic resistance of the two models is greater compared to the C1 and C4 
cases; 
 The equilibrium pressure of the MELCOR run in the 48 model is different 
compared to the 47+1 model.  
 In both C7 and C8 cases the equilibrium pressure is about 0.3 MPa; although this 
values are higher than the design pressure of the EV, mitigating actions can be 
undertaken due to the slow pressurization dynamic of the event. 
 
Nevertheless, several limitations in the approach employed can be reported: 
 The decay heat is assumed constant, while in reality it decreases along the time; 
however, the contribution to increase the final pressure value inside the EV is of 
the second order and in any case conservative from the safety point of view. 
 For long transient, the contribution of the EV walls in decreasing the 
temperature of the discharged He would also reduce the final pressure value; 
again this effect is estimated to be of the second order and in any case the 
current assumptions are conservative. 
 For the very small rupture areas also the shape of the break might play a role in 
the transient and hence a more detailed analyses (e.g. CFD) should be performed 
to investigate the complex phenomena happening near the boundaries of the 
break; however the possibility to implement a equivalent hydraulic diameter for 
the size would be still valid. 
 The intact loop should be simulated to improve the temperature prediction in 
the PHTS. 
 
As conclusion it can be stated that an equilibrium pressure around, or above, 0.3 MPa is 
not acceptable because the postulated EV is not designed to withstand to these high 
loads. The cause of this higher value can be found in the huge helium inventory 
presented inside the PHTS that poses a clear risk to the safety of the plant. However the 
MELCOR results can give a clear picture of the dynamic pressurization of the EV, i.e. a 
good estimation of the time to reach the equilibrium condition is given in function of the 
break size. 
 
The installation of safety devices, as isolation valves in the main coolant pipes, could 
reduce the He mass released inside the EV thus reducing the pressure peak reached. 
However, the assumption made in the current work is that at least 20 seconds are 
required from the leak detection to the complete closure of the valves, due to the large 
size of the He main piping (DN1200).  
Hence results show clearly that this actions can be performed only for IB-LOCA and SB-
LOCA (C4, C7 and C8 cases). For these purposes, alternative PHTS design solutions 
should be studied to improve the overall reactor safety.   
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Graph 1: Total pressure trends for the BP001 break scenarios (48 model) 
 
 
Graph 2: Total pressure trends for the BP011 break scenarios (47+1 model) 
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Table 5.14: Time and pressure values at which the system reaches an eq. condition 
Case  
Area  
[m2] 
48 model 47+1 model 
Time [s] Press. [MPa] Time [s] Press. [MPa] 
C1 0.09048 330.0 0.27 390.0 0.25 
C4 0.00452 2100.0 0.29 1540.0 0.28 
C7 0.00045 13400.0 0.31 13900.0 0.3 
C8 0.00005 150000.0 0.39 15000.0 0.29 
 
 
5.3.3.2 Mass flow rates 
In Graph 3 and Graph 4 the mass flow rates during several LOCAs affecting the outlet 
blanket pipes are shown, and in Table 5.15 the maximum mass flow rates reached are 
reported. As expected, bigger rupture areas are characterized by higher mass flow rates, 
while smaller rupture areas are characterized by lower maximum mass flow rates. Both 
codes and both models report similar results, but some minor differences due to the 
system inertia can be highlighted in the C1 and C4 cases. In detail, the mass flow rate 
trends are better reproduced in the 47+1 model thanks to the more realistic approach 
employed to simulate the parallel pipes. 
 
 
 
Graph 3: Mass flow rates for the BP001 break scenarios (48 model) 
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Graph 4: Mass flow rates for the BP011 break scenarios (47+1 model) 
 
Table 5.15: Maximum mass flow rates shown by the outlet blanket pipe LOCAs 
Case  
Area  
[m2] 
48 model 47+1 model 
Mass Flow Rate [kg/s] Mass Flow Rate [kg/s] 
C1 0.09048 402.2 234.0 
C4 0.00452 20.96 20.93 
C7 0.00045 2.09 2.1 
C8 0.00005 0.2325 0.23 
 
5.3.4 Ruptures of the main coolant pipes before the SGs 
Two CVs simulate main coolant pipes before the SGs, the MP001 and the HD001 (hot 
header). The results shown by these two CVs are similar; hence in the following only the 
graphs related to hot header (HD001) will be reported and discussed, because also the 
alternative layout has been investigated during these LOCA scenarios. 
 
5.3.4.1 Total pressure 
In Graphs 5, 6 and 7 the pressure trends during several LOCAs affecting the main coolant pipes 
before the SGs are shown, and in  
Table 5.16 the time and pressure values at which the systems reach equilibrium 
conditions are reported. The results shown are quite similar to the outlet blanket pipes, 
particularly for breaks of same area Since the equilibrium pressure values are 
comparable to the outlet blanket ones, same conclusions can be drawn.  
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The first investigated case (C1) is characterized by a rupture area of 1.83218 m2. As 
shown in the three graphs the equilibrium conditions are reached in less than 20 s. The 
equilibrium pressure is below 0.27 and 0.13 MPa for the reference and alternative 
design, respectively. The great difference among these two values can be explained 
considering that the helium inventory of the alternative design is much lower than the 
reference one, and the relationship among the helium inventories is the same of the 
equilibrium pressures. The final pressure reached with the reference design is quite 
challenging for the EV itself, while the pressure reached by the alternative design does 
not represent a risk in terms of confinement of pressure and radiological material. It can 
be also noticed that the sudden change in the depressurization slope in the reference 
design is due to the blower trip. The blower trip is supposed to occur 10.0 s after the 
LOCA event. 
Finally, as for the C1 case (LB LOCA) of the outlet blanket pipes, safety devices cannot be 
employed to reduce the severity of the transient. 
 
The second investigated case (C4) is characterized by a rupture area of 0.09161 m2. As 
shown in the graphs the time needed to reach equilibrium conditions is 160.0 s for the 
reference design and 20.0 for the alternative design. The difference among the 48 and 
47+1 models is due to the hydraulic resistance, which is better predicted in the latter 
since also flow reversal phenomena may take place during a LOCA. On the contrary, the 
alternative layout provides a depressurization time almost identical to the one shown by 
the reference design in the C1 case. Differently from the outlet blanket pipe C4 case in 
these scenarios no mitigative actions can be performed to reduce the severity of the 
transient due to the fast evolution of the accident. 
The third investigated case (C7) is characterized by a rupture area of 0.00916 m2. As 
reported in the three graphs the depressurization slope is similar for both designs, but 
the equilibrium conditions are different due to the different helium inventories. In the 
reference design the maximum expected pressure is 0.28 MPa, as for the C4 case. On the 
contrary, the maximum expected pressure in the alternative design is 0.12 MPa. For 
these purpose, it can be stated that in the reference design the maximum pressure 
reached is quite challenging for the EV integrity, while in the alternative design the 
maximum stresses to the EV are not of main concern. Although, the slow 
depressurization rate shown by the reference design allows the introduction of safety 
valves, which can contribute to the reduction of the EV stresses. On the contrary, for the 
alternative design the depressurization rate is still fast, thus no mitigative action can be 
performed. 
Finally, the fourth and last investigated case (C8) is characterized by a rupture area of 
0.00092 m2. This case is the only one in which mitigative actions can be performed in 
both designs thanks to the slow depressurization rates reported. The maximum 
expected pressure in the EV is 0.32 MPa and 0.12 MPa for the reference and the 
alternative design, respectively. As for the previous cases these pressure values are 
quite challenging for the reference design, while are not of main concern for the 
alternative design. 
As conclusion it can be stated that, differently from the ruptures affecting the outlet 
cooling pipes, both the LB- and the IB-LOCA transients (C1 and C4 cases) are too fast to 
be mitigated with safety devices. For this purpose, in the reference design the 
introduction of safety valves seems useful only for SB-LOCA (C7 and C8 cases), while for 
the alternative layout also the C7 case seems quite complex to mitigate.  
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Table 5.16: Time and pressure values at which the systems reach an eq. condition 
Case  
Area  
[m2] 
48 model 47+1 model 10 model 
Time [s] 
Press. 
[MPa] 
Time [s] 
Press. 
[MPa] 
Time [s] 
Press. 
[MPa] 
C1 1.83218 112.0 0.26 111.0 0.26 102.0 0.12 
C4 0.09161 165.0 0.27 257.0 0.27 115.0 0.12 
C7 0.00916 810.0 0.27 1000.0 0.28 460.0 0.12 
C8 0.00092 6600.0 0.30 7000.0 0.31 1255.0 0.12 
 
 
Graph 5: Total pressure trends for the HD001 break scenarios (48 model) 
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Graph 6: Total pressure trends for the HD001 break scenarios (47+1 model) 
 
 
Graph 7: Total pressure trends for the HD001 break scenarios (10 model) 
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5.3.4.2 Mass flow rates 
In Graphs 8, 9, and 10 the mass flow rates across the ruptures are reported, and in Table 
5.17 the maximum mass flow rates reached in each rupture case are shown. 
Regarding the alternative design, the maximum mass flow rates for the C1 and C4 cases 
are quite lower compared to the same cases of the reference design, while the values 
shown during the C7 and C8 cases are comparable.  
 
 
Graph 8: Mass flow rates for the HD001 break scenarios (48 model) 
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Graph 9: Mass flow rates for the HD001 break scenarios (47+1 model) 
 
 
 
Graph 10: Mass flow rates for the HD001 break scenarios (10 model) 
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Table 5.17: Maximum mass flow rates shown by the main coolant pipe LOCAs (before the SGs) 
Case  
Area  
[m2] 
48 model 47+1 model 10 model 
Mass Flow Rate 
[kg/s] 
Mass Flow Rate [kg/s] 
Mass Flow Rate [kg/s] 
C1 1.83218 4053.3 4054.0 1582.45 
C4 0.09161 407.7 409.18 350.34 
C7 0.00916 42.36 42.3 41.84 
C8 0.00092 4.41 4.18 4.39 
 
5.3.5 Ruptures of the main coolant pipes after the SGs 
Three CVs simulate main coolant pipes after the SGs, the MP002, the MP003, and the 
HD002 (cold header). The results shown by these three CVs are similar; hence in the 
following only the graphs related to cold header (HD002) will be reported and 
discussed, because also the alternative layout has been investigated during these LOCA 
scenarios 
 
5.3.5.1 Total pressure 
In Graphs 11, 12, and 13 the pressure trends during several LOCAs affecting the main 
coolant pipes after the SGs are reported, and in Table 5.18 the time and pressure values 
at which the systems reach equilibrium conditions are reported. As expected, for both 
designs the time needed to reach equilibrium conditions is lower compared to the 
ruptures affecting the main coolant pipes before the SGs thanks to the positive head 
provided by the helium blower during the first 10.0 s of the transient. Regarding the 
equilibrium pressure the reference design shows lower values compared to the ones 
shown in the ruptures affecting the main coolant pipes before the SGs. This is probably 
due to the heat removal function that is still provided by the SGs and hence the coolant 
released in the EV has lower enthalpy. On the contrary, no significant differences are 
shown in the alternative design due to both the lower coolant inventory  and lower time 
required to reach the equilibrium condition.  
As conclusion it can be stated that, as for the ruptures affecting the main coolant pipes 
before the SGs, both the LB- and the IB-LOCA transients (C1 and C4 cases) are too fast to 
be mitigated with safety devices. For this purpose, in the reference design the 
introduction of safety valves seems useful only for SB-LOCA (C7 and C8 cases). 
 
Table 5.18: Time and pressure values at which the system reaches an eq. condition 
Case  
Area  
[m2] 
48 model 47+1 model 10 model 
Time 
[s] 
Press. 
[MPa] 
Time 
[s] 
Press. 
[MPa] 
Time [s] 
Press. 
[MPa] 
C1 1.83218 111.0 0.23 111.0 0.23 102.0 0.12 
C4 0.09161 273.0 0.24 250.0 0.24 104.0 0.12 
C7 0.00916 725.0 0.24 757.0 0.24 400.0 0.12 
C8 0.00092 5815.0 0.27 6000.0 0.26 1255.0 0.12 
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Graph 11: Total pressure trends for the HD002 break scenarios (48 model) 
 
 
Graph 12: Total pressure trends for the HD002 break scenarios (47+1 model) 
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Graph 13: Total pressure trends for the HD002 break scenarios (10 model) 
 
 
5.3.5.2 Mass flow rates 
In Graphs 14, 15, and 16 the mass flow rates across the ruptures are reported, and in 
Table 5.19 the maximum mass flow rates reached in each rupture case are shown.  Same 
conclusions drawn for the main coolant pipes scenario are valid for the present cases. 
 
Table 5.19: Maximum mass flow rates shown by the main coolant pipe LOCAs (after the SGs) 
Case  
Area  
[m2] 
48 model 47+1 model 10 model 
Mass Flow Rate 
[kg/s] 
Mass Flow Rate [kg/s] 
Mass Flow Rate [kg/s] 
C1 1.83218 4271.9 4290.0 1650.0 
C4 0.09161 494.65 489.6 900.51 
C7 0.00916 51.1 51.03 50.5 
C8 0.00092 5.14 4.78 5.15 
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Graph 14: Rupture mass flow rates for the HD002 break scenarios (48 model) 
 
 
Graph 15: Rupture mass flow rates for the HD002 break scenarios (47+1 model) 
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Graph 16: Rupture mass flow rates for the HD002 break scenarios (10 model) 
 
5.3.6 Ruptures of the blanket inlet pipes 
5.3.6.1 Total pressure 
In Graph 17 and in Graph 18 the pressure trends during several LOCAs affecting the inlet 
blanket pipes are shown, and in Table 5.20 the time and pressure values at which the 
system reaches an equilibrium condition are reported. Some differences can be 
highlighted among the two models, meaning that the influence of the system inertia is 
not negligible. In the following each case will be reported and discussed with greater 
detail. 
The first investigated case (C1) is characterized by a rupture area of 0.1311 m2. As 
reported in Table 5.20 the equilibrium conditions are reached in less than 100.0 s in the 
48 model, and in less than 150.0 s in the 47+1 model. The fast depressurization of the 
system does not allow the introduction of safety valves, thus no mitigative actions can be 
performed. The maximum pressure expected inside the EV is 0.25 MPa, and it is quite 
challenging for the EV integrity. Therefore, alternative designs with smaller helium 
inventories should be developed to reduce the stresses on the EV building. 
The second investigated case (C4) is characterized by a rupture area of 0.00656 m2. 
Compared to the C1 case, the depressurization rate is slower due to the smaller rupture 
area investigated, but the final pressure values are comparable. The equilibrium 
conditions are reached in around 900.0 s, which is a suitable time to execute mitigative 
actions. In detail, isolation valves on the main coolant pipes could be able to reduce the 
consequences of the transient reducing the helium inventory discharged inside the EV. 
The third investigated case (C7) is characterized by a rupture area of 0.00066 m2.  
As conclusion it could be stated that the maximum pressure expected in the EV is of 
main concern for each case investigated, especially for the slower ones. Although, the 
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severity of the LOCA events could be reduced introducing isolation valves on the main 
coolant pipes before and after the SGs. These valves are able to reduce the helium 
inventory released inside the EV, but only if the transient is sufficiently slow. For this 
purpose, the LB-LOCAs (C1 case) cannot be mitigated, thus alternative PHTS designs 
should be developed to reduce the maximum helium inventory releasable during an 
accident. 
 
 
Graph 17: Total pressure trends for the BP003 break scenarios (48 model) 
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Graph 18: Total pressure trends for the BP003 break scenarios (47+1 model) 
 
Table 5.20: Time and pressure values at which the system reaches an equilibrium condition 
Case  
Area  
[m2] 
48 model 47+1 model 
Time [s] Press. [MPa] Time [s] Press. [MPa] 
C1 0.1311 185.0 0.24 237.0 0.24 
C4 0.00656 930.0 0.24 970.0 0.26 
C7 0.00066 8360.0 0.27 8520.0 0.28 
C8 0.00007 150000. 0.34 123000. 0.34 
 
5.3.6.2 Mass flow rates 
In Graph 19 and Graph 20-a the mass flow rates during the various BP003 and BP013 
rupture cases are reported. Similar results were shown for the previous incidental 
scenarios, thus the same explanation provided before are also applicable to these 
scenarios. The only remark that should be made is about the blowdown times, which are 
slightly inferior to the ones shown by the breaks affecting the outlet blanket pipes due to 
the positive head provided by the HB in the first 10 s after the rupture, and the slightly 
higher rupture areas. 
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Graph 19: Mass flow rates for the BP003 break scenarios (48 model) 
 
 
Graph 20-a: Mass flow rates for the BP013 break scenarios (47+1 model) 
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Table 5.21: Maximum mass flow rates shown by the inlet coolant pipe LOCAs 
Case  
Area  
[m2] 
48 model 47+1 model 
Mass Flow Rate [kg/s] Mass Flow Rate [kg/s] 
C1 0.1311 688.4 482.43 
C4 0.00656 36.61 36.46 
C7 0.00066 3.7 3.697 
C8 0.00007 0.3953 0.3954 
 
Graph 20-b shows the detail of the flow rate for the 47+1 model, assuming a C1 pipe 
rupture occurring in the hot header. The green and the red lines represent the flow rate 
through the 47 merged pipes and the single pipe respectively. As can be seen, both flow 
rates change in sign after the begin of the accident: i.e. the loop experiences counter 
current phenomena due to the large mass flow through the rupture (green line). Also the 
flow rate through the blanket slightly increase right after the occurrence of the break,  
due to the sudden increase on the velocity within the portion of the loop before the 
break. Therefore it is possible to state that the 47+1 model, compared to the 48 one, 
allows to better simulate the dynamic behaviour of the coolant velocities within the 
loop, which results in an overall higher hydraulic resistance of the circuit. However, no 
relevant differences on the calculated pressure peak values were found between the two 
models, hence, for the objective of this analysis, the 48 model was judged more 
convenient due to the simple mesh and hence lower calculation time. 
 
Graph 21-b: detail of flow reversal phenomena within the 47+1 model 
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5.4 Comparison of the MELCOR models: HD001 case with thermal 
conductivity of TB walls 
5.4.1 Generalities 
As shown in 5.3, the HD001 case is the most challenging from the confinement point of 
view, since the very quick pressurization of the TB. In the next pages this case is further 
studied taking into account the heat transfer between the coolant released from the 
PHTS and the TB walls: in other words the target is to evaluate the contribution of the 
thermal conduction of the confinement liner in reducing the helium temperature and 
hence the pressure within the TB itself. 
The heat transfer between the TB walls and the coolant released from the PHTS has 
been simulated by introducing a conducting structure in the TB, which exchanges 
constantly heat with the outer environment. This structure represents the TB walls, 
which is assumed to be made by a cylindrical stainless steel layer, 0,1 m thick, and with 
an outer surface kept constantly at the conservative value of 40 °C. 
In the following graphs temperature and pressure behaviour for the 48, 47+1 and 10 
models during C1, C4, C7 and C8 LOCA are shown(please mind the logarithmic scale for 
the x axis). 
 
5.4.2 C1 case– 200% main header area 
The TB atmosphere temperature and pressure behaviour are shown in Graph 22-22. For 
the C1 cases, the temperature rises very quickly, reaching in the first few seconds the 
peak value, due to the large inventory released in the TB atmosphere. Immediately after 
the peak, the temperature inside the TB starts to decrease due to the heat exchange 
between the released “hot” helium and the “cold” TB walls.  The 48 and 47+1 models 
show practically the same temperature behaviour (in fact the two lines are hardly 
discernible due to closeness of temperature values ): despite of the positive contribution 
of the containment walls in reducing the temperature, the TB atmosphere stays above 
100 °C for about 800 s (the room temperature decrease below 100 °C after 898 s from 
the beginning of the run) to finally reach an equilibrium value of about 46 °C about after 
5800 s  from the beginning of the accident. For both models the TB pressure overpasses 
0.2 MPa practically immediately after the accident; acceptable pressure level are 
reached about 620 seconds after the accident due to the beneficial effect of heat removal 
through the TB walls towards the environment. 
The 10 model shows a temperature peak of about 73 °C, while the equilibrium 
temperature, 47 °C) is reached about 1600 s after the begin of the accident, the TB 
pressure never exceeding the design limit (pressure peak value 0.12 MPa). 
Curiously enough, the 10 model shows an equilibrium temperature that is slightly 
higher than the ones encountered for the 48 and 47+1 models. This is judged to be due 
to the lower helium pressure inside the TB and hence a lower heat removal efficiency at 
equilibrium condition. However, the  capability of the code to predict the equilibrium 
temperature might  be affected by the large discrepancy between the loops and TB 
volumes. Nevertheless the temperature difference is below 1°C and it has been judged 
acceptable for the present study. 
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Graph 22: Temperature behaviour within the TB for C1 case 
 
Graph 23: Pressure behaviour inside the TB for C1 case 
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5.4.3 C4 case– 5% main header area 
Similarly to the C1, the C4 cases (Graph 24 and Graph 25) show a quick rise in 
temperature and pressure within the first hundred seconds after the accident. Both 
model 48 and 47+1 room temperatures exceed 100 °C for about 820 s while the 10 
model shows a temperature peak of about 72 °C. The design pressure of the TB is 
exceeded both for models 48 and 47+1 (peak values of 0.25 MPa), while model 10 reach 
approximately the same value of the C1 case. It’s important to underline that the 48 and 
47+1 model show a closer pressure behaviour than the one shown in 5.3: in particular 
pressure values along the time are practically the same, hence the coolant flow reversal 
phenomena occurring in the loop have no big impact both on pressure peak value and 
time. 
Concerning the equilibrium temperatures,  model 48 show a values close to the C1 case 
(44 °C), while 47+1 and 10 models show a sensible higher value: respectively about 51 
and 60 °C. Again, the reason of these discrepancies in the temperature of equilibrium 
seems to be related to the differences in the CVs simulating the loop and the TB one.   
 
Graph 24: Temperature behaviour within the TB for C4 case 
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Graph 25: Pressure behaviour inside the TB for C4 case 
5.4.4 C7 case– 1% main header area 
As it is possible to appreciate in Graph 26and Graph 27, the C7 cases show lower value 
of temperature and pressure than C1 and C4 ones.  The heat transfer through the TB 
walls has the dual beneficial effect to “slow-down” the rise in pressure and also to limit 
the peak value.  Although for the 48 and 47+1 model the peak of pressure is higher than 
acceptable values, the possibility to perform mitigating action is enabled, since the 
design limit of 0.2 MPa is exceed about 130 seconds after the begin of the accident. 
All the three model show good agreement among the equilibrium temperature values 
(46-44 °C): this should lead to the conclusion that the “funny” values calculated in 
previous C4 cases are due to numerical error due to the difference in the employed CVs 
sizes (loop and TB ones). 
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Graph 26: Temperature behaviour within the TB for C7 case 
 
 
Graph 27: Pressure behaviour inside the TB for C7 case 
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5.4.5 C8 case– 0.1% main header area 
Due to the very low pressurization of the TB atmosphere, the design limit is never 
exceeded for all the models: the pressure peak value for both 48 and 47+1 models  is 
slightly below 0.18 MPa and it is reached about 1900 seconds after the begin of the 
accident. Also the peak in room temperature  is consistently lower than the ones shown 
in C1, C4 and C7 cases: although the assumed limit of 100 °C is exceeded the relative 
brevity of the event should not represent a serious issue in terms of safety.  
 
 
Graph 28:Temperature behaviour within the TB for C8 
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Graph 29: Pressure behaviour inside the TB for C8 rupture 
5.4.6 Summary Tables 
Table 5.21 shows the summary of the temperature behaviour within the TB for the 
HD001 break case for all the three loop models and for different size of the rupture. 
It’s evident that the 10 model shows the best results for all the size rupture, being the 
maximum atmosphere temperature well below 100 °C along the whole duration of the 
accident. 
On the contrary, for the 48 and 47+1 models, i.e. for the reference layout, the maximum 
temperatures are high enough to represent an issue for the efficiency of the Detritiation 
System. However, for all the cases analysed the atmosphere temperature decreases 
below 100 °C within about 1000 s, hence the DS could then be again in operational 
condition. 
Table 5.22: Max Temperature reached in the TB [°C] 
Case  48 model 47+1 model 10 Model 
C1 222.5   222.6 73.2 
C4 224.7 224.7 71.7 
C7 191.7 191.7 70.1 
C8 125.3 125.3 72.9 
 
In Table 5.22 the pressure values for the HD001 break case are reported: it is possible to 
state that, for the reference layout, even with the introduction of the heat transfer model 
between the TB walls and its atmosphere, only for the C4 cases the design pressure limit 
of the TB is not exceeded: therefore active safety systems are required in order to 
prevent the building pressurization also for pipe rupture smaller than the maximum 
one. On the other hand, the 10 model used for the alternative layout shows promising 
results: the design pressure within the confinement is never exceeded and, also 
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considering the relative low temperature and smaller released helium inventory, the 
requirements for the active safety systems seems to be less challenging. 
By comparing the results of Table 22 with the one of Table 5.18-bis (hereafter reported 
for sake of comparability) is possible to appreciate the differences in pressure values 
between the runs with and without the heat transfer through the TB inner walls for the 
reference layout. 
While in the former case the maximum pressure value decreases by decreasing the 
rupture size, while in the latter case the vice-versa occurs. This discrepancy is due to the 
assumption that the decay heat coming from the broken loop (i.e. the decay heat of the 
faulted blanket segment) never goes to zero during all the calculation time: therefore the 
provided heat slightly increases the temperature and hence the pressure within the 
confinement. 
A different behaviour is shown for the 10 model: here the heat transfer thorugh the 
inner walls is practically negligible in terms of maximum pressure value. The 
explanation to this was found to the relative low pressure of the TB atmosphere and 
hence to quite ineffective heat exchange through the inner walls.  
Table 5.23: Max Pressure reached in the TB [MPa] 
Case  48 model 47+1 model 10 Model 
C1 0.26 0.26 0.12 
C4 0.25 0.25 0.12 
C7 0.23 0.23 0.12 
C8 0.18 0.18 0.12 
 
 
Table 5.24 bis: Time and pressure values at which the systems reach an eq. condition. 
Case  
Area  
[m2] 
48 model 47+1 model 10 model 
Time [s] 
Press. 
[MPa] 
Time [s] 
Press. 
[MPa] 
Time [s] 
Press. 
[MPa] 
C1 1.83218 112.0 0.26 111.0 0.26 102.0 0.12 
C4 0.09161 165.0 0.27 257.0 0.27 115.0 0.12 
C7 0.00916 810.0 0.27 1000.0 0.28 460.0 0.12 
C8 0.00092 6600.0 0.30 7000.0 0.31 1255.0 0.12 
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5.5 Conclusions 
The aim of this work can be split into two parts: 
 
 Calculate the maximum expected pressures inside the EV in order to provide 
clear boundary conditions for its design; 
 Demonstrate that alternative PHTS designs could reduce the pressurization of  
the tokamak building; 
These analyses focused on two PHTS layouts: the well-known reference design 
(Conceptual design of the cooling system for a DEMO fusion reactor with helium cooled 
solid breeder blanket, and calculation of the transient temperature behaviour in 
accidents, 1992), and an alternative design developed specifically for this analyses and 
not yet reported in literature. These two designs have been investigated with three 
nodalisations: 
 
 The first, called 48 model, refers to the reference design, and it is characterized 
by all the parallel pipes simulated as a single CV. 
 The second, called 47+1 model, also refers to the reference design, but the model 
approach is different: 47 pipes are lumped as a single CV, while one another CV, 
simulating a single piping connection, is simulating one of the 48 piping 
connections in parallel to the lumped one. Similarly the 5 main pipes and the 48 
outlet blanket pipes were simulated with the same approach employed for the 48 
inlet blanket pipes.    
 The third and last model, called 10 model, follows the same assumptions made 
for the 48 model but it is referred to the alternative design. 
  
The 48 and 10 models were developed to provide fast running simulations to evaluate 
the influence of size rupture and location on the pressure behaviour both in EV and 
PHTS.  
The 47+1 model was developed to analyse if the level of detail of the geometry of the 
system(single vs lumped piping) influences the overall depressurization trends. 
However, this analysis has shown negligible differences, thus an analogous model for the 
alternative layout was not developed.  
However, some considerations on the models used for the present work can be listed: 
 
 A more realistic blower trip logic and behaviour should be implemented in the 
reference layout to better simulate the dynamic behaviour of the coolant within 
the circuit right after the break; 
 More realistic decay heat behaviour should be implemented. The supposed 
decay heat behaviour is characterized by an instant fall to 5.0 % of the nominal 
heat power. In the meantime a complete loss of heat sink occurs. However, this 
approach leads to a continuous temperature increase, providing values that are 
no longer credible (<2000 °C). At these high temperatures structural failures 
could be expected, and hence in the future analysis a proper maximum 
temperature limit should be introduced (supposing that at some stage an 
emergency safety feature will starts to cool down the system); 
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 A new model  should be introduced to allow the correct simulation of the plasma 
heating. This heating should be employed as a boundary condition for an HS 
capable to reproduce the thermal gradient expected in the blanket segments; 
and  
 At the same time, the broken and the intact loops should be simulated both. This 
would improve the temperature analysis of the PHTS providing more realistic 
results. 
 The introduction of a heat sink simulating the TB walls enable a better and more 
realistic prediction of the pressure behaviour within the confinement system. 
The 48 and 10 models have shown very different results due to the different helium 
inventories. In the reference layout the pressure reached inside the TB are very 
challenging, while in the alternative layout the maximum pressure can be easily 
managed. Moreover, the presence of several parallel and independent cooling loops 
increases the availability and the reliability of the system, as well as easing the decay 
heat removal capabilities of the intact loops. As for the 48 and the 47+1 models, in the 
future some input deck improvements should be introduced to simulate more realistic 
scenarios, but the results here shown can be considered credible. 
Regarding more specific safety aspects the following conclusions can be drawn: 
 
 Considering the size of the main piping and the time (at least 20 s) to 
hydraulically  isolate such a line, it is not possible to mitigate the effect of a  LB-
LOCA by the actuation  of safety isolation valves; 
 For longer transients safety isolation valves could be an option to limit the EV 
pressurization for the reference design. However the alternative design had 
shown acceptable maximum EV pressures, thus the implementation of safety 
valves could not be a requirement for this layout; 
 Considering that pressures up to 3.0 bar and temperatures up to 300 °C cannot 
be sustained by the EV (dictated both by space limitation within the TB and cost 
fo the EV itself), the alternative PHTS design should be deeply investigated. This 
layout, characterized by 10 parallel systems  each containing a lower helium 
inventory, reduces the maximum loads in the EV and ease the requirements for 
the decay heat removal of each parallel system.  
 Also the temperature behaviour within the TB clearly indicate an advantage in 
terms of safety in favour of the alternative design: in fact the TB atmosphere, 
although the He inventory release, is below 100 °C for all the rupture size. This 
means that the Detritiation System within the confinement walls can effectively 
operate in order to remove the eventual T released from the broken loop, reduce 
the confinement pressure and temperature and finally bring back the plant into a 
safe state.  
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6 Conclusions  
 
A study on the PHTSs of ITER and DEMO reactor, both during normal operation and 
accidental condition has been conducted. Through the performed analytical and 
computational analyses, a rationale for a future fusion power plant cooling circuit has 
been defined and hereafter briefly summarized, as summa of the activity developed in 
the past three and half years. The novelty of the work can be summarized in the 
proposed approach for the cooling loop for a fusion power plant: safety first also as 
method to optimize, and even simplify, the design. 
 
Pulsed heat load coming from Plasma 
The pulsed operation of the plasma implies a variable heat load that has to be transfer to 
the secondary side through the primary heat transfer system. Therefore pressure, 
coolant temperature and inventory volume shall be accurately controlled along both 
plasma pulse and dwell time. 
 
The pressure of the system can be controlled through the actuation of pressurizer 
heaters (to increase the pressure of the circuit) and water spray (to decrease the 
pressure of the circuit). Attention shall be paid to the life-cycle of the pressurizer back-
up heaters (used during the dwell time), which are supposed to face thermal fatigue due 
to the high number of call on service (once each dwell time). 
 
The coolant temperature can be controlled by switching the control valves of the HXs 
and increase the flow rate in the bypass line, such a way that the pump velocity is not 
required to vary during the transition between plasma pulse and dwell time and vice 
versa. However, in the real circuit attention shall be paid to possible flow unbalance due 
to the opening/closing of the by-pass valve, which may induce multiple pump trip and 
hence a general loss of flow within the circuit. 
 
However, the pulsed reactor PHTS will have to manage the coolant volume 
expansion/contraction during plasma burn/dwell phase, respectively. 
A possible strategy is to monitor the level of the pressurizer and regulate the volume of 
the circuit during each dwell time, through the CVCS associated to the PHTS.  
In any case, the quite large temperature difference between the pressurizer and the 
cooling circuit (about 50 °C) may induce thermal fatigue on the pressurizer surge line, 
and hence increase the risk of leakage/rupture of the pipeline. 
 
Safe design of the primary cooling system 
On the base of the conceptual design of the DEMO PHTS, a systematic approach aiming 
to identify potential hazards arising from HCPB DEMO concept systems was carried out 
to identify a list of accident initiators. A new method was adopted, in collaboration with 
ENEA-FUS Frascati, to perform the FMEA at component level with evaluation of loss of 
function. This methodology has given first screening of the various causes that could 
induce failures in the plant or simply a stop in the operating phases because of failures 
in HCPB Blanket, PHTS, CPS, or SCWS. Also a qualitative overview on accident sequences 
arising from each elementary failure could be derived on FMEA tables looking at 
consequences description and preventive/mitigating actions. 
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A list of fifteen public safety relevant PIEs has been set assessing elementary failures 
related to the different components of HCPB systems. Four of these have been identified, 
basis on possible consequences, as the ones more relevant from the safety point of view: 
 
 AOP1: Accidental Loss of Power; 
 FB1: Loss of Flow; 
 LBO1: Loss of Coolant from the PHTS; 
 HB1: Loss of Heat Sink. 
 
The Loss of Coolant accident from the PHTS was selected as reference scenario to be 
analysed through MELCOR code version 1.8.2. In parallel to the analyses for the 
reference PHTS layout, also an alternative PHTS layout was proposed and investigated.  
The aim of these analyses was twofold: 
 
 Evaluate influence of break size and location for the two layouts; 
 Compare the temperature and pressure behaviour within the Tokamak Building 
during the coolant discharge from the PHTS. 
 
Obtained results show that, for large breaks, both layouts practically doesn’t allow the 
possibility to isolate the broken pipeline before the complete inventory discharge in the 
Tokamak Building. Therefore it is paramount to reduce the releasable inventory from 
the PHTS by limiting the loop size in volume: in particular the cold and hot header of 
each loop size shall be minimized, compatibly with the coolant allowable maximum 
velocity and overall circuit pressure drops. It is clear that, for the alternative layout, the 
considerable smaller size of the cold and hot headers, compared to the reference layout 
one, leads to less challenging accidental scenario: both temperature and pressure 
dynamic values within the Tokamak Building don’t exceed the assumed limit, i.e. 100 °C 
and 0.2 MPa, respectively. The former limit on temperature is directly connected to the 
efficiency of an active safety barrier, the Detritiation System, which is due to reduce 
tritium concentration in the confinement atmosphere and keep it a lower pressure than 
the environmental one. On the other hand, the latter limit on pressure is directly related 
to a passive safety barrier such as Tokamak Building: i.e. the design pressure of the inner 
walls shall be such to withstand any design basis accidental scenario. 
 
Future Developments 
From the safety point of view, the designer of the PHTS should take into account both 
cooling schemes analysed in this work comparing advantages and disadvantages, also 
from the operational point of view, of both solutions. However, the possibility to 
perform mitigative actions in case of LOCA of one PHTS circuit is strictly dependent on 
the break size. Therefore a preventive, safety-oriented design of the PHTS and its 
auxiliaries is required in order to minimize the risk of radiological release towards the 
environment. 
 
The separated redundant cooling scheme, proposed in Chapter 5 as alternative HCPB 
PHTS, is able to fulfil all the requirements rising from the normal operation scenario, 
and, at the same time, to incorporate some preventive measures (like the reduction of 
releasable coolant in case of LOCA) that are dictated by safety consideration.  
Further accidental scenarios can be investigated by using the same model proposed in 
this study (both for the reference and alternative layouts): in particular the in-box LOCA 
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and the in-vessel LOCA accident shall be carefully assessed along the DEMO design 
activities. 
As final remark, this layout has been considered for the current Balance of Plant design 
and Safety activities within EUROfusion consortium. 
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Annex I 
FMEA Table 
PBS 
Associated 
Op.Md. Failure Cause Failure Consequences 
 
  
Mitigating Action Event Note 
Function Services Type Action 
            
1-Primary He Cooling System 
(HCS) 
           
1-1-Outboard segment A            
1-1-1-Ring Header feeder A 
(cold leg) 
           
1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at 
process level 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Reactor unavailability plus the following safety concerns: 
Loss of He coolant into building (ex-vessel LOCA); 
Building pressurization; 
Tritium and radioactive products contained in coolant 
released into building; 
Environmental release through building leaks; 
Environmental release through HVAC if not promptly 
isolated 
  Design as SIC SSC; 
Control of operating 
parameters; 
Isolation of faulted 
line; 
Chemical purification 
and tritium removal 
from coolant; 
Building pressure 
relief towards 
expansion volume; 
HVAC isolation; 
Switch-on atmosphere 
DS 
LBO1; 
LBO2 
Half of the 
outboard BK 
cooling 
channels are 
impaired by the 
loss of heat 
transfer 
efficiency of the 
SG line 
      Depressurization of primary loop; 
Reduction of capability to remove plasma heat from FW-
BK segments; 
Switching of safety plasma shutdown; 
FW-BK rupture because thermal and/or mechanical 
(disruption) stress; 
In-vessel LOCA from FW-BK modules; 
VV pressurization; 
Pressure relief to EV 
  Fast Plasma shutdown; 
VV pressure relief 
towards expansion 
volume 
 Plasma 
disruption could 
also occur 
because 
poisoning of the 
plasma for the 
melting of FW 
armour 
material, but in 
case W is used 
this effect is 
improbable 
      TES leakage/rupture within the VV; 
Loss of purge gas into VV; 
Possible pressurization of purge gas system (TES) up to 
VV pressure; 
Possible loss of leak tightness in purge gas system; 
Release of VV activated products ad tritium into Port Cell 
and/or to tritium plant according the leak location in the 
TES circuit 
  Prompt TES isolation; 
Pressure relief in TES 
towards controlled 
volume 
 Complete 
rupture of the 
FW is assumed 
      Possible rupture of Divertor because plasma disruption; 
Ingress of Divertor cooling water in VV; 
VV pressurization due to ingress of water (i.e. case where 
FW-BK maintain integrity); 
VV pressure relief to Expansion Volume 
     
      VV pressurization due to ingress of Helium and water 
(i.e. case where both Divertor and FW-BK loose their 
integrity); 
VV pressure relief to Expansion Volume; 
Water-Be (breeder) reaction and H2 formation; 
Possible H2 explosion in VV or in EV 
  Design EV to contain 
both He and steam 
water mixture 
  
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
169 
1-1-1-2-Outlet from  distributor 
manifold to CPS 
F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at 
process level; 
F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain 
integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS 
lines 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture 
Loss of He coolant into building (ex-vessel LOCA); 
Reactor unavailability plus the safety concerns identified 
above for 1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of primary 
confinement 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
LBO1; 
LBO2 
Half of the 
outboard BK 
cooling 
channels are 
impaired by the 
loss of heat 
transfer 
efficiency of the 
SG line 
      Possible reverse He flow into CPS line; 
Loss of tritium and radioactive products from CPS into 
Vault 
  Provide the line with 
check valve 
  
 F2-2-1-4-2-Provide 
flow in CPS lines 
 NOp Loss of flow in CPS Valve failure to remain 
open; 
Piping clogging 
Loss of capability to purify He coolant; 
Increase of tritium inventory in He coolant; 
Tritium permeation and diffusion; 
Tritium release into building due to permeation; 
Material embrittlement due to tritium diffusion; 
Increase of activated products inventory in He cooling 
piping; 
Increase of gamma radiation fields inside the Vault; 
Workers radiological over-exposure 
  Room tritium 
monitoring; 
Low flow rate alarm; 
Stop plasma 
operations; 
Maintenance 
N/S  
      Reactor Unavailability in long term if failure cause is not 
detected and removed before the tritium contamination 
and/or gamma fild in the vault reaches unacceptable 
values 
     
1-1-1-3-Outlet from  distributor 
manifold to PCS 
F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at 
process level; 
F2-2-1-3-2-Maintain 
integrity of PCS 
loops 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture 
Loss of He coolant into building (ex-vessel LOCA); 
Reactor unavailability plus the safety concerns identified 
above for 1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of primary 
confinement 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
LBO1; 
LBO2 
Half of the 
outboard BK 
cooling 
channels are 
impaired by the 
loss of heat 
transfer 
efficiency of the 
SG line 
 F2-2-1-3-1-Provide 
inventory control in 
He primary loops; 
F1-3-1-Manage 
pressure 
 NOp Loss of flow Valve failure to remain 
open; 
Piping clogging 
Loss of capability to manage operational parameters; 
Possible over-pressurization of primary loop; 
Opening of safety valves towards EV; 
Plasma shutdown;  
Reactor unavailability   
plus the safety concerns identified below for 1-1-1-4-
Pressure Relief in the distributor manifold - Spurious 
opening of relief valve 
  Low flow rate alarm; 
High coolant pressure 
alarm; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Maintenance and 
testing of detectors; 
Redundant control of 
operating parameters 
LBO1; 
LBO2 
 
            
1-1-1-4-Pressure Relief in the 
distributor manifold 
F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at 
process level 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture 
Loss of He coolant into building (ex-vessel LOCA); 
Reactor unavailability plus the safety concerns identified 
above for 1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of primary 
confinement 
   LBO1; 
LBO2 
Half of the 
outboard BK 
cooling 
channels are 
impaired by the 
loss of heat 
transfer 
efficiency of the 
SG line 
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 F1-3-1-Manage 
pressure 
 NOp Loss of pressure 
control 
Spurious opening of 
Relief valves; 
Relief device internal 
leak 
Reactor unavailability plus the following safety concerns: 
Depressurization of primary loop; 
Reduction of capability to remove plasma heat from FW-
BK segments; 
Switching of safe plasma shutdown; 
FW-BK rupture because thermal and/or mechanical 
(disruption) stress; 
In-vessel LOCA from FW-BK modules; 
VV pressurization; 
Pressure relief to Expansion Volume; 
Other consequences due to other PFCs (e.g. Divertor) 
break can follow too as described for "1-1-1-1-Distributor 
Manifold - Loss of confinement" 
  Soft plasma shutdown; 
VV pressure relief 
towards expansion 
volume 
LBO1; 
LBO2 
Plasma 
disruption could 
also occur 
because 
poisoning of the 
plasma for the 
melting of FW 
armour 
material, but in 
case W is used 
this effect is 
improbable 
1-1-2-Segment supply line A 
(48) 
F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops;F1-1-
1-Confine at process 
level 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Piping 
Leak/Rupture;Valve 
Leak/Rupture 
Loss of He coolant into building (ex-vessel 
LOCA);Reactor unavailability plus the safety concerns 
identified above for 1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss 
of primary confinement 
   LBO2  
 F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops 
 NOp Loss of flow Valve failure to remain 
open; 
Piping clogging 
Drying of cooling channels; 
Overheating of BK modules; 
Over-stress due to different thermal expansion; 
BK module break; 
In-vessel LOCA from FW-BK modules; 
VV pressurization; 
Pressure relief to Expansion Volume; 
Reactor unavailability; 
Other safety consequences due to other PFCs (e.g. 
Divertor) break can follow too as described for "1-1-1-1-
Distributor Manifold - Loss of confinement" 
  Design as SIC SSC; 
Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
FB2  
1-1-3-Blanket channels A F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at 
process level 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Break in internal hipping 
joint 
Opening of bypass between adjacent cooling channels; 
Increase of temperature in local zone of the FW-BK 
because the disturbance in coolant flow; 
Possible break due to over thermal-mechanical stress; 
Reactor unavailability plus the in-vessel safety concerns 
identified above for 1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss 
of primary confinement could follow 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
FB3 The opening of 
the bypass 
could be 
progressive 
because the 
impossibility to 
detect the break 
and the high 
pressure inside 
the cooling 
channels 
     External Leak/Rupture 
of welds of manifold 
FW-BK modules; 
External Leak/Rupture 
of FW channels 
Loss of He coolant into VV (in-vessel LOCA); 
Plasma disruption; 
Reactor unavailability plus the in-vessel safety concerns 
identified above for 1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss 
of primary confinement 
  VV pressure relief 
towards expansion 
volume 
LBV1; 
LBV2 
 
     Internal Leak/Rupture of 
welds or channels of 
FW-BK modules 
Loss of He coolant into the FW-BK box; 
Pressurization of FW-BK box to He coolant pressure; 
Pressurization of TES; 
Possible loss of leak tightness in purge gas system; 
Release of Tritium from TES and FW-BK to Port Cell 
and/or to tritium plant according the leak location in the 
TES circuit 
  Monitoring of FW-BK 
box pressure; 
Prompt TES isolation 
to prevent over 
pressurization; 
Pressure relief both of 
FW-BK box and TES 
towards controlled 
expansion volume; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
to prevent overstress 
on FW-BK box, which 
is getting critical 
conditions (8 MPa 
internal pressure, 
vacuum outside) 
LBB1; 
LBB2 
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 F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops 
 NOp Loss of flow Channel clogging Drying of cooling channels; 
Overheating of BK modules; 
Over-stress due to different thermal expansion; 
BK module break; 
In-vessel LOCA from FW-BK modules; 
VV pressurization; 
Pressure relief to Expansion Volume; 
Reactor unavailability; 
Other safety consequences due to other PFCs (e.g. 
Divertor) break can follow too as described for "1-1-1-1-
Distributor Manifold - Loss of confinement" 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
FB3  
1-1-4-Segment return line A 
(48) 
F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at 
process level 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture 
Loss of He coolant into building (ex-vessel LOCA); 
Reactor unavailability plus the safety concerns identified 
above for 1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of primary 
confinement 
   LBO2  
 F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops 
 NOp Loss of flow Valve failure to remain 
open; 
Piping clogging 
Loss of flow in FW-BK modules; 
Overheating and over-pressurization of BK modules; 
Over-stress due to different thermal expansion and over-
pressure; 
FW-BK module break; 
In-vessel LOCA from FW-BK modules; 
VV pressurization; 
Pressure relief to Expansion Volume; 
Reactor unavailability; 
Other safety consequences due to other PFCs (e.g. 
Divertor) break can follow too as described for "1-1-1-1-
Distributor Manifold - Loss of confinement" 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
FB2  
1-1-5-Ring Header collector A 
(hot leg) 
           
1-1-5-1-Collector Manifold F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at 
process level 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Loss of He coolant into building (ex-vessel LOCA); 
Reactor unavailability plus the safety concerns identified 
above for 1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of primary 
confinement 
   LBO1; 
LBO2 
 
1-1-5-2-Inlet from CPS to 
collector manifold 
F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at 
process level; 
F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain 
integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS 
lines 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture 
Loss of He coolant into building (ex-vessel LOCA); 
Reactor unavailability plus the safety concerns identified 
above for 1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of primary 
confinement 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
LBO1; 
LBO2 
Half of the 
outboard BK 
cooling 
channels are 
impaired by the 
loss of heat 
transfer 
efficiency of the 
SG line 
      Possible reverse He flow into CPS line; 
Loss of tritium and radioactive products from CPS into 
Vault 
  Provide the line with 
check valve 
  
 F2-2-1-4-2-Provide 
flow in CPS lines 
 NOp Loss of flow in CPS Valve failure to remain 
open; 
Piping clogging 
Loss of capability to purify He coolant; 
Increase of tritium inventory in He coolant; 
Tritium permeation and diffusion; 
Tritium release into building due to permeation; 
Material embrittlement due to tritium diffusion; 
Increase of activated products inventory in He cooling 
piping; 
Increase of gamma radiation fields inside the Vault; 
Workers radiological over-exposure 
  Room tritium 
monitoring; 
Low flow rate alarm; 
Stop plasma 
operations; 
Maintenance 
N/S  
      Reactor Unavailability in long term if failure cause is not 
detected and removed before the tritium contamination 
and/or gamma fild in the vault reaches unacceptable 
values 
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1-1-5-3-Inlet from PCS to 
collector manifold 
F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at 
process level; 
F2-2-1-3-2-Maintain 
integrity of PCS 
loops 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture 
Loss of He coolant into building (ex-vessel LOCA); 
Reactor unavailability plus the safety concerns identified 
above for 1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of primary 
confinement 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
LBO1; 
LBO2 
Half of the 
outboard BK 
cooling 
channels are 
impaired by the 
loss of heat 
transfer 
efficiency of the 
SG line 
 F2-2-1-3-1-Provide 
inventory control in 
He primary 
loops;F1-3-1-
Manage pressure 
 NOp Loss of flow Valve failure to remain 
open;Piping clogging 
Loss of capability to manage operational 
parameters;Possible de-pressurization of primary 
loop;Increase of temperature in local zone of the FW-BK 
because the disturbance in coolant pressure;Possible 
break due to over thermal-mechanical stress;Reactor 
unavailability plus the in-vessel safety concerns identified 
above for 1-1-1-4-Pressure Relief in the distributor 
manifold - Spurious opening of relief valve 
  Low flow rate 
alarm;High coolant 
pressure alarm;Soft 
plasma 
shutdown;Maintenance 
and testing of 
detectors;Redundant 
control of operating 
parameters 
LBO2  
1-1-6-Cooling trains A (5+1)            
1-1-6-1-Line from Ring Header 
Collector to SG 
F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at 
process level 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Loss of He coolant into building (ex-vessel LOCA); 
Reactor unavailability plus the safety concerns identified 
above for 1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of primary 
confinement; 
In-vessel damage and related safety concerns can be 
limited if faulted SG line is promptly isolated and spare 
SG line switched on (reactor will be in any case out of 
order until vault is decontaminated and failed loop 
repaired or put in safe conditions) 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines 
LBO1; 
LBO2 
Half of the 
outboard BK 
cooling 
channels are 
impaired by the 
loss of heat 
transfer 
efficiency of the 
SG line 
 F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops 
 NOp Loss of flow Valve failure to remain 
open; 
Piping clogging 
Reduction of flow in all FW-BK cooling channels of 
section A of the outboard segments (48); 
Risk to generate over-heating ad over-pressurization of 
primary loop; 
Reactor unavailability if spare SG is not switched on; 
In-vessel damage and related safety concerns (see "1-1-1-
1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of confinement") could 
follow if spare line is not promptly activated 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines 
FB2 Half of the 
outboard BK 
cooling 
channels are 
impaired by the 
loss of heat 
transfer 
efficiency of the 
SG line 
1-1-6-2-Pressure Relief at the 
SG sections 
F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at 
process level 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture 
Loss of He coolant into building (ex-vessel LOCA); 
Reactor unavailability plus the safety concerns identified 
above for 1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of primary 
confinement; 
In-vessel damage and related safety concerns can be 
limited if faulted SG line is promptly isolated and spare 
SG line switched on (reactor will be in any case out of 
order until vault is decontaminated and failed loop 
repaired or put in safe conditions) 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines 
LBO1; 
LBO2 
Half of the 
outboard BK 
cooling 
channels are 
impaired by the 
loss of heat 
transfer 
efficiency of the 
SG line 
 F1-3-1-Manage 
pressure 
 NOp Loss of pressure 
control 
Spurious opening of 
Relief valves; 
Relief device internal 
leak 
Depressurization of primary loop; 
Reactor unavailability plus the safety concerns listed 
above for the "1-1-1-4-Pressure Relief in the distributor 
manifold - Loss of pressure control"; 
In-vessel damage and related safety concerns, as well 
reactor unavailability can be limited if faulted SG line is 
promptly isolated and spare SG line switched on 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines 
LBO1; 
LBO2 
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1-1-6-3-Steam Generator F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at 
process level 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
SG tube leak/rupture Reactor unavailability if faulted SG is not promptly 
isolated and spare SG switched on. 
The following safety concerns can follow too: 
Ingress of water into primary He loop; 
Damage of He circulator; 
Pressurization of primary loop; 
Release of tritium and radioactive products contained in 
primary loop into secondary loop after pressure 
equalization (contamination of secondary loop); 
Primary pressure relief to EV (He and water); 
Risk of Be-water reaction in case of consequential failure 
in breeding blanket cooling channels with H2 production; 
Possible H2 explosion inside EV 
  Sensitive detection of 
tube leaks; 
Isolation of SG in 
secondary and primary 
sides; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Circulator stop; 
Design EV to contain 
both He and steam 
water mixture 
LBO3 Assumed: 
steam/water 
side pressure > 
10 bar of He 
pressure 
      Ingress of He into secondary loop after pressures 
equalization; 
High pressure in Condenser of secondary loop;  
Loss of flow in secondary loop; 
Unavailability and Tritium contamination of secondary 
loop 
     
 F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops 
 NOp Loss of flow SG tube clogging Partial loss of flow in primary loop; 
Risk to generate over-heating ad over-pressurization of 
primary loop; 
Reactor unavailability if clogged SG is not isolated and 
spare SG switched on 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Isolation of SG in 
secondary and primary 
sides; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines; 
N/S SG capacity 
assumed large 
enough to 
withstand 
clogging of 
several tubes 
before 
maintenance 
 F2-2-1-5-Provide 
Heat Sink for BK 
cooling loop 
 NOp Loss of heat removal 
from all SG 
Unavailability of  
turbine loop  
Reactor unavailability; 
See below "2-5-Turbine loop" 
   HB1  
     Unavailability of  SG 
secondary side loop  
Reactor unavailability if faulted SG is not promptly 
isolated and spare SG switched on. 
The following safety concerns can follow too: 
Overheating and overpressurization of primary loops; 
Opening of relief valves of primary loops towards EV; 
Drying of FW-BK cooling channels; 
Over-stress due to different thermal expansion; 
BK module break; 
In-vessel LOCA from FW-BK modules; 
VV pressurization; 
VV pressure relief to VV Expansion Volume; 
Reactor unavailability; 
Other safety consequences due to other PFCs (e.g. 
Divertor) break can follow too as described for "1-1-1-1-
Distributor Manifold - Loss of confinement" 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Isolation of SG in 
secondary and primary 
sides; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
HB2  
1-1-6-4-Line from SG to 
Circulator 
F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at 
process level 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Loss of He coolant into building (ex-vessel LOCA); 
Reactor unavailability; 
Other concerns as the ones described for "1-1-6-1-Line 
from Ring Header Collector to SG" 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines 
LBO1; 
LBO2 
 
 F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops 
 NOp Loss of flow Valve failure to remain 
open; 
Piping clogging 
Reduction of flow in all FW-BK cooling channels of 
section A of the outboard segments (48); 
Risk to generate over-heating ad over-pressurization of 
primary loop; 
Reactor unavailability if spare SG is not switched on; 
In-vessel damage and related safety concerns (see "1-1-1-
1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of confinement") could 
follow if spare line is not promptly activated 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines 
FB2 Half of the 
outboard BK 
cooling 
channels are 
impaired by the 
loss of heat 
transfer 
efficiency of the 
SG line 
1-1-6-5-HCS-Circulator F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at 
process level 
  Loss of primary 
confinement 
Compressor case/seal 
Leak/Rupture 
Loss of He coolant into building (ex-vessel LOCA); 
Reactor unavailability; 
Other concerns as the ones described for "1-1-6-1-Line 
from Ring Header Collector to SG" 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines 
LBO1; 
LBO2 
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 F2-2-1-3-Provide 
pressure control in 
BK cooling loops 
  Loss of flow Circulator trip;I&C 
failure (Erratic 
stop);Loss of local 
power;Loss of 
component cooling 
(circulator trip by 
protection means) 
Reduction of flow in all FW-BK cooling channels of 
section A of the outboard segments (48);Risk to generate 
over-heating ad over-pressurization of primary 
loop;Reactor unavailability if spare SG is not switched 
on;In-vessel damage and related safety concerns (see "1-
1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of confinement") could 
follow if spare line is not promptly activated 
  Redundant control of 
operating 
parameters;Soft 
plasma 
shutdown;Switch on 
spare SG lines 
FB2 Half of the 
outboard BK 
cooling 
channels are 
impaired by the 
loss of heat 
transfer 
efficiency of the 
SG line 
     Short circuiting of the 
cooling flow via the 
defective coolant circuit 
All circulators trip    FB1  
      In-vessel damage and related safety concerns (see "1-1-1-
4-Pressure Relief in the distributor manifold - Spurious 
opening of relief valve") could follow if spare line is not 
activated 
   LBV1; 
LBV2 
 
     Loss of Off Site power; Plasma shutdown; 
Reactor unavailability; 
Loss of flow in all primary and secondary loops; 
FW-BK modules overheatig due to decay heat; 
Decay-heat removal through VV cooling loop 
 Design as 
SIC SSC; 
Redundant 
control of 
operating 
parameters; 
Provide 
cooling 
through 
Emergency 
cooling 
loop to 
remove 
decay heat 
(Plasma is 
self-
terminated) 
Emergency diesel 
generator starts; 
Heat removal through 
emergency cooling 
loop 
AOP1  
1-1-6-6-Circulator by-pass F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at 
process level 
  Loss of primary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture 
Loss of He coolant into building (ex-vessel LOCA); 
Reactor unavailability; 
Other concerns as the ones described for "1-1-6-1-Line 
from Ring Header Collector to SG" 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines 
LBO1; 
LBO2 
 
 F2-2-1-3-Provide 
pressure control in 
BK cooling loops 
  Loss of valve control Valve failure to 
open/close; 
I&C failure (Erratic 
closure) 
Reduced capability to manage operational parameters; 
Risk to generate over-pressurization of primary loop; 
Reactor unavailability if cooling function is not trasferred 
to spare SG; 
  Pressure control 
through PCS; 
High coolant pressure 
alarm; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Maintenance and 
testing of detectors; 
Redundant control of 
operating parameters 
N/S  
      Circulator trip due to flow umbalance    FB2  
      All circulators trip    FB1  
      In-vessel damage and related safety concerns (see "1-1-1-
4-Pressure Relief in the distributor manifold - Spurious 
opening of relief valve") could follow if spare line is not 
activated 
   LBV1; 
LBV2 
 
1-1-6-7-Line from Circulator to  
Ring Header 
F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops; 
F1-1-1-Confine at 
process level 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Loss of He coolant into building (ex-vessel LOCA); 
Reactor unavailability; 
Other concerns as the ones described for "1-1-6-1-Line 
from Ring Header Collector to SG" 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines 
LBO1; 
LBO2 
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 F2-2-1-2-Provide 
flow in BK module 
cooling loops 
 NOp Loss of flow Valve failure to remain 
open; 
Piping clogging 
Reduction of flow in all FW-BK cooling channels of 
section A of the outboard segments (48); 
Risk to generate over-heating ad over-pressurization of 
primary loop; 
Reactor unavailability if spare SG is not switched on; 
In-vessel damage and related safety concerns (see "1-1-1-
1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of confinement") could 
follow if spare line is not promptly activated 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines 
FB2 Half of the 
outboard BK 
cooling 
channels are 
impaired by the 
loss of heat 
transfer 
efficiency of the 
SG line 
1-2-Outboard segment B      As corresponding component of "1-1-Outboard segment 
A" above 
     
1-3-Inboard segment C      As corresponding component of "1-1-Outboard segment 
A" above 
     
1-4-Inboard segment D      As corresponding component of "1-1-Outboard segment 
A" above 
     
2-Secondary water cooling 
circuit 
           
2-1-SG 2nd side loop - 
Outboard A (5+1 lines) 
           
2-1-1-Saturated steam line F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument 
Leak/Rupture; 
Loss of saturated steam into building; 
Building pressurization; 
Release into building of Tritium permeated through SG; 
Environmetal release through building leaks; 
Environmental release through HVAC if not promptly 
isolated; 
Reactor unavailability; 
Loss of heat sink for the primary loop has some delay 
because supplying of water to the SG should continue 
despite the break downstream the SG. So, in-vessel 
damage and related safety concerns can be prevented if 
faulted SG section is isolated and spare SG line switched 
on (reactor will be in any case out of order until vault is 
decontaminated and failed loop repaired or put in safe 
conditions) 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Isolation of SG failed 
loop in secondary and 
primary sides; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines; 
Building pressure 
relief towards 
expansion volume; 
Switch-on atmosphere 
DS 
HB2 For what 
concern the 
unavailability 
event the 
assumption that 
faulted line is 
promtly isolated 
is made. 
      Steam reverse flow from collector to breached section 
can happen in function of line break size. Then, abnormal 
feed of steam to turbine could induce Turbine trip 
because protection intervention;  
Loss of heat sink in all primary loops; 
Plasma disruption and possible in-vessel break of FW-BK 
modules as described as described for "1-1-1-1-
Distributor Manifold - Loss of confinement" 
  Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
  
2-1-2-Separator F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines; 
F3-1-5-Keep 
integrity of water 
lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument 
Leak/Rupture; 
As for 2.1.1 Saturated steam line      
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
176 
 F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of flow Valve failure to remain 
open 
Reactor unavailability if faulted SG is not promptly 
isolated and spare SG switched on.The following safety 
concerns can follow too:Overheating and 
overpressurization of primary loops;Opening of relief 
valves of primary loops towards EV;Drying of FW-BK 
cooling channels;Over-stress due to different thermal 
expansion;BK module break;In-vessel LOCA from FW-
BK modules;VV pressurization;VV pressure relief to VV 
Expansion Volume;Other safety consequences due to 
other PFCs (e.g. Divertor) break can follow too as 
described for "1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of 
confinement" 
  Redundant control of 
operating 
parameters;Isolation of 
SG in secondary and 
primary sides;Switch 
on spare SG lines;Soft 
plasma shutdown 
HB2  
    Flow reduction Flooding of separator Low quality steam; 
Damage to the HP Turbine due to water droplets; 
Possible turbine trip switched by turbine protections (in 
this case plasma is automatically shutdown); 
Reduction in the heat removal from the primary loop; 
Reactor unavailability if faulted SG is not isolated and 
spare SG switched on; 
Other in-vessel damage can occur too if the faulty line is 
not exchanged with the spare SG line 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Isolation of SG in 
secondary and primary 
sides; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
(interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters) 
HB2  
 F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Flow reduction Low water level in the 
separator, e.g. for failure 
in level control, tank 
leak 
Steam in water line; 
Pump cavitation; 
Loss of heat removal from one SG; 
Reactor unavailability if faulted SG is not promptly 
isolated and spare SG switched on. 
The safety concerns identified above for the "1-1-6-3-
Steam Generator - Unavailability of  SG secondary side 
loop cause" can follow too 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Isolation of SG in 
secondary and primary 
sides; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
HB2  
2-1-3-Water line from separator 
to SG 
           
2-1-3-1-Piping upstream pump F3-1-5-Keep 
integrity of water 
lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
As for 2.1.1 Saturated steam line    HB2  
 F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of flow Valve failure to remain 
open; 
I&C failure (Erratic 
closure); 
Piping clogging 
Pump cavitation and trip; 
Loss of heat removal from one SG; 
Reactor unavailability if faulted SG is not promptly 
isolated and spare SG switched on. 
The safety concerns identified above for the "1-1-6-3-
Steam Generator - Unavailability of  SG secondary side 
loop cause" can follow too 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Isolation of SG in 
secondary and primary 
sides; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
HB2  
2-1-3-2-Separator pump F3-1-5-Keep 
integrity of water 
lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
As for 2.1.1 Saturated steam line    HB2  
 F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of flow Pump trip; 
I&C failure (Erratic 
stop); 
Loss of local power; 
Loss of component 
cooling (pump trip by 
protection means) 
As for 2.1.1 Saturated steam line    HB2  
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     Loss of Off Site power; Plasma shutdown; 
Reactor unavailability; 
Loss of flow in all primary and secondary loops; 
FW-BK modules overheatig due to decay heat; 
Decay-heat removal through VV cooling loop 
 Design as 
SIC SSC; 
Redundant 
control of 
operating 
parameters; 
Provide 
cooling 
through 
Emergency 
cooling 
loop to 
remove 
decay heat 
(Plasma is 
self-
terminated) 
Emergency diesel 
generator starts; 
Heat removal through 
emergency cooling 
loop 
AOP1  
2-1-3-3-Piping downstream 
pump 
F3-1-5-Keep 
integrity of water 
lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
As for 2.1.1 Saturated steam line    HB2  
 F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of flow Valve failure to remain 
open; 
I&C failure (Erratic 
closure); 
Piping clogging 
Loss of heat removal from one SG; 
Reactor unavailability if faulted SG is not promptly 
isolated and spare SG switched on. 
The safety concerns identified above for the "1-1-6-3-
Steam Generator - Unavailability of  SG secondary side 
loop cause" can follow too 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Isolation of SG in 
secondary and primary 
sides; 
Switch on spare SG 
lines; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
HB2  
2-1-4-Steam line from separator 
to collector 
F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
    As for 2.1.1 Saturated steam line    HB2  
2-2-SG 2nd side loop - 
Outboard B (5+1 lines) 
     As corresponding component of "2-1-SG 2nd side loop - 
Outboard A (5+1 lines)" above 
     
2-3-SG 2nd side loop - Inboard 
C (2+1 lines) 
     As corresponding component of "2-1-SG 2nd side loop - 
Outboard A (5+1 lines)" above 
     
2-4-SG 2nd side loop - Inboard 
D (2+1 lines) 
     As corresponding component of "2-1-SG 2nd side loop - 
Outboard A (5+1 lines)" above 
     
            
2-5-Turbine loop            
2-5-1-Steam Collector F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Loss of steam into building; 
Building pressurization; 
Release into building of Tritium permeated through SG; 
Environmetal release through building leaks; 
Environmental release through HVAC if not promptly 
isolated; 
Reactor unavailability; 
Loss of heat sink in all primary loops should have some 
delay because supplying of water to the SGs continues 
until water is available in the circuit. So, in-vessel 
damage and related safety concerns can be prevented if 
plasma is safely shutdown 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Building pressure 
relief towards 
expansion volume; 
Switch-on atmosphere 
DS 
HB1  
      Turbine trip because abnormal feed of steam to turbine 
would speed up the loss of heat sink in all primary 
loops;Plasma disruption and possible in-vessel break of 
FW-BK modules as described for "1-1-1-1-Distributor 
Manifold - Loss of confinement" can follow too 
  Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
 In case of 
turbine trip 
protection 
command, both 
turbines should 
be tripped to 
avoid imbalance 
induced by the 
common shaft 
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2-5-2-HP Steam line F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
As for 2-5-1-Steam Collector      
 F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of flow Valve failure to remain 
open (e.g. main steam 
isolation valve, turbine 
control valves); 
I&C failure (Erratic 
closure) 
No steam supplied to the HP and LP Turbines, which trip; 
Loss of heat sink in all primary loops (fast transient); 
Reactor unavailability plus: 
Fast over-pressurization of primary and secondary loops 
if plasma is not promptly shutdown; 
Leaks/ruptures in ex-vessel and in-vessel sections of 
primary loops can occur as well leaks/ruptures in 
secondary circuit; 
Plasma disruption and possible in-vessel break of FW-BK 
modules as described for "1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - 
Loss of confinement" can follow too 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
HB1  
2-5-3-HP Turbine F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Case Leak/Rupture As for 2-5-1-Steam Collector    HB1  
 F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines; 
F3-1-8-Provide 
transformation of 
thermal energy 
conveyed by steam 
in mechanical 
energy 
 NOp Turbine trip Loss of component 
cooling (failure in 
cooling the bearings); 
Shaft breakage; 
Turbine trip for 
protection intervention 
(e.g. overspeed, high 
vibrations, imbalance, 
high temperature, loss of 
external load) 
Loss of heat sink in all primary loops (fast transient); 
Reactor unavailability plus: 
Fast over-pressurization of primary and secondary loops 
if plasma is not promptly shutdown; 
Leaks/ruptures in ex-vessel and in-vessel sections of 
primary loops can occur as well leaks/ruptures in 
secondary circuit; 
Plasma disruption and possible in-vessel break of FW-BK 
modules as described for "1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - 
Loss of confinement" can follow too 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
HB1  
2-5-4-HP Spillage line F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
As for 2-5-1-Steam Collector    HB1  
 F3-1-3-Provide 
temperature and 
quality control in 
steam lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of flow in steam 
line to steam heater 
Channels clogging; 
Valve failure to remain 
open; 
I&C failure (Erratic 
closure); 
Piping clogging; 
HX tube clogging 
Reduced efficiency in providing superheated steam 
towards LP turbine; 
Low steam quality into LP turbine; 
Bleads damage; 
Turbine vibrations and consequent trip because protection 
intervention; 
Reactor unavailability plus: 
Fast over-pressurization of primary and secondary loops 
if plasma is not promptly shutdown; 
Leaks/ruptures in ex-vessel and in-vessel sections of 
primary loops can occur as well leaks/ruptures in 
secondary circuit; 
Plasma disruption and possible in-vessel break of FW-BK 
modules as described for "1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - 
Loss of confinement" can follow too 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
HB1 In case of 
turbine trip 
protection 
command, both 
turbines should 
be tripped to 
avoid imbalance 
induced by the 
common shaft 
 F3-1-7-Provide 
temperature control 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of flow in steam 
line to degasser tank 
Valve failure to remain 
open; 
I&C failure (Erratic 
closure); 
Piping clogging 
Reduced capability to control water temperature; 
Water to SGs provided at higher temperature; 
Reduced efficiency in the thermal cycle and energy 
conversion 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters 
N/S  
2-5-5-LP Steam Line            
2-5-5-1-Piping F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
As for 2-5-1-Steam Collector    HB1  
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 F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of flow Valve failure to remain 
open (e.g. main steam 
isolation valve, turbine 
control valves); 
I&C failure (Erratic 
closure) 
No steam supplied to the LP Turbine, which trip; 
Loss of heat sink in all primary loops (slower transient 
than the case both HP and LP trip because thermal energy 
conversion into mechanical energy continues for a while 
through HP turbine and some  water/steam circulation 
continues through HP spillages and LP turbine bypass); 
Reactor unavailability plus: 
Over-pressurization of primary and secondary loops if 
plasma is not promptly shutdown; 
Leaks/ruptures in ex-vessel and in-vessel sections of 
primary loops can occur as well leaks/ruptures in 
secondary circuit; 
Plasma disruption and possible in-vessel break of FW-BK 
modules as described for "1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - 
Loss of confinement" can follow too 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
HB1  
2-5-5-2-Demister F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines; 
F3-1-3-Provide 
temperature and 
quality control in 
steam lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
As for 2-5-1-Steam Collector    HB1  
 F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines; 
F3-1-3-Provide 
temperature and 
quality control in 
steam lines 
  Loss of flow in water 
line to degasser tank 
Piping clogging; 
Valve stuck closed 
Demister flooding or high water level; 
Low steam quality into LP turbine; 
Bleads damage; 
Turbine vibrations and consequent trip because protection 
intervention; 
Reactor unavailability plus: 
Fast over-pressurization of primary and secondary loops 
if plasma is not promptly shutdown; 
Leaks/ruptures in ex-vessel and in-vessel sections of 
primary loops can occur as well leaks/ruptures in 
secondary circuit; 
Plasma disruption and possible in-vessel break of FW-BK 
modules as described for "1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - 
Loss of confinement" can follow too 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
HB1  
2-5-5-3-Steam Re-heater F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines;F3-1-2-Provide 
flow in steam 
lines;F3-1-3-Provide 
temperature and 
quality control in 
steam lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
HX tube rupture Steam inlet from the high pressure line (HP turbine 
spillage) to the low pressure line (piping to LP 
turbine);Steam supplied to the LP turbine at higher 
pressure than normal operating pressure;Reverse flow of 
steam from Recuperator to last stage of HP turbine;Both 
HP and LP turbines trip because high pressure 
protection;Reverse flow from degasser tank towards 
Recuperator and HP and LP turbines is possible 
too;Reactor unavailability plus safety concerns indicated 
for "2-5-3-HP Turbine - Turbine trip" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs;Soft 
plasma 
shutdown;Interlock 
plasma operation with 
turbine parameters 
(shutdown the plasma 
in case of turbine trip 
or out of order signals) 
HB1  
     HX shell rupture As for 2-5-1-Steam Collector    HB1  
 F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines; 
F3-1-3-Provide 
temperature and 
quality control in 
steam lines 
 NOp Loss of flow in steam 
line to degasser tank 
Piping clogging; 
Valve stuck closed 
No steam spillage from HP turbine; 
Steam to LP turbine provided at higher pressure and 
lower temperature than normal operating values; 
Low steam quality into LP turbine; 
Bleads damage; 
Turbine vibrations; 
Turbine trip because protection intervention (vibration, 
pressure signals); 
Reactor unavailability plus safety concerns indicated for 
"2-5-3-HP Turbine - Turbine trip" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
HB1  
2-5-6-LP Turbine F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Case Leak/Rupture As for 2-5-1-Steam Collector    HB1  
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
180 
 F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines; 
F3-1-8-Provide 
transformation of 
thermal energy 
conveyed by steam 
in mechanical 
energy 
 NOp Turbine trip Loss of component 
cooling (failure in 
cooling the bearings); 
Turbines trip for 
protection intervention 
(e.g. overspeed, high 
vibrations, imbalance, 
high temperature, loss of 
external load) 
Loss of heat sink in all primary loops (fast transient); 
Reactor unavailability plus safety concerns indicated for 
"2-5-3-HP Turbine - Turbine trip" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
HB1  
2-5-7-Generator F3-1-8-Provide 
transformation of 
thermal energy 
conveyed by steam 
in mechanical 
energy; 
F3-1-9-Provide 
transformation of 
turbine mechanical 
energy into electric 
energy 
 NOp Loss of external load Power network failure Turbine overspeed; 
Turbine trip because protection intervention; 
Reactor unavailability plus safety concerns indicated for 
"2-5-3-HP Turbine - Turbine trip" 
  Use of dummy load 
(e.g. resistors); 
Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
HB1 In case of 
turbine trip 
protection 
command, both 
turbines should 
be tripped to 
avoid imbalance 
induced by the 
common shaft 
    Generator damage Short circuit in the 
stator; 
Insulation, mechanical, 
thermal and bearing 
damages 
Possible stop of rotator; 
Possible stop of turbine shaft; 
Turbine trip because protection intervention; 
Reactor unavailability plus safety concerns indicated for 
"2-5-3-HP Turbine - Turbine trip" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
HB1 In case of 
turbine trip 
protection 
command, both 
turbines should 
be tripped to 
avoid imbalance 
induced by the 
common shaft 
2-5-8-LP spillage 1st stage line 
(to degasser tank) 
F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement in the 
line to degasser tank 
(steam pressure > 
atmospheric pressure) 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
As for 2-5-1-Steam Collector    HB1  
 F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines; 
F3-1-7-Provide 
temperature control 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of flow Valve failure to remain 
open; 
I&C failure (Erratic 
closure); 
Piping clogging 
Reduced capability to control water temperature; 
Water to SGs provided at lower temperature; 
Reduced efficiency in the thermal cycle and energy 
conversion 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters 
N/S  
2-5-9-LP spillage 2nd&3rd 
stage lines (to recuperators) 
F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement (steam 
pressure < 
atmospheric pressure) 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Ingress of air into steam loop towards LP turbine and 
condenser; 
Loss of condenser vacuum; 
Turbine trip for protection intervention (high pressure 
control); 
Reactor unavailability plus safety concerns indicated for 
"2-5-3-HP Turbine - Turbine trip" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
HB1 In case of 
turbine trip 
protection 
command, both 
turbines should 
be tripped to 
avoid imbalance 
induced by the 
common shaft 
2-5-10-Turbine exhaust line F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Valve Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Ingress of air into steam loop towards LP turbine and 
condenser; 
Loss of condenser vacuum; 
Turbine trip for protection intervention (high pressure 
control); 
Reactor unavailability plus safety concerns indicated for 
"2-5-3-HP Turbine - Turbine trip" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
HB1  
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 F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of flow Valve failure to remain 
open; 
I&C failure (Erratic 
closure); 
Piping clogging 
Steam pressurization in the LP turbine; 
Turbine trip for protection intervention (high pressure 
control); 
Reactor unavailability plus safety concerns indicated for 
"2-5-3-HP Turbine - Turbine trip" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
HB1 In case of 
turbine trip 
protection 
command, both 
turbines should 
be tripped to 
avoid imbalance 
induced by the 
common shaft 
2-5-11-Condenser            
2-5-11-1-Condenser vessel F3-1-4-1-Provide 
condenser 
vacuum;F3-1-1-
Keep integrity of 
steam lines;F3-1-5-
Keep integrity of 
water lines;F3-1-2-
Provide flow in 
steam lines;F3-1-6-
Provide flow in 
water lines;F3-1-4-
Provide steam 
condensation 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Vessel 
Leak/Rupture;Instrument 
Leak/Rupture 
Ingress of air into condenser;Loss of condenser 
vacuum;Turbine trip for protection intervention (high 
pressure control);Reactor unavailability plus safety 
concerns indicated for "2-5-3-HP Turbine - Turbine trip" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs;Soft 
plasma 
shutdown;Interlock 
plasma operation with 
turbine parameters 
(shutdown the plasma 
in case of turbine trip 
or out of order signals) 
HB1  
 F3-1-4-Provide 
steam condensation 
 NOp Loss of vacuum Vacuum pump trip/Loss 
of flow of ejector motive 
fluid; 
Loss of flow in water 
coolant loop of 
condenser; 
Condenser Flooding 
(erratic level control); 
Loss of heat sink 
Turbine trip for protection intervention (high pressure 
control); 
Reactor unavailability plus safety concerns indicated for 
"2-5-3-HP Turbine - Turbine trip" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
HB1  
     Leakage from water 
coolant tubing inside 
condenser; 
Ingress of water coolant into condenser; 
Loss of condenser vacuum; 
Turbine trip for protection intervention (high pressure 
control); 
Reactor unavailability plus safety concerns indicated for 
"2-5-3-HP Turbine - Turbine trip" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
HB1  
2-5-11-2-Vacuum pumping F3-1-4-1-Provide 
condenser vacuum; 
F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines; 
F3-1-5-Keep 
integrity of water 
lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Pump Leak/Rupture As for "2-5-11-1-Condenser vessel - Loss of secondary 
confinement" 
   HB1  
    Loss of flow in 
vacuum pumping line 
Vacuum pump trip/Loss 
of flow of ejector motive 
fluid 
As for "2-5-11-1-Condenser vessel - Loss of vacuum"    HB1  
2-5-11-3-chilling water F3-1-4-1-Provide 
condenser vacuum 
 NOp Loss of Heat Sink Pump trip; 
Valve failure to remain 
open; 
I&C failure (Erratic 
closure); 
Piping clogging; 
Condenser tubes 
clogging 
As for "2-5-11-1-Condenser vessel - Loss of vacuum"    HB1  
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2-5-11-4-Condenser Pump F3-1-5-Keep 
integrity of water 
lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Pump Leak/Rupture; 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Loss of condensed water into Vault; 
Emptying of condensed sump; 
Pump cavitation and trip because low liquid head at the 
pump inlet (in case of rotative pump); 
No water supply to SGs; 
Ingress of air into condenser; 
Loss of condenser vacuum; 
Turbine trip for protection intervention (high pressure 
control); 
Reactor unavailability plus safety concerns indicated for 
"2-5-3-HP Turbine - Turbine trip" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
HB1  
 F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of flow Pump trip; 
Valve failure to remain 
open; 
I&C failure (Erratic 
pump stop or valve 
closure) 
No water supply to SGs, heat-up of primary loops; 
a) No water removal from condenser, which will get 
flooding conditions; 
b) No cool down and condensation of steam from LP 
spillage 2nd&3rd Lines; 
c) Steam supplied to the condenser sump; 
Loss of condenser vacuum for both events a) and c); 
Turbine trip for protection intervention (high pressure 
control); 
Reactor unavailability plus safety concerns indicated for 
"2-5-3-HP Turbine - Turbine trip" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
HB1  
2-5-12-Condensate line            
2-5-12-1-Piping F3-1-5-Keep 
integrity of water 
lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Loss of water into Vault; 
Emptying of degasser tank; 
Cavitation of pump feeding Separators and its trip 
because low liquid head at the pump inlet; 
No water supply to SGs; 
Heating up of all primary loops; 
Reactor unavailability plus the safety concerns identified 
above for "1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of 
primary confinement" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
HB1  
 F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of flow Valve failure to remain 
open; 
I&C failure (Erratic 
valve closure) 
As for "2-5-11-4-Condenser Pump - Loss of flow"    HB1  
2-5-12-2-LT Recuperator F3-1-5-Keep 
integrity of water 
lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
HX shell Leak/Rupture As for "2-5-12-1-Piping - Loss of secondary 
confinement" 
   HB1  
 F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Reduced flow Recuperator tube 
Leak/Rupture 
Water from heat sink cooling loop leak towards steam 
line or viceversa condensed water release towards head 
sink loop; 
Problems in control water inventory and chemical 
properties in secondary loop; 
Possible damage or failure in the loop in the long term 
   N/S  
2-5-12-3-MT Recuperator F3-1-5-Keep 
integrity of water 
lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
HX shell Leak/Rupture As for "2-5-12-1-Piping - Loss of secondary 
confinement" 
   HB1  
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 F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of flow Recuperator tube 
Leak/Rupture 
Water leak towards steam line and LP turbine 
stages;Bleads damage;Turbine vibrations and consequent 
trip because protection intervention;Reactor 
unavailability plus safety concerns indicated for "2-5-3-
HP Turbine - Turbine trip" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs;Soft 
plasma 
shutdown;Interlock 
plasma operation with 
turbine parameters 
(shutdown the plasma 
in case of turbine trip 
or out of order signals) 
HB1  
2-5-12-4-HT Recuperator      As for 2-5-12-3-MT Recuperator    HB1  
2-5-12-5-Degasser tank F3-1-5-Keep 
integrity of water 
lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Tank Leak/Rupture As for "2-5-12-1-Piping - Loss of secondary 
confinement" 
   HB1  
 F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of flow in steam 
distribution 
Clogging; 
Inlet valve - failure to 
remain open 
Reduced gas stripping; 
Increase of O2 and other gases dissolved in the 
water/steam; 
Icrease of corrosion products and damage to the circuit 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters 
N/S  
2-5-12-6-Water pump F3-1-5-Keep 
integrity of water 
lines; 
F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement upstream 
the impeller 
Pump Leak/Rupture; 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Loss of water into Vault; 
Ingress of air towards impeller; 
Cavitation of pump; 
No water supply to SGs; 
Heating up of all primary loops; 
Reactor unavailability plus the safety concerns identified 
above for "1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of 
primary confinement" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
HB1  
    Loss of secondary 
confinement 
downstream the 
impeller 
Pump Leak/Rupture; 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Loss of water into Vault; 
Reduced water supply to SGs; 
Heating up of all primary loops; 
Reactor unavailability plus the safety concerns identified 
above for "1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of 
primary confinement" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
HB1  
 F3-1-6-Provide flow 
in water lines 
 NOp Loss of flow Pump trip (motor or 
impeller failure, loss of 
chilling water, etc.); 
Valve failure to remain 
open; 
I&C failure (Erratic 
pump stop or valve 
closure) 
No water supply to SGs; 
Heating up of all primary loops; 
Reactor unavailability plus the safety concerns identified 
above for "1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of 
primary confinement" 
  Pressure relief in 
primary and secondary 
loops towards 
controlled EVs; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
HB1  
2-5-13-Water Distributor F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Loss of water into building; 
Depressurization and emptying of separators; 
Reverse flow of steam and water from separators to 
collector and into vault; 
Building pressurization; 
Release into building of Tritium contained in the coolant 
permeated through SG; 
Environmetal release through building leaks; 
Environmental release through HVAC if not promptly 
isolated; 
Reactor unavailability plus the safety concerns identified 
above for "1-1-1-1-Distributor Manifold - Loss of 
primary confinement" 
  Design as SIC SSC; 
Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown; 
Building pressure 
relief towards 
expansion volume; 
Switch-on atmosphere 
DS 
HB1  
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      Turbine trip because abnormal feed of steam to turbine 
would speed up the loss of heat sink in all primary loops 
  Interlock plasma 
operation with turbine 
parameters (shutdown 
the plasma in case of 
turbine trip or out of 
order signals) 
 In case of 
turbine trip 
protection 
command, both 
turbines should 
be tripped to 
avoid imbalance 
induced by the 
common shaft 
2-5-13-1-Outlet to Outboard A 
SG (6 lines) 
F3-1-1-Keep 
integrity of steam 
lines; 
F3-1-2-Provide flow 
in steam lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
As for 2-5-13-Water Distributor    HB1  
2-5-13-2-Outlet to Outboard B 
SG (6 lines) 
     As Outlet to Outboard A    HB1  
2-5-13-3-Outlet to Inboard C 
SG (3 lines) 
     As Outlet to Outboard A    HB1  
2-5-13-4-Outlet to Inboard D 
SG (3 lines) 
     As Outlet to Outboard A    HB1  
3-Pressure Control System            
3-1-PCS - Storage Tank F2-2-1-3-1-Provide 
inventory control in 
He primary loops; 
F2-2-1-3-2-Maintain 
integrity of PCS 
loops; 
F2-2-1-3-3-Provide 
coolant pressure 
control 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Vessel Leak/Rupture; 
Piping Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Loss of He coolant into building (Vault); 
Building pressurization; 
Tritium and radioactive products contained in coolant 
released into building; 
Environmetal release through building leaks; 
Environmental release through HVAC if not promptly 
isolated; 
Increase of ORE for recovery actions; 
Reactor shutdown on safety alarms; 
Loss of capability to provide on demand addition of 
helium into primary circuit; 
Reactor unavailability until the vault is decontaminated 
and failed loop repaired or put in safe conditions 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Chemical purification 
and tritium removal 
from coolant; 
Building pressure 
relief towards 
expansion volume; 
Switch-on atmosphere 
DS 
LBO2 Unavailability 
concerns can be 
reduced or 
eliminated in 
case 
redundancy of 
storage tanks is 
used and in case 
it is done 
through 
physical 
separation of 
the rooms 
hosting the 
redundant tanks 
 F2-2-1-3-1-Provide 
inventory control in 
He primary loops; 
F2-2-1-3-3-Provide 
coolant pressure 
control 
 NOp Loss of He flow 
between PCS tanks 
Spurious opening of 
Relief valves 
Emptying / depressurization of tank; 
Loss of capability to provide on demand addition or 
reduction of helium inventory into/from primary circuit; 
Failure to control primary circuit pressure; 
Reactor shutdown on safety alarm; 
Reactor unavailability 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Redundant storage 
tank in each PCS; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
N/S Credit has given 
to the capability 
in detecting the 
low pressure in 
the tank and 
shutdown the 
plasma before 
occurrence of 
aggravating 
failures 
3-2-PCS - Buffer Tank      As for 3-1-PCS - Storage Tank      
3-3-PCS - Source Tank      As for 3-1-PCS - Storage Tank      
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3-4-PCS - Helium compressor F2-2-1-3-1-Provide 
inventory control in 
He primary 
loops;F2-2-1-3-2-
Maintain integrity of 
PCS loops;F2-2-1-3-
3-Provide coolant 
pressure control 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Case Leak/Rupture;Joint 
Leak/Rupture;Instrument 
Leak/Rupture 
Loss of He coolant into building (Vault);Building 
pressurization;Tritium and radioactive products contained 
in coolant released into building;Environmetal release 
through building leaks;Environmental release through 
HVAC if not promptly isolated;Increase of ORE for 
recovery actions;Reactor shutdown on safety alarms;Loss 
of capability to provide on demand addition of helium 
into primary circuit;Reactor unavailability until the vault 
is decontaminated and failed loop repaired or put in safe 
conditions;Safety concerns identified above for "1-1-1-1-
Distributor Manifold - Loss of primary confinement" can 
follow if the PCS is not isolated from the primary loop 
  Redundant control of 
operating 
parameters;Soft 
plasma shutdown 
LBO1;LBO2 Half of the 
outboard BK 
cooling 
channels are 
impaired by the 
loss of heat 
transfer 
efficiency of the 
SG line 
 F2-2-1-3-1-Provide 
inventory control in 
He primary loops; 
F2-2-1-3-3-Provide 
coolant pressure 
control; 
F2-2-1-3-4-Provide 
flow in PCS loops 
 NOp Loss of compressor 
capacity 
Compressor trip; 
I&C failure; 
Loss of power supply; 
In/Out valve fail to open 
or remain open 
Loss of capability to transfer He coolant between PCS 
tanks; 
Loss of capability to provide on demand addition or 
reduction of helium inventory into/from primary circuit; 
Failure to control primary circuit pressure; 
Reactor shutdown on safety alarm; 
Reactor unavailability 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
N/S Credit has given 
to the capability 
in detecting the 
low or high 
pressure in PCS 
tanks and in 
primary loops. 
Then, in 
shutdown the 
plasma before 
occurrence of 
aggravating 
failures 
3-5-Piping  in the Pressure 
Control System 
F2-2-1-3-1-Provide 
inventory control in 
He primary loops; 
F2-2-1-3-2-Maintain 
integrity of PCS 
loops; 
F2-2-1-3-3-Provide 
coolant pressure 
control 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture As for "3-4-PCS - Helium compressor - Loss of primary 
confinement" 
   LBO1; 
LBO2 
 
3-6-Valves in the Pressure 
Control System (25) 
F2-2-1-3-1-Provide 
inventory control in 
He primary loops; 
F2-2-1-3-2-Maintain 
integrity of PCS 
loops; 
F2-2-1-3-3-Provide 
coolant pressure 
control 
 NOp Loss of primary 
confinement 
Valve Leak/Rupture As for "3-4-PCS - Helium compressor - Loss of primary 
confinement" 
   LBO2  
D. Carloni -2015 
Thermal Hydraulic and Safety Analyses for Fusion Reactor PHTSs 
 
186 
 F2-2-1-3-1-Provide 
inventory control in 
He primary loops; 
F2-2-1-3-3-Provide 
coolant pressure 
control; 
F2-2-1-3-4-Provide 
flow in PCS loops 
 NOp Loss of He flow 
between PCS tanks 
and between tanks and 
primary loop 
Valve failure to 
open/close; 
I&C Erratic In/Out 
signal; 
Valve internal leak 
Loss of capability to provide on demand addition or 
reduction of helium inventory into/from primary circuit; 
Failure to control primary circuit pressure; 
Possible over-pressurization of primary loop; 
Opening of primary loop safety valves towards EV; 
Plasma shutdown;  
Reactor unavailability   
plus the safety concerns identified for "1-1-1-4-Pressure 
Relief in the distributor manifold - Spurious opening of 
relief valve" 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
LBO2 Sufficient time 
should be 
available to 
prevent 
occurrence of 
aggravating 
failures by 
detecting the 
low or high 
pressure in PCS 
tanks and in 
primary loops. 
Then, in safely 
shutdown the 
plasma 
 F2-2-1-3-1-Provide 
inventory control in 
He primary loops; 
F2-2-1-3-3-Provide 
coolant pressure 
control 
 NOp Loss of pressure 
control 
Spurious opening or 
internal leak of valve 
isolating high pressure 
coolant from empty tank 
(depressurization tank, 
e.g. buffer tank) 
Ubnormal depressurization of  primary circuit; 
Reactor unavailability 
plus the safety concerns identified for "1-1-1-4-Pressure 
Relief in the distributor manifold - Spurious opening of 
relief valve" 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
LBO2 Sufficient time 
should be 
available to 
prevent 
occurrence of 
aggravating 
failures by 
detecting the 
low or high 
pressure in PCS 
tanks and in 
primary loops. 
Then, in safely 
shutdown the 
plasma 
4-Coolant Purification System            
4-1-Water Separator F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain 
integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS 
lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide 
flow in CPS lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement (External 
leak from the gas 
stream volume) 
Seal failure; 
Weld failure 
Loss of He coolant into building (Vault); 
Building pressurization; 
Tritium and radioactive products contained in coolant 
released into building; 
Environmetal release through building leaks; 
Environmental release through HVAC if not promptly 
isolated; 
Increase of ORE for recovery actions; 
Reactor shutdown on safety alarms; 
Reactor unavailability until the vault is decontaminated 
and failed loop repaired or put in safe conditions; 
Safety concerns identified above for "1-1-1-1-Distributor 
Manifold - Loss of primary confinement" can follow if 
the CPS is not isolated from the primary loop 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Tritium monitoring; 
Isolation of water 
separator; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
LBO1; 
LBO2; 
TBO2 
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 F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain 
integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS 
lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide 
flow in CPS lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement (External 
leak from the water 
sump) 
Seal failure; 
Weld failure 
Loss of tritiated water into the vault; 
Loss of He coolant into the Vault if the leak from the 
sump is not repaired before its emptying or the separator 
is not isolated; 
As for the previous failure "Loss of secondary 
confinement (External leak from the gas stream volume)" 
can follow 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Tritium monitoring; 
Isolation of water 
separator; 
Soft plasma shutdown 
LBO1; 
LBO2 
In this case, 
besides the 
tritium currently 
contained in the 
gaseous stream, 
the tritium 
accumulated in 
the separator 
after several 
hours of 
operations 
could be 
released in the 
vault. 
Furthermore, it 
is in the more 
hazardous HTO 
form 
 F2-2-1-4-4-Provide 
temperature and 
quality control in 
CPS lines 
 NOp Failure in condensing 
water 
Loss of water separator 
heat sink (i.e. failure in 
chilling water 
system);Clogging of 
cooling tubes 
Loss of capability to remove possible high content of  
water from He coolant;Possible damage of compressors 
blades;Possible reactor unavailability because failure of 
compressors;Reduced capability to detritiate HCS by 
removing tritiated water;Increase of tritium permeation 
from HCS to building;Increase of ORE 
  Redundant control of 
operating 
parameters;Tritium 
monitoring;Isolation of 
failed 
CPS;Maintenance 
N/S  
 F2-2-1-4-4-Provide 
temperature and 
quality control in 
CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain 
integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS 
lines 
 NOp Loss of confinement 
barrier between 
primary He coolant 
and chilling water of 
separator heat sink 
Water tube 
Leak/Rupture; 
Weld failure 
He coolant released into chilling water system; 
Tritium and activated products released from primary 
loop into chilling water system; 
Increase of ORE and risk for evironmental release; 
Depressurization of primary loop; 
Ingress of water into CPS and primary He loop after 
pressure equalization if faulted CPS is not isolated; 
Damage of He circulators blades; 
Risk of Be-water reaction in case of consequential failure 
in breeding blanket cooling channels with H2 production; 
Possible H2 explosion inside EV; 
 
Reactor unavailability because safety control intervention 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Tritium monitoring; 
Isolation of failed CPS 
or just failed water 
separator; 
Maintenance 
LBO3  
            
4-2-Heater-2a F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain 
integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS 
lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide 
flow in CPS lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Vessel Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Consequences as the ones listed for the "4-1-Water 
Separator - Loss of secondary confinement (External leak 
from the gas stream volume)" 
   LBO1; 
LBO2 
 
 
F2-2-1-4-4-Provide 
temperature and 
quality control in 
CPS lines 
 NOp Loss of temperature 
control 
Resistor rupture; 
Loss of power supply; 
I&C failure 
Reduced capability to oxidize H and T contained in the 
He stream; 
Loss of CPS effectiveness; 
Increase of tritium accumulated in HCS; 
Increase of tritium permeation from HCS to building; 
Increase of ORE 
  Controlled access into 
HCS loop areas; 
Tritium monitoring; 
Maintenance 
N/S  
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4-3-Catalytic oxidizer F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain 
integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS 
lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide 
flow in CPS lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Vessel Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Consequences as the ones listed for the "4-1-Water 
Separator - Loss of secondary confinement (External leak 
from the gas stream volume)" 
   LBO1; 
LBO2 
 
4-3-Catalytic oxidizer F2-2-1-4-5-Provide 
detritiation in CPS 
line 
 NOp Loss of capability to 
oxidyze hydrogen 
isotopes 
Oxidizer deterioration 
(e.g. aging, dirtying) 
Reduced capability to oxidize H and T contained in the 
He stream; 
Loss of CPS effectiveness; 
Increase of tritium accumulated in HCS; 
Increase of tritium permeation from HCS to building; 
Increase of ORE 
  Periodical 
replacement; 
Controlled access into 
HCS loop areas; 
Tritium monitoring 
N/S  
4-4-Water Cooler F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain 
integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS 
lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide 
flow in CPS lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
HX Shell Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Consequences as the ones listed for the "4-1-Water 
Separator - Loss of secondary confinement (External leak 
from the gas stream volume)" 
   LBO1; 
LBO2 
 
 F2-2-1-4-4-Provide 
temperature and 
quality control in 
CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain 
integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS 
lines 
 NOp Loss of confinement 
barrier between 
primary He coolant 
and chilling water of 
cooler heat sink 
Water tube 
Leak/Rupture; 
Weld failure 
Consequences as the ones listed for the "4-1-Water 
Separator - Loss of confinement barrier between primary 
He coolant and chilling water of separator heat sink" 
   LBO3  
 F2-2-1-4-4-Provide 
temperature and 
quality control in 
CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-5-Provide 
detritiation in CPS 
line 
 NOp Loss of capability to 
cool down the He gas 
stream to Adsorbers 
Loss of water separator 
heat sink (i.e. failure in 
chilling water system); 
Clogging of cooling 
tubes 
Heating up of "CPS-Adsorber-6a/6b"; 
Release of water content and gaseous impurities to outlet 
stream; 
Loss of CPS effectiveness; 
Increase of tritium accumulated in HCS; 
Increase of tritium permeation from HCS to building; 
Increase of ORE 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Tritium monitoring; 
Isolation of failed 
CPS; 
Maintenance 
N/S  
4-5-Blower F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain 
integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS 
lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide 
flow in CPS lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement when not 
isolated 
Case Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Consequences as the ones listed for the "4-1-Water 
Separator - Loss of secondary confinement (External leak 
from the gas stream volume)" 
   LBO1; 
LBO2 
 
 F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain 
integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS 
lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide 
flow in CPS lines 
 NOp Loss of flow Circulator trip; 
I&C failure (Erratic 
stop); 
Loss of local power; 
Loss of component 
cooling (circulator trip 
by protection means) 
Reduced flow in CPS; 
Reduced CPS effectiveness; 
Increase of tritium accumulated in HCS; 
Increase of ORE for recovery actions 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Tritium monitoring; 
Isolation of failed 
CPS; 
Maintenance 
N/S This blower 
should operate 
only on demand 
in the case, 
increased 
prevalence is 
required 
4-6-Adsorbers: 2 Molecular 
Sieve Beds 
F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain 
integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS 
lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide 
flow in CPS lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Vessel Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Consequences as the ones listed for the "4-1-Water 
Separator - Loss of secondary confinement (External leak 
from the gas stream volume)" 
   LBO1; 
LBO2; 
TBO2 
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 F2-2-1-4-5-Provide 
detritiation in CPS 
line 
 NOp Loss of capability to 
adsorb water content 
Molecular bed 
deterioration (e.g. aging, 
dirtying) 
Loss of capability to trap  water content and impurities 
from the gas stream; 
Loss of CPS effectiveness; 
Increase of tritium accumulated in HCS; 
Increase of ORE for recovery actions 
  Periodical 
replacement; 
Isolation of 
deteriorated Adsorber; 
Activation of 
redundant Adsorber; 
Controlled access into 
HCS loop areas; 
Tritium monitoring 
N/S  
 F2-2-1-4-4-Provide 
temperature and 
quality control in 
CPS lines 
 NOp Spurious heating-up of 
the He stream 
Spurious activation of 
heater used for adsorber 
regeneration 
Heating up of "CPS-Adsorber-6a/6b"; 
Release of water content and gaseous impurities to outlet 
stream; 
Loss of CPS effectiveness; 
Increase of tritium accumulated in HCS; 
Increase of tritium permeation from HCS to building; 
Increase of ORE for recovery actions 
  Setting of interlocks 
during operations; 
Isolation of CPS from 
HCS; 
Isolation of failed 
Adsorber; 
Activation of 
redundant Adsorber 
N/S  
4-7-Heater-2b F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain 
integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS 
lines;F2-2-1-4-2-
Provide flow in CPS 
lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Vessel 
Leak/Rupture;Instrument 
Leak/Rupture 
Consequences as the ones listed for the "4-1-Water 
Separator - Loss of secondary confinement (External leak 
from the gas stream volume)" 
   LBO1;LBO2  
 
F2-2-1-4-4-Provide 
temperature and 
quality control in 
CPS lines 
 NOp Loss of temperature 
control 
Resistor rupture; 
Loss of power supply; 
I&C failure 
Return pure He into the main cooling loop at room 
temperature; 
Disturbance in HCS parameters 
   N/S  
4-8-Relief Tank F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain 
integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS 
lines; 
F2-2-1-4-5-Provide 
detritiation in CPS 
line 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Tank Leak/Rupture; 
Instrument Leak/Rupture 
Consequences as the ones listed for the "4-1-Water 
Separator - Loss of secondary confinement (External leak 
from the gas stream volume)" 
   LBO1; 
LBO2; 
TBO2 
 
4-9-Helium Make-up Unit F2-2-1-4-4-Provide 
temperature and 
quality control in 
CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-5-Provide 
detritiation in CPS 
line 
 NOp Fail to operate: 
addition of H2 low 
with respect to design 
parameters 
Control system failure; 
Ancillary system failure 
Loss of capability to fix tritium in HT; 
Increase of tritium permeation from HCS to building; 
Increase of ORE 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Tritium monitoring; 
Isolation of failed 
CPS; 
Maintenance 
N/S  
4-9-Helium Make-up Unit F2-2-1-4-4-Provide 
temperature and 
quality control in 
CPS lines; 
F2-2-1-4-5-Provide 
detritiation in CPS 
line 
 NOp Fail to operate: 
addition of H2O low 
with respect to design 
parameters 
Control system failure; 
Ancillary system failure 
Loss of capability to oxidize internal TBM and HCS 
surfaces in order to reduce tritium permeation; 
Increase of tritium permeation from HCS to building; 
Increase of ORE 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Tritium monitoring; 
Isolation of failed 
CPS; 
Maintenance 
N/S  
4-10-Valves needed to operate 
the circuit (26) 
F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain 
integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS 
lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide 
flow in CPS lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Valve Leak/Rupture Consequences as the ones listed for the "4-1-Water 
Separator - Loss of secondary confinement (External leak 
from the gas stream volume)" 
   LBO2  
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 F2-2-1-4-2-Provide 
flow in CPS lines 
 NOp Loss of flow Valve failure to 
open/close; 
I&C Erratic In/Out 
signal 
Loss of CPS effectiveness; 
Increase of tritium accumulated in HCS; 
Increase of tritium permeation from HCS to building; 
Increase of ORE 
  Redundant control of 
operating parameters; 
Tritium monitoring; 
Isolation of failed 
CPS; 
Maintenance 
LBO2 Valves here 
considered are 
the ones open 
during NOp 
4-11-Piping  in the Coolant 
Purification System 
F2-2-1-4-1-Maintain 
integrity of coolant 
containment in CPS 
lines; 
F2-2-1-4-2-Provide 
flow in CPS lines 
 NOp Loss of secondary 
confinement 
Piping Leak/Rupture Consequences as the ones listed for the "4-1-Water 
Separator - Loss of secondary confinement (External leak 
from the gas stream volume)" 
   LBO1; 
LBO2 
 
 
